BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002876 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2018 TAGS: PREF PGOV PTER PREL MOPS PK SUBJECT: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND STABILIZATION REF: A. (A) ISLAMABAD 02798 ¶B. (B) ISLAMABAD 2762 Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Ref A laid out the opportunity that the current situation in Bajaur and Rajanpur presents to achieve some of our counterterrorism goals. While mission's long term programs are designed to pursue those same goals, we are missing the immediately-available funding that would allow us to help prevent insurgents from taking advantage of a displaced (and unhappy) population and extend the writ of the government at the same time. Additional funding should help us address not only the immediate humanitarian needs of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) and victims of flooding in Rajanpur, but also provide intermediate assistance to help us link humanitarian assistance with longer term reconstruction and development. ¶2. (C) Embassy is grateful for the assistance provided by USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Regional Office in Bangkok in undertaking an assessment of the humanitarian needs in both Rajanpur and Bajaur and in providing TDYers to assist in monitoring and coordinating with other donors and the GoP. We urge that Washington commit USD 8.0 million in additional funding to address needs in both places. In particular, we - and the Government of Pakistan - see a rapid and effective response to the urgent requirements, especially in Bajaur, as a critical component in bringing security and stability to the people of the affected areas, and providing a foundation upon which we can build popular sentiment that rejects militancy and extremism. With reports in the press that the Pakistani military may be considering additional operations against insurgents in other Agencies, we anticipate needing additional short fuse funding to do the same thing as part of those operations. End Summary. Response for Rajanpur - request USD 1.6 million -------------- -- ¶3. (C) Embassy Islamabad and Consulate General Lahore strongly recommend that the USG responds aggressively to the current humanitarian crisis in Rajanpur, an area that has been overlooked traditionally by the Pakistani government and where insurgents have found fertile recruiting ground. Without such assistance, the area may continue on its downward economic spiral and become a greater target for terrorist activity. ¶4. (SBU) Therefore, we are requesting a total of USD 1.6 million to provide immediate relief and implement small scale cash for work programs. These funds will provide for the clean up of flooded communities, and repair essential small scale public buildings and roads. USAID has no current mechanisms by which we can direct resources into the area. However, it is currently in the process of selecting an implementer for a national small scale infrastructure project (CRISP),which will be operational by January 2009. At that time we will transition to long-term funding for addressing the severe economic conditions in southern Punjab. The additional funds requested will build upon the initial humanitarian assistance provided and link this assistance to our longer term programs. Bajaur - request USD 6.4 million -------------- ¶5. (C) The IDP situation in Bajaur continues to be a matter of serious concern. Operations to root out significant Taliban concentrations have been on-going for several weeks and may continue for several more weeks. We believe that we are in the nascent stages of a classic counter-insurgency approach to the current situation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that we believe is essential ISLAMABAD 00002876 002 OF 003 if Pakistan is to succeed in stabilizing conditions in the FATA and denying al-Qaeda and its affiliates a key safe haven for their activities. We are told that the Bajaur operation is just the first phase of an on-going effort by the GoP against the Taliban that will likely result in the near term in further dislocations in both FATA and in neighboring districts in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). ¶6. (SBU) Both the GoP and the international community are turning their attention to addressing the needs of the people displaced by the GoP kinetic operations. To date, USG humanitarian assistance for Bajaur IDPs amounts to USD 145,000. This includes USD 50,000 in emergency assistance provided by OFDA and USD 95,000 provided by USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) under the FATA Development program. This week UNHCR indicated to us that the United Nations would provide USD 1.2 million now, and then next week launch an international flash appeal for the Bajaur IDPs. These early commitments of aid will help deal with immediate needs, but we believe that to achieve our counterinsurgency goals, we need to be prepared to assist the GoP over the longer term in returning IDPs to their homes and rehabilitating areas damaged by the fighting. ¶7. (SBU) During the course of a long discussion with the head of the GoP's National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA), General Farooq Ahmad Khan, we identified short term needs of food, water, shelter, and medicine. In the medium term, as the fighting subsides, the Pakistani strategy is to encourage people to move back to their homes as quickly as security (and weather) conditions permit, to avoid the establishment of long term IDP camps. ¶8. (SBU) Tents, basic building materials, and a small monetary award to each family will assist in the return to, and rehabilitation of, areas damaged by the fighting. With the NDMA, we settled on an initial target population of 10,000 families (about 80,000 people). The assistance package would include a monetary incentive of approximately USD 400 per family to pay for immediate needs, including home repair; tents for temporary shelter; and a weekly 25kg family food package consisting of flour, cooking oil, pulses, sugar, tea, and milk flour (to be provided for up to a month). This type of assistance package was used very effectively during the earthquake relief effort and kept thousands of families out of camps, with all the long-term dislocation, costs and social upheaval associated with the operation of such camps. The cost for this package would be about USD 6.4 million. ¶9. (C) In our discussions with national and provincial leaders, they have expressed support for this approach. Senior Pakistani leaders, including the Prime Minister, have asked we coordinate our efforts through NDMA. This will not only give us a single point of contact on the national level, but, as we work together, it will help us build the capacity of this office to handle future crises. At the same time, working through NDMA provides us the opportunity to inject a civil-military planning element which has so far been virtually absent from GoP counter-insurgency efforts. We will continue to consult closely with provincial and local officials, of course, to ensure they are brought into the planning process, and to make sure GoP officials at all levels are seen to be responding to the needs of the displaced population. ¶10. (SBU) Our intention is to use existing OTI contractors to procure and deliver assistance to GoP authorities for distribution. We prefer this approach to funneling funding through the traditional international relief organizations (IOs) for two reasons. First, by delivering aid locally, we ensure that the GoP, assisted by the U.S., is perceived by the population to be responding to their needs. Having IOs take the lead role would only feed the perception that the government creates the problem (via its military operations), but is incapable of taking care of its people. Second, local ISLAMABAD 00002876 003 OF 003 procurement will make our dollar go a lot further, as we will not be paying the administrative fees associated with working through IOs. USAID/OTI's SWIFT contracts have the ability to absorb additional funding. OTI already is working in the impacted area and already has very useful contacts and working relationships in Peshawar with provincial authorities. ¶11. (SBU) As is the case in Rajanpur, the Bajaur relief effort is a transitional activity. Following the repatriation of IDPs, both OTI and our Livelihoods contractor, would begin reconstruction and long-term development work, which would go on for several years. Funding this activity would also demonstrate to the GoP the need for forward planning in post-kinetic operations and could strengthen civil-military cooperation - one of our objectives for our FATA program. ¶12. (SBU) In addition to OFDA resources provided for flood relief, USAID/OTI's FATA Development Program is providing USD 400,000 to repair damaged infrastructure in Khyber. One of the contractors under the USAID Livelihoods Program is also allocating an additional USD 6.5 million in reconstruction assistance to help communities recover from the devastation of the flooding in Khyber and the settled areas in Peshawar. ¶13. (SBU) Mission is pleased to have Le Grand Malany from OFDA here for several weeks to help coordinate assistance activities. Mr. Malany's services will be used to finalize details of our proposal and make recommendations on implementation and management. ¶14. (C) Comment. Mission is grateful to OFDA for the excellent support it has provided in addressing the complex emergency caused by flooding and war. We believe that we have a significant opening at this time to respond to critical needs as identified by the Government of Pakistan in ways that address not only an immediate humanitarian situation but also demonstrate an approach to militancy and extremism in the country that will serve our long-term goals in the war on terror. PATTERSON