AMBASSADOR BRIEFS MOD ON SECURITY ISSUES

S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 002365

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BRIEFS MOD ON SECURITY ISSUES

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (S/NF) Ambassador, RAO and the Office of Defense
Representative July 9 briefed Defense Minister Mukhtar on
U.S. intelligence cooperation, military cross border
operations and U.S.-Pakistan security assistance. Mukhtar
noted that press reports about impending unilateral military
action, civilian casualities caused by strikes, and the death
June 10 of 11 Pakistani military personnel increased pressure
on the GOP to distance itself from the U.S. and "sets us back
in a common struggle" to provide training for the Frontier
Corps. Defense Secretary Rasool noted that the MOD had to
catch the Prime Minister at the airport to obtain approval to
release $140 million for the June 15 F-16 payment; it would
be "very hard" to also make the $61 million overdue payment
for the mid-life upgrade. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) Ambassador, accompanied by RAO Archibald, Office
of Defense Representative (ODRP) MG Helmly and Polcouns
(notetaker) met July 9 with Defense Minister Ahmed Mukhtar,
Defense Secretary Rasool, and Rear Admiral Tanveer Faz. This
was one of a series of briefings the Embassy is providing on
security/defense issues for Pakistan's new civilian
leadership. We have provided the same briefing to PM Gilani,
Pakistan People's Party leader Asif Zardari, Pakistan Muslim
League-N leader Nawaz Sharif and several ministers.

Intelligence Brief


3. (S/NF) Archibald provided Mukhtar with a briefing on al
Qaeda activities in Pakistan and the threat that al Qaeda and
Taliban activities in Pakistan pose for both the U.S. and
Pakistan itself. He reviewed al Qaeda training techniques
and organizational structure and the history of plots
emanating from Pakistan against western targets over the past
seven years. He explained how militants had exploited the
hiatus and safe haven provided by peace negotiations to
regroup their forces and detailed the increasing ties among
foreign fighters, local Taliban sympathizers and the Afghan
Taliban network.


4. (S/NF) Explaining that al Qaeda was copying classic
Maoist insurgency strategy, Archibald noted that Pakistan was
between the subversion stage (talibanization and intimidation
through attacks on girls' schools, barber shops, CD shops,
etc) into the guerrilla warfare stage (attacks on security
forces and police; increased coordination between criminal
warlords like Mangal Bagh and militants like Baitullah
Mehsud). Unless Pakistan could contain this trend, cautioned
Archibald, they would soon be facing the final stage of
insurgency, large-scale military operations against the
militants.


5. (S/NF) Mukhtar expressed appreciation for the briefing
and asked that the U.S. understand the difficulty of his
position. Constant media reports suggesting the U.S. plans
to launch unilateral military operations and the June 10
incident where a U.S. strike killed 11 Pakistani security
forces, according to Mukhtar, was putting pressure on the
government to distance itself from the U.S. This is
complicated by the confusion over the U.S. rules of
engagement in Pakistan, said Mukhtar.


6. (S/NF) Ambassador responded that we understood Mukhtar's
difficulties, but that border incidents had increased 40%
over last year and this was increasing pressure on Washington
as well. In response to Rasool's question, Ambassador
stressed that many media reports of U.S. strikes were
factually inaccurate; in one case recently, an explosion of
arms at a militant camp was wrongly interpreted as being the
result of a U.S. strike. Helmly clarified that U.S. military
aircraft transiting Pakistani airspace en route to
Afghanistan were not used in strikes against Pakistan.

Cross-Border Operations


7. (S/NF) MG Helmly explained the complex, unpredictable
reality of night-time combat in the mountainous area of the
Pakistan-Afghan border. The majority of ground engagements
occurred between 8 pm and 6 am, often in bad weather;
coordination was based on verbal (usually radio) exchanges
using maps with different Pakistani and Afghan names for the
same geographical areas across an unrecognized border line.
Helmly noted that problems with ground coordination were
compounded by a high level of distrust and miscommunication
between poorly trained Pakistani Frontier Corps and Afghan
Border Police. This murky situation, suggested Helmly,
invites fratricide like that which occurred on June 10.
Helmly noted that the combined investigation of the June 10
incident was ongoing and said we hoped the report would
include recommendations on how to reduce the possibility of
further such incidents. The incident was demonstrable
evidence that we needed to begin tripartite operation of the
Border Coordination Centers as soon as possible.


8. (S/NF) Helmly outlined the three rules of engagement
governing use of FORCE by the U.S.: (1) if a U.S. commander
has intelligence about an imminent threat from a site within
10 km inside Pakistan, he may take action against that site;
(2) if ground or aerial forces are in hot pursuit of a
target, they can follow and strike 10 km inside Pakistan; and
(3) if U.S. troops are being fired upon by a site 10 km
within Pakistan, we can return fire.


9. (S/NF) Mukhtar said that the Pakistani perception of the
June 10 incident was that the U.S. strike was deliberate, not
accidental or the result of confusion. He noted the ongoing
communication during the day between Pakistani and U.S.
forces that demonstrated who was where. Mukhtar lamented
that the incident "sets us back in a common struggle" against
military forces because both the public and the Pakistani
military were deeply upset over the incident. Civilian
causalities, he insisted, were inevitable in all scenarios.


10. (S/NF) Helmly noted that the uptick in border
engagements was due to three factors: (1) the annual
spring/summer fighting season; (2) a "thickened battle space"
as a result of having more U.S./ISAF forces on the ground,
especially in Kandahar, Helmond and Konain; and (3) a lack of
pressure from the east, which had allowed the militants to
focus more intently on coalition forces. Helmly also stated
that the militants were changing tactics--using more suicide
bombings and IEDs against government targets in both Pakistan
and Afghanistan. The intensity and increasing sophistication
of a growing level of close border engagements, said Helmly,
reinforced the importance of Pak/Afghan/U.S. coordination,
especially in the Border Coordination Centers.

Security Assistance
--------------


11. (C) Helmly provided Mukhtar with a power point briefing
outlining U.S. security cooperation programs with Pakistan,
highlighting both the F-16 program and the train and equip
program for Pakistan's special forces (SSG) and the Frontier
Corps. Noting that President Bush's commitment for $300
million per year in FMF expired in 2009, Helmly urged that we
coordinate closely with Pakistan's Joint Staff to craft
future FMF proposals that met the expectations of the U.S.
Congress. He reported that the administration was working
with the Congress to gain approval for Pakistan's request to
use FMF for the F-16 mid-life upgrade program. However, he
cautioned this would take some time and urged Pakistan to
make the $61 million late payment for the mid-life upgrade.


12. (C) Rasool responded that this was "an immense problem
for us." To obtain approval to use national funds to make
the $140 million F-16 payment that was due on June 15, the
Air Chief Marshall and MinDef had to appeal to PM Gilani.
"We had to catch him at the airport" to convince him to tell
the Finance Minister to release the funds said Rasool. "It
will be very hard to meet the July 31 date for payment of the
$61 million."


PATTERSON