CODEL SCHIFF MEETS PML-N INFO SECRETARY AHSAN IQBAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002041

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: CODEL SCHIFF MEETS PML-N INFO SECRETARY AHSAN IQBAL

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: Codel Schiff -- U.S. Representatives ADAM
Schiff (D-CA) and Allyson Schwartz (D-PA) -- met May 27 with
Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) Information Secretary
and National Assemblyman Ahsan Iqbal. He argued that the
U.S. had relied too heavily on President Pervez Musharraf,
particularly to fight the war on terror. This is really "our
war," Iqbal argued, but the Pakistani public did not perceive
it that way. Iqbal insisted that the pre-November 3
judiciary would be restored. Though his party hoped to
continue to stay in the government coalition, it had to
withdraw from the federal cabinet when the 30-day deadline
passed and would join thousands in the streets if the former
judges were not put back on the bench, he warned. He ended
by suggesting that the U.S. should deploy more "soft power"
through parliamentary exchanges, social development projects,
and American university satellite campuses; the USG had given
too much military aid over the years. End summary.

Aiming for Musharraf
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2. (C) PML-N Information Secretary Ahsan Iqbal launched his
May 27 meeting with Codel Schiff by stating that "the root
cause of all Pakistan's problems is our many military
dictatorships." Pointedly including President Pervez
Musharraf, Iqbal recounted how each military leader was
forced to target the country's mainstream political parties
in order to legitimize their own rule and eliminate
legitimate competition. However, this course of action
inevitably creates space for marginal groups, such as
religious parties, which would otherwise not win popular
support, Iqbal argued.


3. (C) Iqbal criticized the U.S.'s acceptance of the
"Musharraf myth," i.e., that without him religious parties
would sweep to power. It was the opposite, Iqbal explained.
By banning Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Benazir
Bhutto and Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) leader Nawaz
Sharif from the 2002 parliamentary elections, the religious
parties won more (not fewer) seats in the national and
provincial assemblies. He further noted that PPP and PML-N
party workers were arrested during the 2007 state of
emergency not alleged terrorists or even religious party
workers.


4. (C) Iqbal continued that Pakistanis' popular perception
was that Musharraf had given into the USG's agenda in
exchange for his staying in power. Consequently, the war on
terror (GWOT) was not widely supported. And yet, Iqbal
insisted, "this is our war." The PML-N hoped to convince the
Pakistani people to support the fight against extremism,
Iqbal committed.

With the PPP
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5. (C) The PML-N hoped its coalition with the PPP would
survive, Iqbal commented, but its ministers, including
himself, had to leave the federal cabinet when the
pre-November 3 judges were not restored within the 30-day
deadline. "This was our number one issue in the election
campaign," Iqbal stated, arguing that Musharraf had imposed
the current judiciary on the country. But PML-N's absence
from the cabinet was a "temporary crisis," he assured the
codel, adding that his party would continue to give
"unconditional support to the PPP-led GOP.


6. (C) Iqbal revealed that the two coalition partners
continued to negotiate on the modalities of restoring the
judiciary. The bone of contention continued to be the future
status of former Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar
Chaudhry. The PML-N, though, would not agree to any
amendments package until the lawyers' movement and civil
society groups concurred, Iqbal insisted. If not satisfied,
he warned, a hundred thousand Chaudhry supporters could be
mobilized. The protesters would be joined by the
economically disadvantaged, Iqbal added.


7. (C) Returning to Musharraf, Iqbal advocated for his
impeachment, though resignation seemed acceptable to the
PML-N and "more honorable" for the President. Iqbal lamented

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that Musharraf was surrounded by a "cadre of bad advisors."

Exchanges
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8. (C) Noting that this visit was under the aegis of the
House Democracy Assistance Commission, Iqbal made a pitch for
more legislature-to-legislature exchanges and support. He
feared Pakistan's parliament lacked sufficient infrastructure
to monitor the executive, particularly the country's military
complex. More staff was needed, and they should be
independent experts, said Iqbal, additionally advocating for
parliament-sponsored think tanks.


9. (C) But instead of democracy assistance, Iqbal complained,
USG financial aid had gone principally to the military, "not
to the people." The public, therefore, historically
associated the USG with the country's many military leaders.
He said the USG should adopt a social sector "flagship
project" to counteract this wide public perception.


10. (C) Pakistan needed more than aid; it also needed private
investment. Furthermore, American universities should be
encouraged to establish satellite campuses throughout
Pakistan, and the U.S.'s immigration policies should be
reviewed to ensure that Pakistani students who did go abroad
for study went to the U.S., Iqbal suggested. More and more
students, however, were studying in the UK, Australia and
other European countries, to the U.S.'s detriment, Iqbal
thought.


11. (U) Codel Schiff did not clear this cable.

PATTERSON