PAKISTAN: ACTING CENTCOM COMMANDER MEETS WITH JCSC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001906 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2018 TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS PGOV PHUM PK PREL SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: ACTING CENTCOM COMMANDER MEETS WITH JCSC CHAIRMAN GENERAL TARIQ MAJID Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Acting USCENTCOM Commander, Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey visited Pakistan May 12. In his meeting with General Tariq Majid, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Committee, Dempsey stressed the U.S.'s continued commitment to our long-term relationship with Pakistan and made assurances regarding continuity of effort during his tour as acting commander. Majid indicated that while the installation of the new civilian administration has come with many challenges, the policy for prosecuting the war on terror, particularly with regard to objectives, end states, and strategies, has not changed. He echoed the need to isolate and marginalize extremists in tribal areas through coordinated military and political engagement. Yet he also acknowledged the benefit of empowering tribes to defend themselves against extremism, corruption, and violence. Dempsey added that managing risk through transparency (i.e. intelligence sharing) between the U.S. and Pakistan would be helpful in developing broad strategies for the synchronization of military and developmental operations. Questioned about the best approach to the current security dilemma with Iran, Majid quickly responded that, from Pakistan's perspective, anything other than diplomacy would be "disastrous." Dempsey expressed his concerns about Iran's influence in a fragile environment and the fear that Iraq could slip into Iran's grasp without positive engagement from the Arab world. Both agreed that it would be beneficial to involve Arab states in supporting Iraq's continuing development and engaging in dialogue with Iran. End Summary ¶2. (C) LTG Dempsey, Major General Robert Allardice, CENTCOM Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy (J5),Henry Ensher, CENTCOM Political Advisor, and U.S. Defense Representative to Pakistan, Major General James R. Helmly met with the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff Committee, General Tariq Majid, on May 12. Dempsey began by stating that Pakistan was the first country he had visited on his trip, other than those with U.S. troops, to purposefully show CENTCOM's commitment to Pakistan, especially during the leadership transition. He emphasized his desire to grasp Pakistan's perspective on its current political and security situation and asked Majid for his thoughts. ¶3. (C) Majid acknowledged that Pakistan's new civilian government is fraught with many challenges, particularly rising security threats and the troubled economy. Increasing prices for oil and food, as well as shortages in electricity and gas, are challenges that the new administration must begin to place more focus on. On the other hand, Majid claimed that with respect to their policy on the war on terror, there would be no change to current objectives, end states and strategies. Current efforts are focused on initiating new responsibility within the tribes for handling terrorists and extremists. Majid expressed hope that engagement and negotiation with the tribes would work, but professed that "spillover" effects from Afghanistan were sometimes detrimental to efforts at marginalizing extremists through military and political engagement. ¶4. (C) Majid went on to say that agreements with the local tribal governments had been reached early in the transition of the new administration, but is optimistic that the agreements would be carried forward. Political and developmental engagement was the only way, according to Majid, to stem the rise in warlordism, clashes among sub-tribes, disputes over smuggling, and other sectarian violence. ¶5. (C) Dempsey expressed gratitude for Pakistan's openness regarding the challenges they face and reiterated that he would advocate for resources to help implement their strategies. Majid stressed the need for U.S. support to allow Pakistan's strategies time to work. In particular, he emphasized that empowering tribes through other than kinetic engagement was essential for success. He stressed that increased development must be the focus and that concurrently establishing security while continuing developmental and education efforts would only be effective with corresponding legislation from the civilian government. Dempsey agreed ISLAMABAD 00001906 002 OF 002 that negotiation with the tribes was a positive strategy, but shared his concern that the time required would be exploited by extremists to undermine stability in the area. ¶6. (C) Majid noted it was essential to keep pressure on the whole Al-Qaeda network while non-kinetic strategies are allowed time to work. Majid agreed with Dempsey that Pakistan must stay on top of any agreements with tribes in the FATA and monitor the extent to which these tribes are taking responsibility for removing extremist elements. Dempsey added that a beneficial method for managing that risk is through increased U.S.-Pakistan transparency and intelligence sharing. ¶7. (C) Dempsey then shifted focus and stressed the need for Pakistan to think broadly with respect to its strategies for coordinating developmental and military efforts. He noted that the conflict in Afghanistan must be seen in terms of its impact on Pakistan and Iran because a stable Afghanistan was key to stability in the region. He then pointed to counter-narcotics efforts as essential to removing a major source of funding for Al-Qaeda, indicating that increased cooperation was critical to stemming this cross-border security issue. ¶8. (C) Dempsey asked Majid for his thoughts on Iran, particularly regarding how Pakistan might suggest containing negative Iranian influence in Iraq. Majid responded that Iran is an important regional player and that, from Pakistan's perspective, engaging Iran through any means other than diplomacy would be "disastrous." Dempsey noted there were some fundamental differences that make engagement between the U.S. and Iran difficult, if not impossible. Although, it was possible to conceive of shared interests in specific areas, such as counter-narcotics. When queried about Iran's possible motives, Majid expressed his belief that the desire to be a major regional player motivates Iran to pursue security measures, as well as spreading its ideology. He also stated that to effectively engage with Iran may require a small consortium of countries - as was done with North Korea - an approach to which Iran may be amenable, particularly from the Arab world. ¶9. (U) CENTCOM POLAD, Mr. Henry Ensher, has cleared this cable. PATTERSON