DEVELOPING PAKISTANI COIN CAPABILITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ISLAMABAD 003035 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS PK SUBJECT: DEVELOPING PAKISTANI COIN CAPABILITY REF: A. ISLAMABAD 2962 ¶B. ISLAMABAD 2961 Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: To help Pakistan roll back an increasingly virulent combination of foreign terrorists and domestic insurgents, the U.S. is implementing a three-part strategy to improve governance, provide economic development and fight extremism in the tribal areas along the Afghanistan border. USAID already has begun work on governance and development projects, and we are exploring (Reftels) ways to help Pakistan apply counter-insurgency (COIN) theory in Bajaur. To date, however, Pakistan has not employed a clear/hold/build COIN strategy. This cable addresses the challenges we face in improving the will and capacity of Pakistan's security forces to implement a COIN strategy. To achieve success, defined as eliminating terrorist safe havens and the conditions that breed support for them, it will require a long term strategy and significant resources. Post strongly recommends that we secure consistent out-year military funding by establishing COIN operations as a Program of Record in the DOD budget and significantly enhancing State/INL support for civil armed forces/police training (addressed septel). End Summary Background/Assumptions -------------- ¶2. (C) Pakistan has fought three wars and multiple lower-level conflicts with India; the composition, deployment, doctrine and tactics of the Pakistani Army (and strategic forces) are designed to fight a land war with India. Former President and Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Musharraf and current COAS General Kayani recognized that a shift has occurred, and that Pakistan now faces a significant threat emanating from extremists in the tribal areas; Kayani accordingly has begun to train forces for low-intensity conflict. However, the bulk of the Pakistani military establishment has yet to make this transition, and promotions have not historically been based on tours in the tribal areas. General Kayani now recognizes the value of experience in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) among the military forces. We want the Pakistani military to accept using COIN doctrine and tactics, but we also recognize that the move to a new strategic focus will be slow. ¶3. (C) The Pakistan Armed Forces are the primary GOP organizations tasked with clearing anti-government elements from both the settled areas of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the FATA. Until 2002, however, the Pakistani military very rarely entered the FATA. The tribal areas were controlled by political agents with authority to call on tribal levies to maintain law and order; the FATA was, and still is, governed by a hodge-podge of administrative punishments and what was for years a successful strategy of divide and conquer over the tribes. ¶4. (C) The 1980's campaign to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan which was launched from the FATA, eroded tribal leadership structures and undermined the writ of government in the region. Pakistanis constantly remind us (exaggeratedly) that the U.S. then packed up and went home; one result being a weakened region ripe for exploitation by the Taliban and al Qaeda. The Pakistani military remains wary of repeating this experience and strongly opposes deployment of U.S. combat or combat support personnel (with the possible exception of intelligence assets) on Pakistani soil. ¶5. (C) When the Punjab-based Army began operations in the FATA 2002-2005, it was seen as a foreign invader and incurred significant casualties. Increasingly, the Army began using the tribal-based Frontier Corps (FC) as its visible front line in the FATA. The FC is the most credible alternative to the Army, but it is neither equipped nor trained for clearing operations, and its numerically limited and underpaid forces are exhausted by over five years of fighting without rotation. The FC reports to the Ministry of Interior in peacetime and to the Army in wartime. As such, the FC should be interoperable with, and tasked to work only with existing Pakistan Security Forces and Pakistan Military units. At present there is no civil-military coordination for planning, ISLAMABAD 00003035 002 OF 005 especially for follow-on actions. A unity of effort is required by both military and civil planners for transition from clearing operations to holding operations, and finally to routine law enforcement operations. ¶6. (C) To further reduce casualties, the Government of Pakistan, the Pakistani military and intelligence services also turned to traditional divide and conquer tactics, including peace negotiations, with the tribes. What the GOP has not yet accepted is that the nature of the enemy has changed, and their traditional strategies are now counterproductive. Even where they acknowledge that negotiations have allowed militants time and space to regroup, Pakistani forces argue that their limited capacity to fight a multi-front war in the FATA leaves them no choice but to use proxy forces. Implementing a successful COIN strategy will require changing the current mindset among the GOP, the military and intelligence forces. Recent Trends -------------- ¶7. (C) In the past year and a half, while Islamabad was distracted with domestic politics, the GOP ceded control of an increasing amount of territory to foreign and domestic