APRIL 23 PAK-AFGHAN BORDER INCIDENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001826



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2028

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MASS, MARR, PK

SUBJECT: APRIL 23 PAK-AFGHAN BORDER INCIDENT





Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for Reasons 1.4 (a)(b)



1. (S/NF) Summary: On the morning of April 23, Pakistani

Frontier Corps and Afghan Border Police clashed during an

Afghan effort to counter an insurgent attack into Konar

province (Afghanistan). During that incident and subsequent

engagements, five Afghan Border Police and one Pakistan

Frontier Corps soldier were killed. Although the situation

was defused following two senior military commander meetings,

the circumstances surrounding the incident clearly

demonstrate the potential for similar incidents to escalate

and create problems for bilateral relations.



2. (C) On 2 May, Chief of the Office of Defense

Representative Pakistan (ODRP),Major General Helmly, met

with Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Satti

Sallahuddin, to share concerns about the increased intensity

of close combat along the border, which raises the chance of

incidents with Pakistani security forces. Sallahuddin

stressed the significance of maintaining the sovereignty of

Pakistan territory and that further incursions by ISAF and/or

Afghani forces would no longer be "accepted." Separately, MFA

Foreign Secretary Khan expressed similar concerns to

Ambassador. Helmly urged consideration of conducting a

tabletop exercise to stress communications and expose

weaknesses in combined procedures. Sallahuddin further

emphasized the importance of the upcoming Combined Border

Planning Session at Bagram on 10 May. End Summary.



"Hot Pursuit"

--------------



3. (S/NF) During the morning of April 23, a CJTF-101 task

force reported receiving small arms fire and mortars from an

unknown number of insurgents near Forward Operating Base

(FOB) Serkani in Konar province (Afghanistan) who had crossed

the border from Bajaur Agency, Pakistan. As the insurgents

withdrew toward the border region, U.S. and Afghan forces

followed in "hot pursuit" with the help of U.S. AH-64's and

artillery support.



4. (S/NF) Ensuing engagements led U.S. and Afghan forces to

follow the insurgents across the Pakistan border. Under

darkness and perhaps unknown to the U.S. and Afghan forces,

Pakistani Frontier Corps (FC) became caught in the middle of

the ensuing fire-fights.



5. (S/NF) Because of safety concerns regarding possible

Taliban in the area, the Afghan forces elected not to

exfiltrate back across the border into Afghanistan and

temporarily occupied several Pakistani border posts that had

been abandoned during the engagement.



6. (S/NF) A meeting between the ETT commander and commander

of the FC Bajaur Scouts was hastily arranged in the late

morning of the April 23. During this meeting, another

skirmish erupted between Afghan Border Police and the FC

during which one FC troop was killed. (Comment: Whether that

skirmish was precipitated by militant activity or simply

tensions between the Afghan and Pakistani troops remains

unclear. End Comment) On 24 April, two subsequent meetings

were held - between the ODRP Chief and Pakistani DGMO in

Rawalpindi and between the Deputy Commanding General for

Operations of CJTF-101 and the Commandant of the Bajaur

Scouts at Nawa Pass - to resolve the situation.



7. (S/NF) As a result, Afghan forces vacated all Pakistani

border posts on April 24, and the stand off between Afghan

and Pakistani forces was defused. As a result of all

engagements from April 22-24, five Afghani Border Police were

killed, one Pakistani Frontier Corps soldier was killed, and

10 Afghani Border Police were injured.



Pakistani Reaction

--------------



8. (S/NF) Initial press indicated that Pakistan launched a

protest with International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

and the Afghan government over the border incident. Pakistan

Army DGMO also indicated that, although Afghani forces held a

Pakistani border post in the vicinity of Nawa Pass

temporarily, they would be "evicted." Additionally, an MFA

spokesman stated "Afghanistan has been told in clear terms



ISLAMABAD 00001826 002 OF 002





that such incidents must not be repeated."



9. (S/NF) During a meeting on April 24, MFA Foreign

Secretary Khan raised with Ambassador the GOP's concern with

the cross-border incident. Although exact details of the

incident were still under investigation, Khan stated

unequivocally that occupation was not acceptable, especially

when the Afghan forces knew they were in Pakistan and refused

to leave. According to Khan, this was not Pakistan's

understanding of the rules of engagement (ROE),and it was

not helpful.



U.S. - Pakistan Discussion

--------------



10. (C) On 2 May, ODRP Chief, Major General Helmly, met with

Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Satti Sallahuddin,

to share concerns about the increased intensity of close

combat along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, raising the

chance of incidents with Pakistani security forces. DGMO,

Major General Pasha, DGMI, Major General Asif, and D/ODRP,

Col Shapiro, were also in attendance.



11. (C) Helmly emphasized that neither side could afford

failures in communication and situational awareness,

particularly given the new Pakistani civilian

administration's unfamiliarity with security issues. He

reiterated current CJTF ROE regarding border incursions and

acknowledged that, although the Pakistani side had never

accepted the validity of the ROE, U.S. forces were operating

under this guidance.



12. (C) Sallahuddin stressed that orders have been issued to

all Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps troops that incursions

by ISAF and/or Afghani forces will no longer be "accepted."

He added that forces would continue to do their best to

prevent militant cross-border movement, but the significance

of maintaining sovereignty of Pakistan territory could not be

overstated. Furthermore, Sallahuddin asserted that

inadvertent border incursions would not be treated as hostile

actions, but deliberate border crossings that endangered

Pakistani troops were "intolerable."



Need for Increased Training and Cooperation

--------------



13. (C) Helmly conveyed that the U.S. and Pakistan had

ignored the possibility for such incidents for too long and

that we must face the potential for "friendly fire"

engagements or for a coalition aircraft downing in the FATA

during night/bad weather in which the rescue operations may

commence under combat conditions. He strongly urged

consideration of conducting a tabletop exercise with

coalition forces simulating a scenario of escalation from a

close border engagement in Afghanistan through "hot pursuit"

and engagement in Pakistan, followed by a simulated aircraft

downing in Pakistan.



14. (C) Helmly explained that if U.S. air forces were to

encounter a catastrophic malfunction just inside the border

that forced them down inside Pakistan, the U.S. would launch

a search/rescue operation that could be perceived by

Pakistani forces in the area as "hostile intent." Limited

means of communication and troops ill-equipped with night

surveillance gear would only increase the chances that such a

cross-border incident would spiral out of control.



15. (C) Both Helmly and Sallahuddin agreed that such an

exercise would stress communications and expose weaknesses in

combined procedures, helping to strengthen mutual trust and

understanding. They also concurred that communications and

verification of Pakistani border positions by International

Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) would greatly assist in

avoiding unnecessary confrontations. Lastly, Sallahuddin

stressed the importance of the upcoming Combined Border

Planning Session at Bagram on 10 May.



PATTERSON