Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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08ISLAMABAD195 | 2008-01-14 12:47:00 | SECRET | Embassy Islamabad |
VZCZCXRO1320 OO RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHIL #0195/01 0141247 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 141247Z JAN 08 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4398 INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 8051 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7055 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2653 RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 8635 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 4568 RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 3221 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000195 |
1. (C) Summary. The most recent round of intra-militant
fighting in Waziristan illustrates just how complicated our and Pakistan's choices are in trying to combat extremism in the tribal areas. Waziristani militant commander Mullah Nazir is being portrayed in the local media as fighting al Qaeda, but the violence we are seeing now may be more inter-tribal conflict than a revolt against al Qaeda supporters. There are no genuine "good guys" in this story. End Summary. 2. (C) The January 8 local press reported that, in the latest round of tribal violence in Wana, South Waziristan, nine "pro-government militants" led by Mullah Nazir were killed by a group of "anti-government militants" supported by Baitullah Mehsud. Mullah Nazir leads the same Wazir tribe which expelled a group of Uzbek terrorists from Waziristan in March 2007 with the support (albeit late) of the government. Many of those Uzbeks promptly turned to and found refuge with Baitullah, exacerbating historical tensions between the Wazirs and the Mehsuds. 3. (SBU) A spokesman for Mullah Nazir responded to the attacks, saying: "We suspect Baitullah and his Uzbek supporters for this gruesome attack which left nine Mujahideen dead. All Mehsud tribesmen, including shopkeepers, farmers and government employees, should leave the Wazir tribal areas by 8 am on Tuesday (January 8); otherwise, they will be responsible for the consequences." The Wazirs killed one attacker, captured four others and vowed revenge for the attacks. On January 10, the Wazirs raised a lashkar (posse) of 600 armed volunteers to "take on" the foreign militants. Reportedly, on January 13, two Uzbek militants were killed and another captured and Nazir survived a roadside bomb attack. 4. (S) Although some press reports describe Nazir as being out to hunt down al Qaeda, the reality is more complicated. Described by Pakistanis as a "moderate" taliban, Nazir also leads the group that destroyed maternal and child health care supplies provided by Save the Children in November of 2007 on grounds that the aid was sterilizing children. There have also been reports that Nazir has allied himself with non-Uzbek (Arab) foreign terrorists. 5. (C) Some local analysts are enthusiastically calling the intra-militant battles an opportunity the government should seize upon to use the Wazirs as proxies in the fight against Mehsud. They argue that "moderate" local taliban are better than extremist Uzbeks and say that, at a minimum, the Wazirs could block Mehsud's ability to cross into Afghanistan via South Waziristan, forcing him to use more difficult routes via Zhob (through Balochistan) or north via the Nawaz Kot route. 6. (S) Comment: This illustrates the conundrum we face in trying to turn back extremism in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The "choice," at least in Waziristan, according to some observers, has become one between the "pro-" and "anti-" government militants. The Mehsud lands of eastern South Waziristan have become a "no go" area for the Pakistani military and Frontier Corps forces. "Friendly" Wazir territory in western South Waziristan is not much better; the Wazirs control security and dispense law and order there without government assistance or interference. 7. (S) Using proxy fighters has been part of the classic "divide and rule" strategy the British and Islamabad have long played to "control" the tribal areas. While employing the Wazirs as a proxy make make tactical sense to some, there are longer-term strategic consequences, as the Pakistanis learned from their experience in supporting the Mujahideen against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. 8. (C) This long term answer is to increase Pakistan's counter-insurgency capability, and that effort is now underway with USG support. For now, the GOP may be criticized if it rewards the "moderate" Mullah Nazir in this fight. But with Baitullah Mehsud responsible for over 600 deaths due to suicide attacks in Pakistan, Islamabad's choice has become one (in the words of a Pakistani editorial) ISLAMABAD 00000195 002 OF 002 between the devil and the deep blue sea. BODDE |