Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ISLAMABAD3373
2008-10-25 08:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:
BOUCHER REVIEWS COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS WITH
VZCZCXRO4057 OO RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHIL #3373/01 2990806 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 250806Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9460 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 5330 INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9293 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 8941 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3929 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 5907 RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0504 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6242 RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5078 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 003373
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: BOUCHER REVIEWS COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS WITH
INTERIOR MINISTER MALIK
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 003373
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: BOUCHER REVIEWS COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS WITH
INTERIOR MINISTER MALIK
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Summary. In two separate wide-ranging discussions
with Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs
Boucher, Interior Minister Malik reported that the Pakistani
government remained firmly committed to completing military
action against extremists in Bajaur. Malik expressed concern
that continued U.S. drone attacks were making it difficult
for the government to describe America as a friend and not an
enemy. He supported the idea of joint border patrols with
Afghanistan and ISAF as a way to curb the growing influx of
Afghan and foreign fighters that were strengthening the
militants in Bajaur. Ambassador Boucher stressed U.S.
support for both the Border Coordination Centers and the
proposed Joint Military Operations Coordination Center as
ways to improve both intelligence and ground forces
coordination. Malik said the government was trying to
provide 50 million rupees as a cash incentive to the emerging
but poorly armed lashkar (tribal militia) forces. Malik
agreed that the Afghan Taliban was not a united group but
expressed concern about the effects in Pakistan of an Afghan
initiative to negotiate with reconcilables. Boucher
reiterated the U.S. position that we supported Afghan and
Pakistan-led reconciliation with those who renounce violence
because we knew any solution to the current conflict required
a political element.
2. (C) Malik identified the Sunni extremist
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi group as having growing ties to both
Baitullah Mehsud and al Qaida; he said Jhangvi was
responsible for both the Danish Embassy and Marriott bombings
in Islamabad and promised the government would soon launch an
operation in Jhang, which was identified as the source of the
Marriott bombing operation. He said concern about the
Talibanization of Karachi was exaggerated but agreed the
increased presence of Pashtuns in the city was exacerbating
long-standing ethnic tensions with the ruling political
party. Malik reviewed his efforts to reach a temporary
cease-fire with Baloch nationalists, detailed equipment and
training required to strengthen local police anti-terrorism
capability, and described what he termed Nawaz Sharif's
efforts "to take down" the current government. Malik offered
a power point presentation on the security situation (sent
separately) and showed video clips of a training camp for
young male suicide bombers in Waziristan. End Summary.
3. (U) On October 18 and 19, Assistant Secretary for South
and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher, accompanied by
Ambassador, met with Interior Minister Rehman Malik.
Assistant Secretary Boucher's Senior Advisor Caitlin Hayden
and Polcouns also attended. Following the first meeting, he
offered a power point presentation on the security situation
(sent separately) and showed video clips of a training camp
for young male suicide bombers in Waziristan.
4. (C) Malik reported that in a five and a half hour
October 18 meeting he attended with President Zardari, Prime
Minister Gilani, Chief of Army Staff General Kayani, Frontier
Corps Chief LtGen Khan and Inter-Services Intelligence Chief
LtGen Pasha, the government decided to continue military
operations in Bajaur Agency. When pressed by Boucher, Malik
insisted that the government had the resolve to finish the
fight in Bajaur. The militants are finally "feeling the heat"
said Malik. "We are losing lives daily" and combating
thousands of militants, including reinforcements from
Afghanistan, who were armed with missiles and rocket
launchers, said Malik. Malik reported that the government
recently had arrested 42 Afghans and 171 Uzbeks in the area.
Malik indicated that all of this demonstrated the need for
joint patrols on both sides of the border; he suggested the
patrols be concentrated in areas where the Haqqani network
and Hekmatyar were operating. Still, he stressed that the
government would reject recent cease-fire offers from
militants.
5. (C) Malik expressed concern about the effect of reports
of U.S. attacks on the government's political position.
During the ongoing joint session of parliament on the
security situation, Malik reported that the opposition was
trying to question whether the U.S. was Pakistan's friend or
ISLAMABAD 00003373 002 OF 003
its enemy. Malik repeated his idea that the U.S. say
publicly it was providing Predator technology to Pakistan
whatever the reality of their control..
6. (C) Ambassador Boucher focused on two elements of
cooperation: the Border Coordination Centers, that would
enhance trilateral sharing of intelligence and ground
operations, and the proposed Joint Military Operations
Coordination Center, that would provide a vehicle for
U.S.-Pakistan intelligence sharing in support of Pakistani
ground operations. He agreed that parts of Afghanistan in
Konar Province were more connected to Pakistan than
Afghanistan and said that U.S. forces were building bridges
across the river to strengthen Afghan ties.
