ISLAMABAD EAC MEETING 09/30/08

S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 003168 SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2013 TAGS: ASEC PTER CASC PK SUBJECT: ISLAMABAD EAC MEETING 09/30/08 REF: A. TD-3214/071638 ¶B. ISLAMABAD 3140 ¶C. ISLAMABAD 3122 ¶D. TD-314/070452-08 Classified By: DCM Gerald M. Feierstein; Reason 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (C) DCM chaired an EAC meeting on 09/30/08 to review Mission's security posture in light of recent threat information (ref A) and imminent visit of the Secretary to Islamabad. All sections/agencies were represented. ¶2. (S/NF) RSO and GRPO reported on the latest threat information (ref A) and potential impact on the Secretary's visit to Islamabad on 10/4/08. GRPO reported that the source of the information was not always credible, but that the targeting and attack scenarios described were not out of the realm of Baitullah Mahsud's capabilities. Both RSO and GRPO opined that much of the attack discussion mirrored that of previous reporting. The disconcerting new reporting links these attacks to the Secretary's visit. It was noted that Indian press reports were speculating about possible dates for the Secretary's visit to the region. RSO and GRPO agreed that the existence of this specific intelligence report has not significantly altered our threat environment as we are already seeing a wealth of intelligence reporting in the same vein and taking commensurate security precautions. ¶3. (S/NF) EAC determined that planning for the visit of the Secretary should not be affected by this latest threat report. The specifics of the visit are not in the public domain and the pending shut down of print media over the Eid holiday will likely keep the news of the visit controlled. Islamabad, and all of Pakistan, will slow to a crawl over the long holiday weekend, while the MOI has imposed a heightened security alert for the police throughout the period. The recent traffic restrictions throughout Islamabad will be kept in place and police are positively identifying travelers through the check points. Security measures in Islamabad have never been higher. ¶4. (S/NF) RSO reported that the DS/P/SD Advance team is currently in Islamabad and assessing the preliminary schedule and related security issues. The consensus, shared by Secretary advance staff and EAC, is that the greatest vulnerability in security planning is the overland motorcade movements from Rawalpindi to Islamabad. While there is no specific mention of targeting motorcade movements in latest intelligence reporting, Embassy and Advance Team are exploring use of NAS helicopters to facilitate movement of the Secretary and reduce size of the overland motorcade. RSO reports extraordinary cooperation from police counterparts in overall visit security planning. Police have committed to securing the motorcade routes with substantial police resources. Results of visit security planning will be reported in appropriate channels. ¶5. (SBU) The EAC also reviewed threat reporting regarding the Embassy and constituent Posts. The group agreed that our restrictions on staff movement in Islamabad (and at the consulates in Pakistan) continues to be appropriate and should continue through the Eid holiday. Consulate EACs are reporting septel. Islamabad personnel are being instructed to limit all extracurricular activities other than visiting the Diplomatic Enclave for work or pleasure. Movement in the city is restricted to essential food shopping only. Embassy Meet and Greet information will be passed verbally once the schedule is firm. ¶6. (C) EAC considers security measures in place commensurate with threat environment. Planning for the Secretary's visit is continuing. Further reporting will be provided as necessary. PATTERSON