ANP'S KHAN LOBBIES FOR SWAT AGREEMENT; DISAVOWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001934 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2018 TAGS: PGOV PK PREL PTER SUBJECT: ANP'S KHAN LOBBIES FOR SWAT AGREEMENT; DISAVOWS SOUTH WAZIRISTAN DEAL REF: A. ISLAMABAD 1615 ¶B. ISLAMABAD 1918 Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Peshawar Principal Officer (PO) Lynne Tracy met Awami National Party (ANP) leader Asfandyar Wali Khan in Islamabad May 23 to discuss the peace agreements being negotiated in Swat and in South Waziristan, separately. Khan was emphatic that the ANP would only take responsibility for the Swat accord; "I won't agree" to take on the South Waziristan agreement, he added. Khan was visibly upset with the Army's handling of these issues prior to his party taking power in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). He blamed the Army for first going into Swat without consulting any parties, and then retreating to their barracks when initially attacked. The Army had lost face, Khan concluded. Khan was "excited" by the development opportunities for his region, mentioning roads, dams and schools. "This is not something we can do alone; we need USG support," echoing his Washington meetings. End summary. Swat vs. South Waziristan -------------- ¶2. (C) Meeting with Peshawar PO Lynne Tracy May 23, coalition partner Awami National Party (ANP) leader Asfandyar Wali Khan stressed the different dynamic faced by Pakistan's political leaders when negotiating with "miscreants" in the Swat region of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) versus with militants in South Waziristan of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (reftels). ¶3. (C) He noted the militants in South Waziristan were Taliban with links to Afghanistan, while those still fighting in Swat were mainly receiving logistical support from Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK). Khan was emphatic that the ANP-led NWFP government had only negotiated a peace accord with individuals from Swat. Whatever militants remained, Khan assured the PO, would see their local support fade away. In response to PO's question about the agreement's release of prisoners, Khan said that these were people who had been picked up in broad security sweeps of Mingora and Saidu Sharif's market areas. ¶4. (C) Khan ensured the Swat agreement because of the built-in enforcement mechanism -- an eight-member committee that would review any violence and judge whether the deal had been broken. Khan would have two ANP representatives on the committee, plus the area's District Police Officer (DPO) and the District Coordination Officer (DCO). On the other side, would be four representatives, one from each of the area's four most influential families. These were "local influentials," Khan promised, "not commanders." Each sub-tribe would be responsible for its area. ¶5. (C) The ANP had misgivings about the GOP's negotiations with South Waziri militants, Khan admitted. He recounted that when he saw the initial draft accord there was no mention of stopping cross-border attacks into Afghanistan and no list of names of who might be released. The deal was hatched even before the February 18 elections, Khan revealed, and would have supposedly released even the assassins of slain PPP leader Benazir Bhutto. ¶6. (C) He reiterated that in this realm, his party was "not in charge of" and "not included in" any deal for South Waziristan. The NWFP government, the ANP leader said, has no jurisdiction over the FATA. Khan continued that the ANP was not consulted about legal reforms or economic development in the FATA, and so would similarly stay out of any security-related agreements. He relayed that when the coalition was first presented with the draft accord, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) Co-Chairman Asif Zardari deferred to him, adding that the PPP would only agree if the ANP did. "I won't agree," Khan reportedly said then and repeated to the PO. ANP still refused to publicly endorse the GOP's piecemeal approach. An Unexpected Linkage -------------- ISLAMABAD 00001934 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Khan revealed that, just today, some Swat leaders had stated the peace deal with the NWFP government would be in jeopardy if the federal government did not reach a full peace agreement with Baitullah Mehsud in FATA's South Waziristan. Khan viewed this "new linkage" as unacceptable and stressed again that the provincial government had no writ to negotiate in FATA. ¶8. (C) Khan said he recently met with the Corps Commander, ISI Director General, and Military Intelligence Director General. He promised them that neither the ANP nor its NWFP government would stop them responding if militants in Swat broke the peace accord and attacked any of them. Khan informed the PO that the highly publicized withdrawal of the Pakistan Army from this northern NWFP district "will take time," and would occur only when trained police had been put in place. ¶9. (C) Khan was visibly upset with the Army's handling of these issues prior to his party taking power. He relayed his previous conversation with then NWFP Governor Orakzai, blaming him for first ordering the Army into Swat without consulting any parties, and then retreating to their barracks when initially attacked. He said the Army misunderstood the "Pushto psyche" and had lost face. ¶10. (C) This "Pushto psyche," which demands hospitality but also that one's guest respect his host's wishes, was the unspoken guarantee of the Swat agreement his party had negotiated. The ANP had been willing to talk. Now that there was an agreement, the militants would be blamed by the public if the peace were broken, Khan claimed. "I've already received many calls from local leaders saying they were ready to take up arms," Khan said, because of today's unexpected linkage between the Swat and South Waziristan agreements. The USG's Role -------------- ¶11. (C) Khan said that, from his trip to Washington, he was "excited" by the development opportunities for his region, mentioning roads, dams and schools. "This is not something we can do alone; we need USG support," Khan said. But because of security concerns that had so far blocked many "quick impact" projects, Khan suggested that the USG let the GOP's planned development package start first, and then USG projects could be blended in unnoticed. PATTERSON