7. (C) Malik reviewed how lashkars (tribal militias) were
springing up across the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
but acknowledged that the Frontier Corps and the Political
Agents were encouraging this phenomena. The problem, said
Malik, was that the lashkars had motivation but few arms.
The Pakistani government was trying to funnel 50 million
rupees of "incentive" money to them through the Frontier
Corps officers. The government needed, he said, to
compensate for the Taliban outpaying soldiers.
8. (C) On Balochistan, Malik said he had negotiated with a
range of stakeholders and had achieved a temporary cease-fire
with the Baloch militant groups. In exchange, he had pulled
back Frontier Corps from 35 checkpoints and dropped pending
charges against key leaders. Boucher commented that
Pakistani pressure on the Quetta shura disrupts militant
ability to organize cross-border attacks. Malik responded
that the shura was not a set, specific group but 5-6
individuals who moved in and out erratically to avoid capture.
9. (C) Saying he spoke regularly with Muttahida Quami
Movement leader Altaf Hussain, Malik said Hussan's concern
about the Talibanization of Karachi were exaggerated.
However, Hussain's party was stockpiling weapons and could
incite a recurrence of long-standing ethnic rivalries between
his Muhajir-based party and the growing community of Pashtuns
in Karachi.
10. (C) Malik spoke repeatedly about the increased role of
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which he claimed was responsible for the
Danish Embassy and Marriott bombings. Malik reported that
the government had tracked the bomb maker and terrorist
handler of the Marriott suicide bomber to Jhang; he would
soon launch an operation in Jhang to break up a terrorist
cell there, said Malik. Further, Malik said that the
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was linked to both Baitullah Mehsud and al
Qaida and was recruiting militants through madrassahs in the
Punjab and Sindh provinces. Boucher noted that the U.S.
repeatedly has pressed Gulf states to cease funding these
madrassahs; we believed militants also were funded through
Afghan drug money and local collections from kidnapping and
extortion.
11. (C) Malik asked if the U.S. had any more information
about the alleged meeting in Saudi Arabia between the Taliban
and Afghan President Karzai. Boucher said we understood that
some Taliban leaders, including the spokesman, had been
invited to an iftar hosted by the Saudi government but that
the event was not part of an organized discussion on
reconciliation. The U.S. believed that the Afghan Taliban
could be split, so there was some merit to exploring an
outreach to moderate forces willing to renounce violence.
Malik reported that "through friends" he knew that Hekmatyar
had people in the Afghan parliament and expressed concern
that this parliament would split and undermine regional
stability.
12. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher asked Malik what was
needed to improve Pakistan's policing capabilities. Malik
said the Frontier Corps, Levies and Khassadars would be the
agents that police the tribal areas; the Frontier Corps
needed armored personnel carriers, protective vests, vehicle
scanners, and training. He was planning to create an
anti-terrorist force within the Federal Intelligence Agency
and give the Northwest Frontier Province police a
ISLAMABAD 00003373 003 OF 003
counter-terrorism force. Malik suggested that the Friends of
Pakistan group focus on establishing a roadmap for
anti-terrorism cooperation, especially real-time intelligence
to support operations.
Politics
--------------
13. (C) Malik said he had met recently with Shahbaz Sharif
to dispel concerns that the Pakistan People's Party would try
to oust him as Chief Minister in Punjab. Malik's concern is
that an assault on the Sharifs in Punjab would prompt a
backlash in Islamabad. Chaudhry Shujaat of the Pakistan
Muslim League was ready to support the Pakistan People's
Party in the center even without regaining control of the
Punjab, claimed Malik, and that would give the government
some additional leverage.
14. (C) Nawaz Sharif, said Malik, "has a plan to take us
down" and has full Saudi support. Boucher noted that the
Saudis are insistant that they have stopped supporting Nawaz;
Malik dismissed this as being untrue. Malik claimed Nawaz
already was implementing a disinformation campaign against
President Zardari and the government; this included spreading
rumors that Zardari was an observant, pro-Iranian Shia,
buying news anchors and reporters and trying to re-engage on
the judiciary issue. Then, there was Nawaz's meeting in
Medina with the Taliban, designed to put more pressure on the
Islamabad government to negotiate with militants, claimed
Malik. Boucher asked what Nawaz would gain from such an
initiative; Malik replied that it would all Nawaz to emerge
as a local hero as compared to a Zardari who had allegedly
sold out to U.S. and Shia interests.
15. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher has cleared this
message.
PATTERSON
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: BOUCHER REVIEWS COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS WITH
INTERIOR MINISTER MALIK
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Summary. In two separate wide-ranging discussions
with Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs
Boucher, Interior Minister Malik reported that the Pakistani
government remained firmly committed to completing military
action against extremists in Bajaur. Malik expressed concern
that continued U.S. drone attacks were making it difficult
for the government to describe America as a friend and not an
enemy. He supported the idea of joint border patrols with
Afghanistan and ISAF as a way to curb the growing influx of
Afghan and foreign fighters that were strengthening the
militants in Bajaur. Ambassador Boucher stressed U.S.
support for both the Border Coordination Centers and the
proposed Joint Military Operations Coordination Center as
ways to improve both intelligence and ground forces
coordination. Malik said the government was trying to
provide 50 million rupees as a cash incentive to the emerging
but poorly armed lashkar (tribal militia) forces. Malik
agreed that the Afghan Taliban was not a united group but
expressed concern about the effects in Pakistan of an Afghan
initiative to negotiate with reconcilables. Boucher
reiterated the U.S. position that we supported Afghan and
Pakistan-led reconciliation with those who renounce violence
because we knew any solution to the current conflict required
a political element.
2. (C) Malik identified the Sunni extremist
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi group as having growing ties to both
Baitullah Mehsud and al Qaida; he said Jhangvi was
responsible for both the Danish Embassy and Marriott bombings
in Islamabad and promised the government would soon launch an
operation in Jhang, which was identified as the source of the
Marriott bombing operation. He said concern about the
Talibanization of Karachi was exaggerated but agreed the
increased presence of Pashtuns in the city was exacerbating
long-standing ethnic tensions with the ruling political
party. Malik reviewed his efforts to reach a temporary
cease-fire with Baloch nationalists, detailed equipment and
training required to strengthen local police anti-terrorism
capability, and described what he termed Nawaz Sharif's
efforts "to take down" the current government. Malik offered
a power point presentation on the security situation (sent
separately) and showed video clips of a training camp for
young male suicide bombers in Waziristan. End Summary.
3. (U) On October 18 and 19, Assistant Secretary for South
and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher, accompanied by
Ambassador, met with Interior Minister Rehman Malik.
Assistant Secretary Boucher's Senior Advisor Caitlin Hayden
and Polcouns also attended. Following the first meeting, he
offered a power point presentation on the security situation
(sent separately) and showed video clips of a training camp
for young male suicide bombers in Waziristan.
4. (C) Malik reported that in a five and a half hour
October 18 meeting he attended with President Zardari, Prime
Minister Gilani, Chief of Army Staff General Kayani, Frontier
Corps Chief LtGen Khan and Inter-Services Intelligence Chief
LtGen Pasha, the government decided to continue military
operations in Bajaur Agency. When pressed by Boucher, Malik
insisted that the government had the resolve to finish the
fight in Bajaur. The militants are finally "feeling the heat"
said Malik. "We are losing lives daily" and combating
thousands of militants, including reinforcements from
Afghanistan, who were armed with missiles and rocket
launchers, said Malik. Malik reported that the government
recently had arrested 42 Afghans and 171 Uzbeks in the area.
Malik indicated that all of this demonstrated the need for
joint patrols on both sides of the border; he suggested the
patrols be concentrated in areas where the Haqqani network
and Hekmatyar were operating. Still, he stressed that the
government would reject recent cease-fire offers from
militants.
5. (C) Malik expressed concern about the effect of reports
of U.S. attacks on the government's political position.
During the ongoing joint session of parliament on the
security situation, Malik reported that the opposition was
trying to question whether the U.S. was Pakistan's friend or
ISLAMABAD 00003373 002 OF 003
its enemy. Malik repeated his idea that the U.S. say
publicly it was providing Predator technology to Pakistan
whatever the reality of their control..
6. (C) Ambassador Boucher focused on two elements of
cooperation: the Border Coordination Centers, that would
enhance trilateral sharing of intelligence and ground
operations, and the proposed Joint Military Operations
Coordination Center, that would provide a vehicle for
U.S.-Pakistan intelligence sharing in support of Pakistani
ground operations. He agreed that parts of Afghanistan in
Konar Province were more connected to Pakistan than
Afghanistan and said that U.S. forces were building bridges
across the river to strengthen Afghan ties.
