WALI KHAN'S STRATEGY FOR CONTAINING MILITANCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 002328


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK
SUBJECT: WALI KHAN'S STRATEGY FOR CONTAINING MILITANCY

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Summary. Awami National Party (ANP) leader
Asfundyar Wali Khan told Ambassador July 7 that security in
Peshawar was under control. He questioned the seriousness of
the recent Khyber operation in Bara, but said that if the
Pakistani security forces can continue to push the militants
into the mountains and control the silk road, the ANP can
clean up Khyber and control Swat "within two months." Khan
reiterated his opposition to the South Waziristan accord as
originally drafted, defended the Swat accord, and repeated
his support for using bribes and inter-tribal rivalries to
keep the peace. He recommended that the GOP confiscate land
from Siraj Haqqani, who controls Baitullah Mehsud. Khan
urged Musharraf to sign an executive order allowing the
political parties to operate in the tribal areas, said the
names of Pakistan's mini-jirga participants should be
announced soon, and reported that the ANP would be forming
lashkars (militias) to help keep the peace. Khan admitted
there were strains in his relationship with Pakistan People's
Party leader Asif Zardari over the GOP's policy towards the
militants. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador and Polcouns met July 7 with Awami
National Party (ANP) leader Asfundyar Wali Khan in Islamabad.
Wali Khan appeared tired and worn out after the death of his
brother and the ensuing days of condolence calls.


3. (C) Khan said the situation around Peshawar was under
control but questioned the seriousness of the recent Frontier
Corps (FC) action in Khyber Agency, saying that the XI Corps
Commander had admitted that no real militants had been
arrested and no significant arms had been seized. Khan
claimed that the house that had been destroyed did not even
belong to criminal warlord Mangal Bagh. Why, Khan asked, did
the FC go after Bagh? Bagh was a "reformist" who opposed the
Taliban and was at odds with Nam Dar, a militant leader who
supported the Taliban. This action will make Dar and his
ally Baitullah Mehsud stronger at Bagh's expense, said Khan,
and Dar will continue transferring foreign fighters fleeing
Swat into Bara, Khyber. Most locals believed, said Khan,
that the operation was an "eyewash" to pacify visiting South
and Central Asia Assistant Secretary Boucher. Khan offered
to share with post a list of houses in Bara where foreign
fighters were hiding.

ANP-PPP Relations
--------------


4. (C) Khan expressed frustration -- which he said he had
shared with Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Asif Zardari
-- that "people (i.e., Interior Minister Rehman Malik) who
did not know the difference between the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Northwest Frontier
Province (NWFP) were making decisions about military action."
NWFP Governor Ghani, said Khan, understood that proposals by
Malik to move military forces into the rugged Tirah Valley
were not feasible. "Malik does not even know the geography,"
claimed Khan.


5. (C) Khan admitted he had had several "spats" with
Zardari over coalition policy for the border areas. "If I
cannot contribute, I will resign," said Khan. But he denied
that the ANP had not coordinated with the government on the
Swat accord by insisting that a PPP provincial minister was a
signatory to the deal. When Nawaz Sharif came to pay a
condolence call, Khan said he told him "the judges are not my
problem, survival is."

ANP-ISI Relations
--------------


6. (C) Khan reported that he had met with both
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief LtGen Nadeem Taj and
ISI Directorate C Chief MG Nusrat Naeem. They had confronted
Khan because he did not support the proposed South Wazisistan
accord. Yes, Khan said, he opposed the accord because he
insisted that it include provisions prohibiting the use of
land or people in attacks into Afghanistan, and the list of
prisoners to be exchanged should have been publicized in
advance. They also complained that the ANP did not take ISI
into confidence before signing the Swat accord. Khan
admitted that he should have had the Swat accord translated
into English and distributed it more widely.


7. (C) ISI, said Khan was trying to reverse course. When
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Kayani was ISI chief, he
adopted a more vigorous policy of combating the militants,
and this convinced the militants to start attacking Pakistan
rather than ISAF troops in Afghanistan. Now, ISI is trying
to make peace for Pakistan at the expense of events in
Afghanistan. Without coordination among the various
government entities, however, Khan predicted the shift would
be counterproductive.