militants; reversing this trend thus requires a geographic approach rather than sequential in time or event to clear and hold operations. The spread of Talibanization from the tribal areas into the "settled" areas of the NWFP and the ability of militants to launch successful suicide attacks across the country have forced the GOP to recognize the need for operations now underway in the NWFP and FATA. ¶8. (C) Civilian casualties from militant attacks on factories and hospitals could be exploited to build public support for what had previously been overwhelmingly unpopular military operations. In some areas of the FATA, local tribes are turning on the militants they previously hosted or tolerated. The GOP has now banned the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP),prohibited TV coverage of al Qaeda/Taliban interviews, and acknowledged the increasing intersection of personnel, resources, and action by the once independent Taliban, al Qaeda and homegrown Islamic extremist groups. ¶9. (C) Policy and operational cooperation between the central and NWFP governments remains poor, as does the willingness of the Pakistani military and Interior Ministry to share intelligence with each other or with the USG. This adversely affects operational coordination and the ability of the GOP to speak with one voice. This also undermines civilian initiatives and blocks USG training of Pakistan Military and Frontier Corps personnel. ¶10. (C) A growing sophistication of militant weaponry and tactics comes as the Pakistan military remains a heavy conventional force focused on regional threats not COIN operations. The Pakistan military and Ministry of Interior have an historic bias against USG provided military/security training. Faced with new militant capabilities, however, the Pakistani military has now recognized the need for additional COIN capability and has asked for Close Air Support (CAS), and Combat Search and Rescue training. They have also agreed to U.S./UK training for the Frontier Corps. Turning the Pakistani military into a modern, light, lethal and agile force trained and equipped to conduct COIN operations is our goal. Developing Clear and Hold Capability -------------- ¶11. (C) We need to advance on two tracks for synchronized COIN strategy operations. Both tracks must be supported by coordinated Information Operations and ongoing USAID development assistance. (I) CLEAR CAPABILITY ¶12. (C) We must increase the Pakistani military's ability to clear an area of militants; this will require a complete overhaul of Pakistan Security Assistance Programs in support of a needs-based acquisition program and training in support of both COIN and territorial defense. Post recommends the following missions receive priority emphasis: ISLAMABAD 00003035 003 OF 005 ¶A. Increase Pakistan Air Mobile Capability --Modernized combat aviation force that includes attack, medium and heavy lift helicopters; air transport of tactical vehicles; and sufficient capability to resupply parts conduct maintenance, and maintain a cadre of trained staff to sustain a high operations tempo --Airborne delivery of combat personnel and equipment ¶B. Combat Logistics and Sustainment --Rotary wing resupply of forward forces --Airdrop of resupply via Pakistan C-130 aircraft --Improve sustainment of forward forces by ground via enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), air support, convoy operations, adequate ground assets and maintenance --Enhance combat logistics and sustainment of forward forces via sling-load operations ¶C. Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Capability / Survivability --Provide Counter Remote-Controlled IED Electronic Warfare (CREW) devices --Provide pre-detonation (PREDET) electronic warfare flights --Pre-deployment C-IED Training, Explosive Ordnance Recognition (EOR) --ISR and air assets for reconnaissance operations --Unexploded ordinance (UXO) clearing in previously anti-government held areas ¶D. Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I)/ ISR --Radio relay, secure, long-range communications equipment which provides interoperability between ground forces and combat aircraft --Enhance and employ Pakistan's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capability, both day and night, for COIN operations --Combined ISR operation with US and/or ISAF forces --Increase capability to fuse intelligence with current operations in order to execute precision strikes and reduce collateral damage --Integration of fixed/rotary-wing assets with current ISR capability to increase coverage in tribal areas ¶E. Close Air Support / Joint Fires --Enhance ability to increase air presence in tribal areas for show of force, route reconnaissance, and kinetic strike operations --Increase PAKMIL CAS capability through better integration with ground forces (terminal guidance operations),use of precision-guidance munitions, and limited visibility/night operations --Increase air threat incorporation using an attack rotary wing and fixed wing fighters --Integrate CAS operations with ground operations utilizing Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTACS) --Enable the Pakistan military to reduce collateral damage and fratricide via the proper use of CAS operations ¶F. Civil Affairs (CA) / Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Operations --Enable Pakistan Military and Frontier Corps units with CA/HA training and engagement --Provision Pakistan Military units to provide immediate HA post battle ¶G. Night Operations --Increase Pakistan Arm