COUNTRY TEAM REQUEST FOR COUNTER-NARCO TERRORISM (CNT)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003067 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018 TAGS: MASS SNAR ASEC PK SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM REQUEST FOR COUNTER-NARCO TERRORISM (CNT) TRAINING EVENT (CPK2009CNT001W) IN SUPPORT OF THE PAKISTAN ARMY SPECIAL SERVICE GROUP (SSG). REF: A. CJCSI 3710.01 CJCS 28 MAY 93 NOTAL AMPN (U)DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR APPROVING OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND COUNTER-DRUG RELATED DEPLOYMENT OF DOD PERSONNEL ¶B. GENADMIN JOINT STAFF 071300Z JUN 04 AMPN HUMAN RIGHTS VERIFICATION FOR DOD-FUNDED TRAINING PROGRAMS WITH FOREIGN PERSONNEL ¶C. EMBASSY ISLAMABAD'S LEAHY HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING (HRV) REQUESTS FOR THE 21ST QRS ¶D. DOS RESPONSES TO AMEMB ISLAMABAD'S HRV REQUEST FOR QRS COMMANDER AND UNIT Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. In accordance with Refs A and B, this message is an Embassy Islamabad request for FY09 DOD operational support under 1004, National Defense Authorization Act 1991, as amended for development of Counter Narco Terrorism (CNT) training deployments (CPK2009CNT001W) in support for the Pakistani Army SSG during 1st quarter of FY09. ¶2. (C) U.S. Agency requesting CNT Events: This request is made and coordinated by the DEA Islamabad Country Office (CO) Country Regional Director MR. Douglas Cortinovis (acting) and has received the approval of U.S. Embassy Islamabad, Pakistan. ¶3. (C) Partner Nation (PN) organization requesting this event: Major General Tahir Mahmood, Commander, Pakistan Army Special Service Group has requested that a battalion from the SSG receive the proposed training. Justification for CNT Training -------------- ¶4. (C) Narcotics ultimately destined for the U.S. and other international markets are transshipped from Afghanistan through Pakistan. The Pakistani SSG conducts interdiction operations within the land borders of Pakistan. An effective, day and night ground tactical training program would significantly increase their effectiveness when conducting interdiction operations, disrupting the escalation of narcotics smuggled from/through Pakistan. The Pakistani SSG also represents a new capability in fighting terrorism and their operations support the DEA Counter-Narcotic efforts in the region. ¶5. (C) The Pakistan Army has requested the assistance of the DEA Islamabad CO in establishing a tactical, Counter Narcotics Training program in day and night operations for the SSG. The SSG has requested training in the following counter-terrorism skill sets: air assault operations/planning, advanced marksmanship, close-quarter-battle, military decision making process, cordon and search tactics, techniques, procedures and apply enhance force protection and OPSEC skills, and conduct law of land warfare and human rights training. This training will be conducted at the Tarbela Cantonment Area, Tarbela (approx 100km from Islamabad), Pakistan. ¶6. (C) The DEA Islamabad CO requests that the training being requested is conducted during 1st QTR, FY09. This program is an aggressive, proactive interdiction initiative ensuring the continued disruption of trafficking patterns. Additionally, this event maintains the persistent engagement between U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) and the Pakistani Army SSG. ¶7. (C) Counter-Narcotic Justification: A tactical counter-drug program would promote greater regional stability and lessen the amount of narcotics which transit through Pakistan to international markets in the United States and Europe. The funds generated from the sale of narcotics provide aid which is likely utilized to support terrorist activity and organized crime. All of these factors are destabilizing the USCENTCOM AOR. In the post 9/11 environment, regional assistance from Pakistan has become more critical in combating terrorist and narcotics activity. This initiative also supports Commander, USCENTCOM's Theater Objectives for CNT Engagement Strategy. ¶8. (C) The SSG, among other agencies, is the primary Counter-Narco Terrorism (CNT) Special Operations-capable forces in Pakistan. The continuation of the CENTCOM, SOCCENT and Embassy Islamabad CNT training program, as part of the overall Foreign Internal Defense (FID) strategy and program for Pakistan, would expand and increase the development of a strong, combined and unified U.S./Pakistan effort in disrupting the escalation of illegal narcotics smuggled through Central Asia. Additionally, this program denies insurgents and terrorists access to a critical funding source for continued terrorist and insurgent operations in Pakistan and the region. ISLAMABAD 00003067 002 OF 002 ¶9. (C) Embassy Islamabad requests that Pre-Deployment Site Surveys (PDSS) and/or assessments be scheduled for all events. Training will be conducted at Tarbela Cantonments Area, IVO Islamabad, Pakistan. Other training locations within Pakistan may be designated by the host nation. Rules of Engagement -------------- ¶10. (C) Rules of Engagement: The DEA Islamabad CO understands that CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement (ROE) are in effect. Deploying forces will not, under any circumstances accompany U.S. DEA, or host country counter-parts on actual counter-narcotic field operations or participate in any activity in which hostilities are imminent. The DEA Islamabad CO further understands that units and individuals deployed outside the United States, its Territories and Possessions will deploy with assigned weapons and ammunition. The weapons will be stored in a secure location that provides reasonable access when not carried. ¶11. (C) Justification: SOF units and individuals must be capable of providing their own force protection when forward deployed in all threat environments. The Regional Security Officer (RSO) for the U.S. Embassy Islamabad, Mr Stephen Smith, will be the coordinating official for all weapons issues. Mr. Stephen Smith can be contacted at 92-51-208-2203. Human Rights Verification -------------- ¶12. (C) Ref D (Human Rights Verification): The DEA Islamabad CO will request that the U.S. Embassy Islamabad verify that the Department of State possesses no credible information of gross violations of human rights by the SSG. Points of Contact for Training -------------- ¶13. (U) The Special Operations Command and Control Element - Pakistan (SOCCE-PAK) is responsible for assisting the CNT team while in Pakistan. DEA Islamabad CO Acting Regional Director Mr. Douglas Cortinovis will be kept informed of any issues, should they arise. ¶14. (U) Any questions concerning the aforementioned cable should be directed to Mr. Douglas Cortinovis at 92-51-208-2325. PATTERSON