USDP EDELMAN MEETS WITH PAKISTAN CJCSC GENERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 002317

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MASS PK
SUBJECT: USDP EDELMAN MEETS WITH PAKISTAN CJCSC GENERAL
TARIQ MAJID

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: Under Secretary for Defense Policy Eric
Edelman met June 2 with General Tariq Majid, Pakistan's
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. USDP Edelman and
Majid discussed strains on the Pakistan military and recent
peace negotiations in the tribal areas. Majid also supported
U.S. assistance to the Frontier Corps and urged continuing
support for the F-16 program. End Summary.


2. (C) General Majid agreed with USDP Edelman that the U.S.
and Pakistan shared long-term, common objectives and that the
rising insurgency posed a serious threat to Pakistan's
security. USDP Edelman noted the U.S. had learned some
critical lessons about counterinsurgency strategy from its
experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially the need to
adapt to shifting challenges. The U.S. would like to share
this knowledge with Pakistan to enhance the military's
effectiveness in combating militants in the tribal areas.


3. (C) Majid thanked USDP Edelman for his offer of support
and observed that the war on terror had taken a serious toll
on Pakistan over the past six years. Pakistan's military was
seriously over-extended, he added. Between forces deployed
on the western and eastern borders, as well as on UN
missions, Pakistan had 140 of 190 infantry elements employed.
At this rate, Majid said, "we cannot continue to sustain our
forces."


4. (C) USDP Edelman shared USG concerns regarding potential
consequences of proposed and completed peace agreements in
border areas, particularly the possibility that cross-border
attacks could increase. Majid responded that the new
coalition government faced "tremendous challenges" and was
struggling to cope with them. He acknowledged the 2006 peace
agreement with North Waziristan had ultimately failed, but
said it had served to temporarily stem the spread of
militancy by opening a dialogue with local leaders. The
tribal system must be used, he insisted, because the Army
could not succeed in these areas without engagement with the
tribes. Regarding current peace negotiations, Majid
asserted, "it won't work if we do not give it a chance to
work." Majid stressed that the government was seeking to
engage local leaders, but not hardened, "irreconcilable"
militants. Make no mistake, said Majid, "Pakistan wants
Baitullah Mehsud dead."


5. (C) Responding to USDP Edelman's remarks regarding
congressional authorities for DOD support in training and
equipping the Frontier Corps, Majid agreed on the need to
enhance the Frontier Corps' capabilities and said he
supported expanding the role of the Frontier Corps in the
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan. Majid
also emphasized the need to move forward in establishing
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Economic and
infrastructure development were key to establishing
long-term, sustainable stability in those areas.


6. (C) Majid stressed the symbolic importance of the F-16
program to Pakistanis who are convinced U.S. engagement with
Pakistan is temporary and driven solely by U.S. security
interests, often at the expense of Pakistan's security
interests. The F-16 program was a tangible commitment by the
U.S. to Pakistan's national security and to a long-term
relationship between the nations. Majid said the government
was genuinely cash-strapped because of the growing economic
crisis and urged the U.S. to allow Pakistan to apply a
greater percentage of its FMF to the F-16 mid-life upgrade
(MLU) case.


7. (U) This cable was cleared by USDP Edelman.

PATTERSON