NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT: A NON-STARTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000238 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PK SUBJECT: NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT: A NON-STARTER REF: ISLAMABAD 226 Classified By: CDA Peter Bodde, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The trial balloon launched to test the idea of a national unity government combined with an election delay (reftels) was shot down very quickly. President Musharraf and all the major political parties have firmly rejected the idea. However, the political and security uncertainty that likely prompted the proposal remains a concern, and we continue to hear rumors of an election delay. We should seek every opportunity to insist that elections be held on February 18. End summary. ¶2. (C) Reftels describe a trial balloon launched during a meeting in Islamabad on January 14 by Musharraf envoy Brig (Ret) Niaz Ahmad, who approached Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) President Shahbaz Sharif about the possibility of forming a national unity government which would oversee Pakistan for a year, thus delaying the scheduled February 18 national and provincial elections. Public reaction to the idea has been swift and negative. Musharraf himself rejected the idea in public statements January 15. PML-N has now backed off the idea, and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League have also opposed the idea as impractical and/or undesirable. Too little, too late -------------- ¶3. (C) The reasons for seeking a national government were sound from the government's perspective. It would buy time for the PML party to recover from the Bhutto assassination and criticism over electricity and flour shortages. It also would ostensibly answer the opposition's demands for a neutral caretaker government that could organize free and fair elections. If Musharraf had followed that reasoning in appointing the caretaker government, he could have significantly increased public confidence in credible elections. ¶4. (C) The current prospects for forming a national unity government, however, are dismal. PPP leaders anticipate an opportunity to lead the next government and know that a year's delay will expose growing rifts within the party and dilute the sympathy vote following Bhutto's assassination. The olive branch to PML-N was offered to Shahbaz Sharif, but we question whether Nawaz Sharif would step back and allow his younger brother to participate in a unity government without Nawaz's presence. PML would still want to lead this unity government, prompting endless inter-party squabbling about whether to participate or on what terms. Given Musharraf's low public popularity, we doubt a unity government can be formed at all, much less in the five weeks before elections. ¶5. (C) A national unity government formed on the premise of a year-long delay in elections is misguided for several reasons. A further delay in elections will send PPP adherents into the streets where they would exacerbate already tense Sindh-Punjab relations. Any unity government would be a weak coalition competing from day one for the next election and unable to focus on growing terrorist militancy or the need for energy and economic reforms. An election delay also would undermine domestic and international credibility in the current government and the prospects for democracy. Why Now? -------------- ¶6. (C) This trial balloon comes on the heels of growing political and security uncertainty in the run-up to February 28 elections. No one party will win enough seats to form a government, so the game is one of coalition building, and there is rampant speculation about who will align with whom after the elections. There also is a leadership struggle taking place within the PPP, which is further confusing the issue of who might lead the next government. At a minimum, this confusion will complicate and delay post-election government formation for weeks, if not months. ¶7. (C) Musharraf himself is still trying to find his place ISLAMABAD 00000238 002 OF 002 as a civilian president. Army Chief of Staff Kayani is publicly distancing the Army from politics and taking the expected steps to normalize relations between the military and a now civilian president. The opposition, particularly Nawaz Sharif, continues to call for Musharraf's ouster. In a well-publicized statement, Musharraf said last week that he would quit if the opposition in the next National Assembly tried to impeach him over his actions during the state of emergency. Musharraf has been forced in recent weeks to publicly distance himself from the U.S. because of press articles indicating that the U.S. is considering unilateral military action in the tribal areas. His government is also on the defensive about rising food prices and electricity shortages. ¶8. (C) Into this mix, the growing number of suicide and other bombings, most recently in Lahore and Karachi, are also increasing unease. RSO recently provided Nawaz Sharif's security team with a briefing on security at their request; press reports indicate that Nawaz, former Interior Minister Sherpao, former Railways Minister Sheikh Rashid, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam leader Fazlur Rehman, and others have received specific threats. The Ministry of Interior January 15 announced that all politicians faced a "looming threat" and urged close liaison with police/security officials; the opposition rejected the advisory saying it was the government's responsibility to protect opposition leaders. From our own observations of party headquarters and political rallies, neither ruling nor opposition party leaders are acting responsibly to increase their own security. Difficult Choices -------------- ¶9. (C) Our analysis shows that the PML remains strong in Punjab, and the race between PPP and PML will be very close. The common wisdom currently, however, is that Bhutto's assassination will translate into a PPP victory. This puts Musharraf and his PML party in a politically difficult position. If the PPP wins a majority in the election, the PML will have at best a secondary role in the next government. A PPP loss, however, may send people into the streets, especially in Sindh, if the public decides that the elections were fraudulent. Neither the Army nor the intelligence services would relish the prospect of adding riot control in Sindh to their current plate of militant battles in the tribal areas and suicide bombings across the country. ¶10. (C) Given these uncertainties, we continue to hear reports of an election delay. In every opportunity with Musharraf and the current government, we will continue to press for elections to proceed as scheduled on February 18. Post-election, there are still real opportunities for a moderate coalition government that can best move our shared objectives forward. BODDE