WAY FORWARD ON BAJAUR AND COIN STRATEGY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 002962 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PREF PINR PK SUBJECT: WAY FORWARD ON BAJAUR AND COIN STRATEGY REF: A. ISLAMABAD 2798 ¶B. ISLAMABAD 2876 Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Reftels laid out the opportunity that the current situation in Bajaur presents to help the Pakistani government implement a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, and our recommended approach for helping them get there. While the circumstances on the ground have changed somewhat, the fundamental situation has not: the Pakistani military continues to struggle to reverse insurgent advances into population centers in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP),while the civilian government is grappling with providing services to the displaced, repairing damaged infrastructure, and ensuring basic security now and after the military reduces its presence or realigns its forces. ¶2. (C) We believe that success in Bajaur will significantly color Pakistani willingness to adopt what is, for them, a new way of doing things as they move into other areas where insurgents have made inroads. But they need our assistance urgently. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are already moving back home, despite continued fighting, and we have deployed little in the way of assistance. The camps were completely inadequate (one factor contributing to the quickness with which people returned to Bajaur),and it does not appear much is being done to help with reintegration. The way is dangerously open for insurgents to exploit the population's deep unhappiness with its government's actions (or lack thereof). ¶3. (C) This cable lays out the overall approach we are taking to help the GoP deal with this complex situation, and reviews some of the resource requests we made in Ref B. Septels will cover: our strategy for enhancing GoP capabilities on the security side in clearing and holding operations in Bajaur and beyond; the OFDA regional representative's recommendations on OFDA-specific funding levels for Bajaur; and a plan for strategic communications to drive home to Bajauris the damage caused by the extremists and militants operating in their midst. ¶4. (C) In using Bajaur as a test case, we need to pursue short- medium- and long-term tracks simultaneously, across three main areas: security (both clearing phase and long-term holding),development (jobs, services, good governance),and information (separating the insurgents from the people and boosting popular perceptions of government). In the short term, we will help provide relief supplies to IDPs and reconstruction assistance as they return home. We will provide law enforcement agencies with some equipment and commodities to improve their ability to react to immediate security issues. We will also press GoP officials to better coordinate across military and civilian lines to inform the population of military operations as well as on how the government will assist those affected. The GoP also needs to shape the message that this is Pakistan's battle for its own future (and not a U.S. proxy war),and that the government's fight is with the insurgents, not the people. ¶5. (C) Over the longer term, we plan to increase our mil-mil engagement to help transform the Pakistani military from ONE poised only to fight a conventional war to ONE that can handle the difficult and complex challenges of a counter-insurgency mission. We will help to reform Pakistani law enforcement entities, especially along the border with Afghanistan, so that they become capable of providing basic security and holding areas that have been cleared by the Pakistani military. Once areas are cleared and secured, we will be able to better offer assistance in improving the lives of people living in these areas - through jobs and economic development, HEALTH and education, and good governance. If we can help the Pakistanis succeed in Bajaur, we should be able to replicate that success as the GoP moves into other areas where insurgents have infiltrated. End Summary. ISLAMABAD 00002962 002 OF 004 CURRENT SITUATION -------------- ¶6. (SBU) With Minister of Interior Rehman Malik's August 30 announcement of a cessation of military operations during Ramadan, most IDPs have moved back into Bajaur. However, the suspension announcement was not coordinated with the military, which continues operations. As a result, we are witnessing mass confusion on the part of the government and the people. Embassy staff report that nearly all IDP camps in Lower Dir (where most of the IDPs had fled) have been closed. Some supplies remain, and are being warehoused by District officials in case IDPs return. