USDP EDELMAN MEETS WITH PAKISTAN CJCSC GENERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 002317 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MASS PK SUBJECT: USDP EDELMAN MEETS WITH PAKISTAN CJCSC GENERAL TARIQ MAJID Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Under Secretary for Defense Policy Eric Edelman met June 2 with General Tariq Majid, Pakistan's Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. USDP Edelman and Majid discussed strains on the Pakistan military and recent peace negotiations in the tribal areas. Majid also supported U.S. assistance to the Frontier Corps and urged continuing support for the F-16 program. End Summary. ¶2. (C) General Majid agreed with USDP Edelman that the U.S. and Pakistan shared long-term, common objectives and that the rising insurgency posed a serious threat to Pakistan's security. USDP Edelman noted the U.S. had learned some critical lessons about counterinsurgency strategy from its experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially the need to adapt to shifting challenges. The U.S. would like to share this knowledge with Pakistan to enhance the military's effectiveness in combating militants in the tribal areas. ¶3. (C) Majid thanked USDP Edelman for his offer of support and observed that the war on terror had taken a serious toll on Pakistan over the past six years. Pakistan's military was seriously over-extended, he added. Between forces deployed on the western and eastern borders, as well as on UN missions, Pakistan had 140 of 190 infantry elements employed. At this rate, Majid said, "we cannot continue to sustain our forces." ¶4. (C) USDP Edelman shared USG concerns regarding potential consequences of proposed and completed peace agreements in border areas, particularly the possibility that cross-border attacks could increase. Majid responded that the new coalition government faced "tremendous challenges" and was struggling to cope with them. He acknowledged the 2006 peace agreement with North Waziristan had ultimately failed, but said it had served to temporarily stem the spread of militancy by opening a dialogue with local leaders. The tribal system must be used, he insisted, because the Army could not succeed in these areas without engagement with the tribes. Regarding current peace negotiations, Majid asserted, "it won't work if we do not give it a chance to work." Majid stressed that the government was seeking to engage local leaders, but not hardened, "irreconcilable" militants. Make no mistake, said Majid, "Pakistan wants Baitullah Mehsud dead." ¶5. (C) Responding to USDP Edelman's remarks regarding congressional authorities for DOD support in training and equipping the Frontier Corps, Majid agreed on the need to enhance the Frontier Corps' capabilities and said he supported expanding the role of the Frontier Corps in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan. Majid also emphasized the need to move forward in establishing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Economic and infrastructure development were key to establishing long-term, sustainable stability in those areas. ¶6. (C) Majid stressed the symbolic importance of the F-16 program to Pakistanis who are convinced U.S. engagement with Pakistan is temporary and driven solely by U.S. security interests, often at the expense of Pakistan's security interests. The F-16 program was a tangible commitment by the U.S. to Pakistan's national security and to a long-term relationship between the nations. Majid said the government was genuinely cash-strapped because of the growing economic crisis and urged the U.S. to allow Pakistan to apply a greater percentage of its FMF to the F-16 mid-life upgrade (MLU) case. ¶7. (U) This cable was cleared by USDP Edelman. PATTERSON