7. (C) Malik reviewed how lashkars (tribal militias) were
springing up across the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
but acknowledged that the Frontier Corps and the Political
Agents were encouraging this phenomena. The problem, said
Malik, was that the lashkars had motivation but few arms.
The Pakistani government was trying to funnel 50 million
rupees of "incentive" money to them through the Frontier
Corps officers. The government needed, he said, to
compensate for the Taliban outpaying soldiers.
8. (C) On Balochistan, Malik said he had negotiated with a
range of stakeholders and had achieved a temporary cease-fire
with the Baloch militant groups. In exchange, he had pulled
back Frontier Corps from 35 checkpoints and dropped pending
charges against key leaders. Boucher commented that
Pakistani pressure on the Quetta shura disrupts militant
ability to organize cross-border attacks. Malik responded
that the shura was not a set, specific group but 5-6
individuals who moved in and out erratically to avoid capture.
9. (C) Saying he spoke regularly with Muttahida Quami
Movement leader Altaf Hussain, Malik said Hussan's concern
about the Talibanization of Karachi were exaggerated.
However, Hussain's party was stockpiling weapons and could
incite a recurrence of long-standing ethnic rivalries between
his Muhajir-based party and the growing community of Pashtuns
in Karachi.
10. (C) Malik spoke repeatedly about the increased role of
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which he claimed was responsible for the
Danish Embassy and Marriott bombings. Malik reported that
the government had tracked the bomb maker and terrorist
handler of the Marriott suicide bomber to Jhang; he would
soon launch an operation in Jhang to break up a terrorist
cell there, said Malik. Further, Malik said that the
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was linked to both Baitullah Mehsud and al
Qaida and was recruiting militants through madrassahs in the
Punjab and Sindh provinces. Boucher noted that the U.S.
repeatedly has pressed Gulf states to cease funding these
madrassahs; we believed militants also were funded through
Afghan drug money and local collections from kidnapping and
extortion.
11. (C) Malik asked if the U.S. had any more information
about the alleged meeting in Saudi Arabia between the Taliban
and Afghan President Karzai. Boucher said we understood that
some Taliban leaders, including the spokesman, had been
invited to an iftar hosted by the Saudi government but that
the event was not part of an organized discussion on
reconciliation. The U.S. believed that the Afghan Taliban
could be split, so there was some merit to exploring an
outreach to moderate forces willing to renounce violence.
Malik reported that "through friends" he knew that Hekmatyar
had people in the Afghan parliament and expressed concern
that this parliament would split and undermine regional
stability.
12. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher asked Malik what was
needed to improve Pakistan's policing capabilities. Malik
said the Frontier Corps, Levies and Khassadars would be the
agents that police the tribal areas; the Frontier Corps
needed armored personnel carriers, protective vests, vehicle
scanners, and training. He was planning to create an
anti-terrorist force within the Federal Intelligence Agency
and give the Northwest Frontier Province police a
ISLAMABAD 00003373 003 OF 003
counter-terrorism force. Malik suggested that the Friends of
Pakistan group focus on establishing a roadmap for
anti-terrorism cooperation, especially real-time intelligence
to support operations.
Politics
--------------
13. (C) Malik said he had met recently with Shahbaz Sharif
to dispel concerns that the Pakistan People's Party would try
to oust him as Chief Minister in Punjab. Malik's concern is
that an assault on the Sharifs in Punjab would prompt a
backlash in Islamabad. Chaudhry Shujaat of the Pakistan
Muslim League was ready to support the Pakistan People's
Party in the center even without regaining control of the
Punjab, claimed Malik, and that would give the government
some additional leverage.
14. (C) Nawaz Sharif, said Malik, "has a plan to take us
down" and has full Saudi support. Boucher noted that the
Saudis are insistant that they have stopped supporting Nawaz;
Malik dismissed this as being untrue. Malik claimed Nawaz
already was implementing a disinformation campaign against
President Zardari and the government; this included spreading
rumors that Zardari was an observant, pro-Iranian Shia,
buying news anchors and reporters and trying to re-engage on
the judiciary issue. Then, there was Nawaz's meeting in
Medina with the Taliban, designed to put more pressure on the
Islamabad government to negotiate with militants, claimed
Malik. Boucher asked what Nawaz would gain from such an
initiative; Malik replied that it would all Nawaz to emerge
as a local hero as compared to a Zardari who had allegedly
sold out to U.S. and Shia interests.
15. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher has cleared this
message.
PATTERSON