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and some local authorities are establishing provisional camps, on the assumption that if the fighting continues, residents will flee again. To date, because of ongoing military operations, we have been unable to get into Bajaur to assess relief, reconstruction or rehabilitation needs. Embassy officials are in continuous contact with the Political Agent for the Bajaur Agency and hope to be able to get a better understanding of the situation soon. ¶7. (S) Pakistani military officials have told us that they plan to continue airstrikes and artillery operations in Bajaur until they have cleared key population centers and roads of militants. There is talk of a ground campaign to follow, but it is not clear that will happen. Officials have told us that when they finish in Bajaur, they will move in force to Swat (where some anti-insurgent operations are already occurring),Mohmand, and possibly Kurram (which is embroiled in sectarian fighting not directly related to the war on terror, but there is some evidence that it is being exploited by Sunni extremists to build their own position in the agency). However, the Pakistani military cannot execute these operations simultaneously and will likely encounter militant resistance along the way. ¶8. (C) This leaves open the question of what force will hold the territory once the military moves on to its next operation. Traditional law enforcement bodies (like the tribal Levies) are neither large enough nor well enough trained and equipped to do it. The NWFP Police and Frontier Constabulary have no jurisdiction in the Tribal Areas, except in hot pursuit. The Frontier Corps (FC) is the logical choice (it has both the administrative mandate and is a heavier, better trained and equipped force). But several officials have told us the FC is "tapped out." The FC has been fighting for the better part of five years, and because it is stretched so thin, has had no opportunity to break and train up to the next level of competence or to replace and modernize equipment. The FC is also stretched thin geographically, and a number of jurisdictions along the border have suffered because of FC troops being called off to address an emergency somewhere else. This could easily happen to the forces left behind to secure Bajaur, once Army operations end. LIMITING FACTORS -------------- ¶9. (C) Paras 1-4 above, and reftels, laid out our suggested approach to helping the Pakistanis deal with this difficult and complex challenge. However, there are a number of limiting factors we must keep in mind as we go forward: -- Suspicions of U.S. intentions. We deal with this phenomenon across all aspects of our bilateral relationship, and especially with our mil-mil relationship. While we have made progress and are having more open discussions with our Pakistani military counterparts now than at any time in recent memory, we are not yet to the point at which they will tell us in advance what they plan to do operationally, nor will we likely be able to engage in detailed forward planning with them. -- Lack of Army receptivity to U.S. training. The Army generally declines U.S. offers for training on Pakistani soil. The NAS Airwing gets the same message from the Frontier Corps officer staff (seconded from the Pakistani Army). We have had better success with the various police forces, which fall under MOI. ISLAMABAD 00002962 003 OF 004 -- Limited military capacity. Despite its traditional reputation and self-image, the Pakistani military is currently not up to the challenge of securing the entire frontier. Septel will discuss this issue further; what it means for us is that we will have to be modest in our expectations of what they can do in the short term. -- Limited capacity of law enforcement bodies. The balkanized system of law enforcement entities throughout the FATA and NWFP means there are both duplication of efforts and huge gaps in coverage. The Frontier Corps and tribal Levies serve in the FATA. The Frontier Constabulary serves the Frontier region, a belt between the tribal areas and settles areas. The NWFP Police serve the settled areas. Additionally, none of the forces engage in strategic planning. There is no consistency in operational capability or in training/procedures that would allow these forces to effectively secure the contested areas along the border, nor do they have the equipment or the manning to do so. Insurgent forces exploit these weaknesses. -- Political situation. While the drama of Musharraf's resignation and Zardari's election as President are now over, and we are hopeful that the political paralysis will ease, disagreement remains among the Pakistani leadership on how aggressively the GoP should go after insurgent groups. Some among the military and in the civilian leadership in Islamabad understand the threat these groups present to Pakistan itself. But some local leaders and some elements of other Pakistani organizations are less enthusiastic, and resist tough action against insurgents. These groups have engaged in a pattern of concluding separate peace agreements with various groups at various times, which muddy the picture and impede the GoP, as a whole, from attacking the problem in a consistent manner. NEXT STEPS - ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶10. (SBU) As noted above, there are both short term and long term things we can do to help the GoP stay committed to these operations and be successful in the end. Reftels laid out a short-medium-long term approach. Because of the Government's unexpected decision to encourage IDPs to return home, even as military operations continued, the short and medium term activities we described have become merged. We need to support ICRC and local governments outside Bajaur as they stockpile relief items (water, food, medicine, and tents) which will be needed if the continued fighting makes people flee their homes a second time. Likewise, the GoP and the international community need to be preparing to receive those who will be displaced by expected new operations in other agencies near Bajaur. The terrible condition of the camps was also a huge black mark for the government as the newly empowered media visited the camps and interviewed residents who had received little or no help from the government. The media also interviewed families who could hardly afford to feed themselves but were taking in relatives. This sharply increased the political pressure on the government to encourage the IDPs to go home. ¶11. (SBU) At the same time, we should be helping people now to rebuild homes and damaged infrastructure as the harvest season and winter approach. Although we cannot yet get into Bajaur to make an assessment, what we know of how the air campaign was conducted leads us to believe that collateral damage to civilian properties and infrastructure will be significant. In ref B, we laid out expected needs, to include: tents, basic building materials, and a small monetary award to each family to assist in the return to, and rehabilitation of, areas damaged by the fighting. ¶12. (SBU) USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) has been told by the FATA secretariat that they will know this week whether they can begin operations in Bajaur. If the answer is yes, OTI will begin its "quick impact" programs, which will then be followed by USAID entities and their Livelihoods program. NEXT STEPS - LONG TERM PLANNING -------------- ISLAMABAD 00002962 004 OF 004 ¶13. (C) In addition, we hope to use this opportunity to force changes in the way Pakistani officials deal with these kinds of situations. Currently, the approach is completely ad hoc. The Pakistani side has resisted the appointment of a senior FATA coordinator/Czar in the area of operations with civilian-military authority, as was done following the October 2005 earthquake. At the national level, there is no formal system for civilian-military planning, and we cannot conclude that such planning is going on informally. Likewise, there is no apparent mechanism for coordinating public information or communicating a coherent government line or policy. Neither is there a forum in which national level and provincial level officials coordinate on either actions or on messaging. ¶14. (C) In the coming weeks, we will continue to press Pakistani officials to meet together. Now that the new civilian government is firmly in place, we will press, at the highest levels, for a session in which officials from the National Disaster Management Agency, the Ministry of Interior, the NWFP government, and the Army sit down to assess the situation in Bajaur and develop a clear strategy. We will also renew our suggestion on the appointment of a senior Pakistani to act as FATA coordinator. ¶15. (C) Our first objective is to craft a plan for delivering assistance and services now to affected populations. Our second objective is to work with the Pakistanis to craft coherent communications on issues of insurgency (putting the blame where it belongs and characterizing insurgency as a national threat, not an international problem),military operations, government support for the civilian population, etc. The third objective is to move Pakistani officials closer to some sort of civil-military planning, at least for identifiable upcoming operations in the short term. COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) Additional cables in this series will address post recommendations regarding security assistance, economic development and humanitarian relief as well as lay out a strategic communication plan. We believe that we are facing a potentially significant opportunity to change fundamentally the nature of Pakistan's engagement with us in the war on terror. Both rhetorically and tangibly, the Government of Pakistan and the Pakistani military have acknowledged that this war is aimed at them. Gone is the conceit that they are drawn into fighting "America's war." Equally gone is the notion that they can draw easy distinctions between al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and the Pakistani Taliban. The enemy here is coalescing into a single extremist entity that threatens equally Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the international community, and senior Pakistani officials are increasingly willing to recognize that reality. Thus, we believe that we have a new opportunity to change the dynamic of our cooperation here. ¶17. (C) But the opportunity is fleeting, and if we are going to succeed, it's essential that we make the same focused, intense effort here that we have made and are making in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pakistan's increasing willingness to face the realities of its situation has not translated into increased capacity to address either the military or humanitarian aspects of its engagement. To avoid having them fall back into old habits or, worse, into defeatism, requires that the U.S. step up here in a way that previous efforts have not matched. We look forward to working with Washington agencies to shape an appropriate U.S. response. PATTERSON