CODELS LEVIN AND CASEY DISCUSS SECURITY WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002042

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL PINR ECON PK
SUBJECT: CODELS LEVIN AND CASEY DISCUSS SECURITY WITH
PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: President Musharraf met with Senator Levin
and Senator Casey May 25 to discuss Pakistan's
counterterrorism efforts, recent peace agreements in the
border areas, U.S. security assistance, and the worsening
economic situation. Musharraf supported the agreements,
saying the military would enforce border security if tribal
leaders failed to do so. Musharraf also reflected on the
deteriorating economic situation, noting the coalition
government would need to take "tough" decisions to put it
back on track. Musharraf asserted said the U.S.-Pakistan
relationship should be characterized by more trust and
respect from the U.S. Regarding his political future,
Musharraf said he intended to make some "personal decisions"
in coming days. End Summary.

AGREEMENTS AND COUNTERTERRORISM: "NOT A BLACK AND WHITE GAME"


2. (C) On May 25, Senator Carl Levin and Senator Robert P.
Casey, Jr. met with President Pervez Musharraf in his
personal residence in Rawalpindi; they began the meeting with
a discussion of Pakistan's security situation and efforts to
combat extremism in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas,
particularly the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).


3. (C) Senator Levin asked if the increase in suicide
bombings in Pakistan had impacted the efforts of the
Government of Pakistan (GOP) to secure the border against
militants. President Musharraf responded that in developing
its counterterrorism strategy, Pakistan had to address both
international and domestic threats. The international threat
was posed by al Qaeda and other foreign extremist groups who
crossed the Pakistan-Afghanistan border for safe haven and
recruitment. The domestic threat was posed by Pakistan-based
Taliban groups based within the FATA and responsible for
suicide bombings throughout the country and the "insidious"
spread of talibanism to settled areas. Musharraf observed
that these groups often had links to al Qaeda.


4. (C) Senators Levin and Casey expressed concerns regarding
the enforceability of recent peace deals with tribal elders
aimed at denying access and safe haven to militants.
Musharraf acknowledged FATA tribal leaders did not easily
accept their responsibility and acknowledged trouble would
likely continue in these areas. Nonetheless, the peace
agreements should go forward, Musharraf said, in hopes they
could reduce cross-border attacks and extremist influence in
tribal areas. The primary elements of such agreements, he
said, should be keeping al Qaeda out, blocking their
cross-border attacks, and, perhaps, a timeline for their
eradication.


5. (C) Agreeing it would prove difficult to enforce such
agreements, Musharraf said that if the tribesmen failed to
uphold their side of the agreements, then the military would
take immediate measures, including sealing the border. The
military would not allow cross-border attacks to go on
unchecked. The President also stressed the need for improved
surveillance capability, noting he had requested more
sophisticated equipment from the U.S.


6. (C) Senator Levin asked if Taliban leader, Baitullah
Mehsud, was involved in the South Waziristan negotiations,
observing that Mehsud had publicly announced he would welcome
Osama Bin Laden. Musharraf said he thought it possible
Mehsud was involved. (Note: GOP officials - both federal and
local - deny that Mehsud participated in any talks or
negotiations. End Note.) Musharraf agreed Mehsud was a
serious threat, adding that he was responsible for many
suicide bombings. Pakistan's forces would, Musharraf
insisted, "eliminate" Mehsud if they got the chance.
Acknowledging the contradiction in possible negotiations with
a man targeted for elimination, Musharraf said this was not a
"black and white game;" it was sometimes a "vicious game," in
which one could not always choose the players. If the tribal
leaders doubled-crossed the government, said Musharraf, then
the government "would do the same to them."

BUILDING UP THE FRONTIER CORPS


7. (C) Regarding Pakistan's efforts to strengthen its

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counterinsurgency capability, Musharraf described the
government's efforts to build up the Frontier Corps. He
noted the GOP had added 12 wings (roughly equivalent to 12
battalions) and planned to raise four more. To make the
Frontier Corps more effective, Musharraf said the
command-and-control structure had been "decentralized,"
dividing the area of responsibility into four command
sectors. The government was also working to improve training
and equipment, but Musharraf noted that more funding was
needed for this effort. The Ambassador pointed out that USD
275 million in supplemental funding had been requested to
strengthen the Frontier Corps.