Solutions
--------------


8. (C) Khan outlined several strategies for combating
terrorists and controlling the border:

(a) Amend the Political Parties Act to allow parties to
operate in FATA. If the Prime Minister could do this, said
Khan, the changes would already have been made, but it
requires an executive order signed by President Musharraf.

(b) Re-instigate the pre-Soviet invasion practice of having
both the GOA and the GOP paying off the maliks in the tribal
regions to keep the peace. "I am a Pashtun and it is
embarrassing to admit this, but we Pashtuns take money in
exchange for behavior." The practice died out when outside
forces pumped millions into the mujahadeen movement, but Khan
believed it was time to reconstitute what was a "cheap"
solution to enforce peace in the tribal area. Khan said he
had discussed the idea with President Karzai, who had agreed
it was a good initiative.

(c) The ANP, reported Khan, was re-forming Peace and Defense
Committees (which traditionally keep the peace during party
meetings) not just for the NWFP but for FATA. These lashkars
(militias) from the Afridi tribe could clean out the
militants in Khyber "within two months" if other forces
(Army, Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary) keep the
momentum up and sweep criminals and militants into the
mountains beyond Bara. Khan said he might ask the U.S. for
some logistical help in this effort. He also pleaded for
arms and equipment for the Frontier Constabulary.

(d) Khan said he told Kayani, "control the silk route
(through the mountains),and the ANP will control Swat."
Khan assessed the current situation in Swat as fluid but
noted that the U.S. should recognize there are two groups in
Swat -- the militants led by Maulana Fazlullah in lower Swat,
and the tribes that oppose him in upper Swat. Fazlullah owes
his allegiance to Baitullah Mehsud, but Mehsud is "an idiot,
a pawn" who takes orders from Siraj Haqqani. Khan evaded the
Ambassador's question of why the GOP had not arrested Siraj
since they know where he is and responded, "Siraj has
millions of dollars worth of real estate in Miranshah and
Mirali -- why doesn't the GOP confiscate his lands?"
Hekmatyar remains loyal to his base support in Jaish Mohammad
and Lashkar-e-Taiyba (LET),said Khan. "Who created Jaish
and LET? ISI did, so they should be able to control
Hekmatyar," asserted Khan. He noted that both Baitullah
Mehsud's brother and Hekmatyar's son managed to pay
condolence calls on him in Chardsaddah and return home
without being arrested--"what does this tell you?" asked Khan.

(e) Reach out to reconcilables. Khan described how the ANP
was using Sufi Mohammed to build support against jihad; since
Sufi's release he has publicly condemned violence openly and
opposed cross border attacks into Afghanistan. Sufi has even
called his daughter (who is married to Maulana Fazlullah)
back, said Khan. "If Sufi is willing to apologize publicly,
why kill him?" At the same time, Khan asked that the ANP
stop being criticized for bringing Sharia to Swat--"all we
have done is bring back the law that was predominant in the
area when Benazir Bhutto was Prime Minister."

(f) Finalize the jirga participant list and schedule the
mini-jirga with Afghanistan as soon as possible. Khan said
he was reviewing the GOP's draft list and hoped it would be
finalized soon. He indicated there was ongoing debate about
who would lead the Pakistani side. "MOI Malik would be a
disaster; it has to be a Pashtun, and any elder would do."
He said he needed to remain free to work the jirga from
behind the scenes.

(g) Exploit inter-tribal differences--"use Commander Nazir
to counter Baitullah Mehsud." Ambassador pushed back, saying
that Nazir was running operations into Afghanistan with ISI
knowledge. In response, Khan said "you have to control the
imam who is leading the prayers, and then you can control the
followers." Khan reported that there were foreign fighters
in Wana -- approximately 600 of them. "We need to wean the
tribals away from the militants; although 80% of Pashtuns
have an AK-47, that isn't enough," said Khan, to go up
against these militants. ISI, he said, gave us 17,000
AK-47s, but it is not enough.


9. (C) Comment: Khan's complex plan of engaging some
tribals and setting others against each other is one that the
GOP does not appear capable of implementing effectively.
There are still too many disconnects between the provincial
and national levels, and the ANP is having trouble educating
its coalition partners on the nuances of tribal politics.
Until the ANP can define a sellable strategy to Zardari,
these disconnects are likely to continue--to the militants'
advantage.


PATTERSON