CJCS MAJID HOSTS CENTCOM CMDR PETRAEUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003595 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK SUBJECT: CJCS MAJID HOSTS CENTCOM CMDR PETRAEUS Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. During a November 3 meeting and lunch, CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Tariq Majid discussed bilateral relations, the need to improve military-military cooperation, and Pakistan's efforts to combat extremism. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Majid met with and hosted lunch November 3 for Ambassador and CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus. Also attending were State Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher, Office of Defense Representative Pakistan Rear Admiral LeFever, CENTCOM J-3 MG Jones, CENTCOM POLAD Gfoeller, CENTCOM Colonel Bell, and polcouns (notetaker). ¶3. (C) Chairman Majid began with a review of what he termed positive developments in these "eventful times." They included improved Pakistani relations with India despite an increase in Line of Control violations in Kashmir, the joint parliamentary resolution against extremism, the Pak-Afghan mini-jirga that took place October 27-28 in Islamabad, the meeting in Turkey between PM Gilani and President Karzai, and the success of the ongoing military action in Bajaur. Still, he assessed, Afghanistan remained in a worrisome state of flux. ¶4. (C) Petraeus reviewed recent progress in the CENTCOM area of operations. Four years ago, Saudi Arabia faced an existential threat from militants but has made enormous strides in bringing extremism under control. There had been no major attacks on the U.S. or Europe on the scale of those that occurred on 9/11. There were better controls on one-way travel by military age males from North Africa, Libya, Morocco, and Egypt to Damascus, Syria. The situation in Iraq had improved significantly. Petraeus said he had been encouraged by Chief of Army Staff General Kayani's briefing on the Pakistani military campaign plan against extremists in the border region. He warned, however, that as the Pakistani military had more success against militants, there would be repercussions from Baitullah Mehsud and others; things would get harder before they got easier. ¶5. (C) Petraeus explained the challenges the U.S. military had faced in the effort to change its doctrine, training and tactics to learn COIN and develop stabilization capabilities while preserving its fighting capability. He highlighted the need for integrated intelligence operations that allowed everyone to share intelligence critical to the battlefield. As an example, he explained the complex inter-cooperation of intelligence and forces used to support operations in Sadr City, Iraq, in March and April 2008. Majid agreed on the importance of shared intelligence and noted that Pakistan still suffers from compartmentalized intelligence collection; it takes, he said, at least four hours from collection to action to launch an air attack against a target, even if the Pakistan Air Force is ready in advance. ¶6. (C) Petraeus recognized that Iraq and Pakistan were very different situations, but there were lessons learned there that could apply in Pakistan. Majid responded that the scope and magnitude of the problems in Pakistan were much greater, and Pakistan had been suffering from the "spillover" effects of 9/11. In analyzing the current situation, Majid felt that: (1) there was no cohesive, regional approach being applied in South Asia; and (2) the U.S. and Pakistan suffered from bilateral mistrust and misperceptions. Popular legitimacy, which was crucial to extend military operations, was different from the legality of such actions. (Note: Presumably, Majid was referring to recent remarks by DHS Secretary Chertoff that the U.S. had the legal right to launch unilateral cross-border attacks in self-defense.) Majid stressed the need for bilateral transparency and synchronization of efforts. Petraeus agreed that the new Pakistani civilian and military leadership and a new administration in the United States presented opportunities for both sides. ¶7. (C) Majid again expressed a desire for improved civilian-military coordination between the U.S. and Pakistan. He noted that the Pakistani military could not go ahead with military operations against militants ahead of the support from the new civilian leadership because they needed civilian ISLAMABAD 00003595 002 OF 002 ownership of the battle against extremism. Over lunch, Majid praised the emergence of lashkars (tribal militias) that demonstrated popular support for Army operations in the tribal areas and voiced continued confidence in the ability of the Pakistani Army to attract volunteers for its ranks. PATTERSON