PAKISTAN: ACTING CENTCOM COMMANDER MEETS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001956 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2018 TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS PGOV PHUM PK PREL SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: ACTING CENTCOM COMMANDER MEETS WITH CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF, GENERAL KAYANI Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Acting USCENTCOM Commander, Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey visited Pakistan May 12. In his meeting with General Ashfaq Kayani, Chief of Army Staff, Dempsey stressed the U.S.'s continued commitment to our long-term relationship with Pakistan and made assurances regarding continuity of effort. He discussed the need to maintain pressure on "irreconcilable" elements within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) while Kayani responded that new agreements were intended to motivate tribes to evict extremists. Kayani said the tribes needed to take ownership for their areas' development activities and added that the NWFP's first "civilian governor" (vice retired military) was coordinating well with the army to "synchronize" operations. ¶2. (C) Kayani said the Army had been in an operational "pause" since before February elections and was now waiting for the new government to take the helm on security matters. He went on to explain that he wanted to give the government time to build the broad political support the Army requires to be effective. Referring to the GOP's strategy in the FATA and recent negotiations, Dempsey said that U.S. support for the strategy must be balanced with the need to manage strategic risk - i.e. assurances the Pakistan Army was not "pulling back." Kayani responded that the Army was redeploying some elements for military reasons but was certainly not withdrawing from the FATA. End Summary. ¶3. (C) LTG Dempsey, Major General Robert Allardice, CENTCOM Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy (J5),Mr. Henry Ensher, CENTCOM Political Advisor, and U.S. Defense Representative to Pakistan, Major General James R. Helmly met with the Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, on May ¶12. Also present were Lieutenant General Sallahuddin, Chief of General Staff; Major General Pasha, DGMO; Major General Asif, DGMI, and Major General Naeem Khalid Lohdi, who is reportedly on a special duty assignment at GHQ dealing with Army restructuring. Dempsey's main points were to determine a feasible method for developing agreements with agreeable elements in the FATA while maintaining pressure on "irreconcilables," and how the U.S would seek to support GOP strategies while managing strategic risk. ¶4. (C) Observing that the Army cannot control all of the FATA, Kayani said he is strengthening selected posts to exert more focused pressure on militants; these posts will also be more supportable. Kayani further explained that proposed agreements with tribal leaders were designed to motivate the tribes to evict extremists themselves and promote mutual reinforcement between tribes. (Comment: Given the strength of Al Qaeda and selected Taliban groups, it is unlikely such a strategy will work. Intelligence traffic has already recorded increased instances of Taliban intimidation and threats against Maliks and tribal leaders. End Comment). ¶5. (C) Kayani claimed the Army was still in an operational "pause." Operations had been put largely on hold prior to February's elections to promote stability and had continued after elections to allow the new government time to get up to speed and develop a sense of responsibility for security matters. (Comment: While such logic is understandable from the Pakistani perspective, such a "pause" creates space and time that can be effectively exploited by militants. End Comment). Saying the GOP has a broad coalition but is "shallow in consensus," Kayani asserted the government had needed time post-election to build the broad political support necessary for the Army to be effective. ¶6. (C) Kayani stated the U.S. and Pakistan were in "total agreement" regarding the need to eliminate/reduce cross border attacks. He added that the GOP needed to make the right "political decisions" and clearly define the role of the Army in security efforts so that he could then execute that role in a "balanced way". Kayani argued that the tribal Maliks, along with other "stakeholders," had to be brought into the FATA security strategy, indicating that the three major sources of influence were the Maliks, Political Agents, ISLAMABAD 00001956 002 OF 002 and Mullahs. He also cited the release of Sufi Muhammad, Tanzim Nifaz Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM) founder, as an example of GOP "ownership" as they have defended that action and taken responsibility for it. ¶7. (C) Dempsey then asked Kayani about shared understanding of "strategic risk," outlining the kinds of events that might cause the U.S. to lose patience -- e.g., attacks by Al-Qaeda against the U.S. homeland emanating from the FATA. He expressed support for the GOP counterinsurgency strategy but stated the need to manage strategic risk, citing the U.S. need for assurances the Pakistani army is not "pulling back." Kayani responded quickly that, although the army was conducting some tactical redeployments, it was definitely not withdrawing from the FATA. ¶8. (C) Kayani noted that any reduction in the level of border attacks over the winter - approximately Oct 07-Feb 08 - was more a result of winter weather than Pakistani military operations, implying the increased attacks since then were due more to improved weather than to a lack of military operations, part of the annual "spring offensive." He further remarked that Pakistan maintained 1,000 border posts while NATO had 100 or less. Finally, he stressed the need to convey a more accurate perception of Pakistan's efforts to apply both direct and indirect pressure through tribal contacts and leaders. ¶9. (C) The meeting concluded with Kayani emphasizing that, to be successful, tribes had to take "ownership" for their areas' development activities. He also commented that the tribes' and militants' influence was not limited by geographic boundaries; Kayani therefore argued that development efforts and "hearts and minds" campaigns should not target specific geographic areas, but should instead be aimed at tribal groups. He also noted that the first "civilian governor" (vice retired military) of the NWFP had been coordinating well with the army to synchronize operations. However, he said, certain U.S. actions, such as the Predator strike in the Wazir area on March 16, only serve to "upset the balance" in that area and illustrated U.S. misunderstanding of the "complexity" in the FATA. ¶10. (U) CENTCOM has not cleared this cable. PATTERSON