FATA TRIBES SIGN PEACE ACCORD FOR KURRAM AGENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003337 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER PK SUBJECT: FATA TRIBES SIGN PEACE ACCORD FOR KURRAM AGENCY REF: ISLAMABAD 3332 Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary. On October 17, Border Coordinator met with Munir Khan Orakzai, Member of the National Assembly from lower Kurram agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Area, to discuss the recent peace agreement brokered during a three-day jirga held in Islamabad in which he participated. According to the terms of the agreement between the Sunni and Shia tribes of the area, the tribes would give up rival occupied villages, with resettlement of the inhabitants to follow, an exchange of the dead and kidnapped, and investigation in a follow-up jirga to determine those responsible for the fighting in the first place. Orakzai expressed concern that the agreement might not last, given that it was between the Sunnis and Shias and did not involve the militants whose involvement in the fighting has exacerbated the situation. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On October 17, Sunni and Shia tribes from the Kurram agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) brokered a cease-fire and peace agreement, following a three-day jirga, or tribal council, held in Islamabad. The jirga, comprised of elder members of the Bangash (Sunni) and Turi (Shia) tribes and led by 23 neutral members from the Hangu tribe, agreed to abandon the occupied villages of the opposite tribe and to take action against those who violate the terms of the agreement. According to one of the lead jirga participants, Munir Khan Orakzai, Member of the National Assembly from lower Kurram agency and the Parliamentary leader of the FATA Parliamentarians, this recent round of fighting started in November 2007 and had continued, despite earlier attempts at resolution, until now. The Peace Agreement -------------- ¶3. (U) According to Orakzai, the jirga decided upon the following terms: -- Each tribe would surrender occupied enemy villages to the Government of Pakistan (GOP) over the next few days; -- The GOP would resettle those persons displaced by the fighting into the previously occupied villages; -- The road from Parachinar to Darra Adam Khel would be opened for all traffic; -- Each tribe would return the dead and any hostages; and -- A follow-up jirga would take place on October 25 in Sadda (Kurram agency) to investigate the origins of the violence and to decide on punishments for those found responsible. ¶4. (C) Although adamant that both the conflict and the agreement were strictly between the warring Sunni and Shia factions of Kurram and not the Taliban or other Pakistani militants, Orakzai expressed apprehension as to how long the cease-fire would last. Given that the militants of the area were not a part of this sectarian agreement, he worried the local Taliban commander, Fazal Saeed, had enough influence to bring down the peace process by stirring violence among the tribes. ¶5. (C) Additionally, Orakzai was further bothered by the "secret" meeting held in Islamabad between the Taliban and Kurram Shia during the recent Ramadan season to discuss the arrangement in which the Shia (who occupy the northern half of Kurram) would continue to provide the militants safe passage through a corridor connecting North Waziristan to Khost province, in exchange for Taliban commitment to stay out of sectarian issues. ¶6. (C) On a positive point, Orakzai said the Kurram Sunnis (who are normally aligned with the Taliban) wanted the fighting to end, feeling that the "war" now belonged to the militants. He also found comfort in knowing that Saeed was close to and influenced by Senator Rashid Ahmed Khan, also from Kurram and one of the authors of the agreement; Orakzai hoped Rashid could keep the militants in check. In a press conference to announce the terms of the agreement, Kurram Political Agent Azam Khan also expressed confidence in the lasting nature of the agreement and proposed that the GOP provide massive development funding to Kurram as an incentive to other agencies to replicate Kurram's peace efforts. ISLAMABAD 00003337 002 OF 002 Countering Militancy in FATA -------------- ¶7. (C) Using frank language, Orakzai suggested the USG urge the GOP to strike at the militants in Kurram with resolve and accuracy so that no one would turn to militancy again in his agency. He also recommended that the USG stop targeting clusters of al Qaeda or Taliban through "inaccurate" drone attacks in North and South Waziristan. Instead, the U.S. should directly target the leadership of the local pro-Taliban superstructure under the command of personalities like Baitullah Mahsud and Hafiz Gul Bahadur. ¶8. (C) Orakzai praised the work of the lashkars (tribal militias created on an as-needed basis to address a specific security issue - see reftel). He recommended that the USG support these forces financially, channeling funds through the Political Agent, and not through the military establishment. Orakzai thought that the people of the FATA would welcome such support from the U.S. and that it would improve the U.S. image in the area. ¶9. (C) Comment. Kurram agency has been a regular source of Sunni-Shia sectarian violence; in 2007, the Shia expelled Sunnis from several villages, prompting a new wave of conflict. What is different this time, and what has greatly extended casualty rates and the longevity of the fighting, was the decision of the Sunni and then Shia tribes to seek militant support for their cause. Recognizing Kurram controls a key crossover point into Afghanistan, the Taliban responded and have exacerbated the violence. To date, the Pakistani military has been reluctant to wade into this dispute despite acknowledgment that the fighting cut off food and other critical resupply routes for citizens, especially in Parachinar. Orakzai is one of the few from the area who has advocated providing direct support to the lashkars, and we suspect he is seeking USG assistance on the questionable premise that this would improve the image of the U.S. End Comment. PATTERSON