8. (C) Senator Levin wondered if the Frontier Corps would be
more effective if its senior military leaders were Pashtun
and if the ARMY intended to direct more Pashtun soldiers to
officer training. (Note: Very few ARMY officers speak
Pashto, the language spoken by the Frontier Corps.)
Musharraf agreed this was a good idea and noted the ARMY
sought to appoint Pashtuns to leadership positions when
possible. On a related topic, Musharraf said the ARMY
avoided assigning members of the Frontier Corps to their own
tribal areas to prevent forcing the men to fight fellow
tribesmen.


9. (C) Senator Casey asked what element posed the greatest
challenge in terms of border security. Musharraf said the
new coalition government needed to "step up and show
ownership" of the problem; now that they were in power, they
could not "pass the buck" and blame him. Musharraf said he
knew the government opposed the militants, but he did not
think the "concerted will" was there to go after them. It
was easier, he said, to blame the military. Musharraf also
charged the media with unjustified criticisms of the Army.


10. (C) Senator Levin asked if substantial U.S. security
assistance contributed to the perception that Pakistan was
serving as a U.S. proxy in the war on terror. Musharraf
assured the Senator it did not.

MUSHARRAF SAYS TRUST IS THE KEY


11. (C) When asked how the U.S. could best strengthen
bilateral relations and create a more positive perception of
the U.S. in Pakistan, Musharraf asserted that trust was the
key. The U.S. needed to demonstrate it trusted Pakistan,
especially in light of the widely-held view that the U.S. had
let Pakistan down in the past and was only engaged now to
further its own interests. Musharraf noted that Pakistan
feels the U.S. treats India as an equal partner - unlike
Pakistan - particularly on nuclear issues. He stated the
nation's nuclear assets were "the pride of each and every
man" in Pakistan, but the U.S. would not accept this. The
U.S., Musharraf stated, preferred the bombs in Israel and
India because they were not "Muslim bombs."


12. (C) Regarding security assistance, Musharraf said
Pakistan had not been given much help in the context of the
struggle Pakistan faced and the assistance the U.S. was
providing in Iraq and Afghanistan. He said more could be
done on the economic assistance front as well -
reconstruction opportunity zones (ROZs),greater market
access, a bilateral investment treaty, etc. Regarding the
USD 750 million FATA Development Plan, Musharraf said
Pakistan hadn't "seen a penny."


13. (C) Senator Casey asked if the perception of the average
Pakistani was that the U.S. was not here for the long-term
and Musharraf replied affirmatively, noting that the more
educated citizenry assumed the U.S. would be engaged with
Pakistan over the long-term but for its own security
interests and not to help Pakistan. Musharraf said this
perception was based on past experience, noting the
U.S.-Pakistan relationship has been seriously strained at
times. He specifically referred to the interrupted F-16 deal
in the early 1990s as still being a sore point with the
Pakistani people, recalling that not only had the U.S.
refused to deliver F-16s purchased by Pakistan, but had
charged Pakistan storage costs for the planes.


14. (C) Musharraf stressed the importance of political
stability in promoting Pakistan's economic well-being and

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success in counterterrorism efforts. Expressing surprise at
how fast the economy had spiraled downward, Musharraf said
foreign investors were now shying away. He added that he
hoped the coalition government could solve these problems and
put the "derailed" economy back on track, though it might
require some tough decisions.

MUSHARRAF CONSIDERING HIS FUTURE


15. (C) Regarding his future, Musharraf said that he could
not yet comment until he knew himself what it would be, but
that he needed to "take some personal decisions" in the
coming days.


16. (U) CODELS Levin and Casey did not clear this cable.

PATTERSON