Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ISLAMABAD1655
2008-04-23 14:30:00
SECRET
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

PAKISTAN'S NEW HEARTS AND MINDS CAMPAIGN

Tags:  PGOV PK PREL PTER 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001655 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2018
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN'S NEW HEARTS AND MINDS CAMPAIGN

REF: (A) PESHAWAR 326 (B) ISLAMABAD 1615 (C)
ISLAMABAD 1614 (D) ISLAMABAD 1609 (E)
ISLAMABAD 1586 (F) ISLAMABAD 1574

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001655



SIPDIS



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2018

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK

SUBJECT: PAKISTAN'S NEW HEARTS AND MINDS CAMPAIGN



REF: (A) PESHAWAR 326 (B) ISLAMABAD 1615 (C)

ISLAMABAD 1614 (D) ISLAMABAD 1609 (E)

ISLAMABAD 1586 (F) ISLAMABAD 1574



Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)



1. (S) Summary. There are multiple initiatives, some old

and some new, underway in Pakistan to negotiate an end to

violence with militants or separatists in the tribal areas as

part of a hearts and minds campaign. Many of these

initiatives involve a prisoner exchange/release of some kind,

but the true numbers and identities of those who may be

released remain unclear. Post has repeatedly stressed to GOP

officials our strong opposition to the release of al

Qaeda/Taliban detainees. We have been equally emphatic that

any new South Waziristan peace agreement must be enforceable.

We are not yet persuaded that this hearts and minds campaign

will succeed but agree that the new government believes it is

a necessary first step in formulating its own anti-terrorism

policy. Pakistani leaders continue to insist that they will

not release the 27 Taliban detainees the U.S. has identified

as problematic, but it is difficult to see how the GOP can

implement a peace deal without offering the release of some

militant detainees. End Summary.



The New Hearts & Minds Campaign

--------------



2. (C) Many Pakistanis believe that a newly elected

government with a popular mandate has an opportunity to

successfully convince the militant "reconcilables" to cease

supporting terrorism and extremism. The Pakistanis continue

to insist to us that they will not negotiate with al Qaeda or

the Taliban/Baitullah Mehsud and that their reconciliation

initiative is aimed at the tribal leaders who form the

support network for militants. Pakistan People's Party

Co-Chair Asif Zardari has made a conscious decision to hand

over implementation of this hearts and minds campaign to

Pashtun-based Awami National Party (ANP) leader Asfundyar

Wali Khan. If Wali Khan fails, Zardari has said "we have

other options." But there is a clear desire to try

negotiations first. Chief of Army Staff General Kayani

believes he nee
ds political support to renew military

operations against the militants and has endorsed the

outreach strategy.



3. (C) The new coalition government led by Prime Minister

Gillani is proceeding with a number of initiatives under this

campaign. Some of these are new proposals; some are a

continuation of negotiations begun by the Musharraf

government. Overall, the new government sees a political

need to distance itself from the Musharraf era agenda, which

has been popularly characterized as a military-focused

approach implemented at the behest of the United States.

Because Musharraf did not regularly brief the parliament or

the general public on activities related to the war on

terror, the plans/rhetoric of many new ministers are not

based on full knowledge of the anti-terrorism agenda that

Musharraf tried, with varying success, to implement.



Multiple Initiatives:

--------------



4. (S) Post has repeatedly stressed our strong opposition

to the release of al Qaeda/Taliban detainees. We have been

equally emphatic that any new South Waziristan peace

agreement must be enforceable (reftels). It may be helpful

to describe the several, often confusing, overlapping

initiatives now underway.



Kidnapped Pakistani Ambassador

--------------



5. (S) On February 11, Tariq Azizuddin, the Pakistani

Ambassador to Afghanistan, was kidnapped in Khyber Agency

while driving from Peshawar to Kabul. It appears this began

as a simple crime for ransom, but the kidnappers may have

turned the Ambassador over to al Qaeda/Taliban terrorists.

Azizuddin appeared in a video April 19 conveying the

kidnappers' demands, which included the release of Taliban

leader Mullah Obaidullah and five or six others. We have

conflicting reports on where this negotiation stands and

which, if any, hostages would be released in exchange for the



ISLAMABAD 00001655 002 OF 003





Azizuddin.



Ladha Fort Negotiations

--------------



6. (S) The Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have

been negotiating for months with Baitullah Mehsud following

the militant attacks on Ladha Fort on January 10 and 22. This

negotiation includes a possible prisoner exchange to free the

approximately 60 captured Frontier Corps personnel from the

Fort.



27 Taliban Militants

--------------



7. (S) The Army and ISI also appear to have been

considering the release of 27 Taliban militants in connection

with the Ambassador's kidnapping and/or the Lahda Fort

negotiations. Zardari, PM Gillani and President Musharraf

have now assured us (Refs C, D) that these 27 militants will

not be released. However, we believe that a prisoner

exchange of some Baitullah Mehsud personnel is still under

discussion.



New South Waziristan Agreement

--------------



8. (S) COAS Kayani April 2 briefed the new government on

the status of a new South Waziristan accord, which the

Pakistanis insist is not with Baitullah Mehsud, but with

tribal leaders. It, too, involves a prisoner exchange of an

indeterminate number of militants. This initiative had been

underway for months before the election; Zardari appears to

have embraced it to prevent a clash with the military and

because it fits the government's new strategy in general.

Zardari has been at great pains to ensure the U.S. was

pre-briefed on the initiative, that it does not include a

prisoner swap and that it has enforceable conditions. (Refs

B, C)



Sufi Mohammad Released

--------------



9. (S) On April 21, with the support of the new coalition,

the leaders of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)

released Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-e-Muhammmadi (TNSM) leader Sufi

Mohammad (Ref A). Despite having once led forces across the

border to attack the U.S.-led coalition, he is now considered

by Pakistanis to be in the "reconcilable" category. Upon

release after six years in jail, the aging Sufi renounced

militancy and pledged to continue to support enforcement of

Sharia law, but through peaceful means. He said he would

respect the government and would not launch attacks against

government and security personnel. The NWFP government is

attempting to use his release to split the support base of

his son-in-law, Swat TNSM warlord Maulana Fazlullah. (Ref A)



Balochistan Outreach

--------------



10. (C) Separately, Zardari is also reaching out to

separatist extremists, mostly based in Balochistan, who for

years have been fighting government forces. The sanctuary

fleeing Baloch leaders reportedly have received in Kabul has

undermined Pak-Afghan relations. On April 22, the Sindh

provincial government dropped treason and other charges

against the President of the Balochistan National Party,

Sardar Akhtar Mengal. Zardari also announced formation of an

All Parties Committee to address ongoing Baloch concerns,

including revenue sharing over the region's coal and gas

reserves. A simmering insurgency has persisted in

Balochistan for several years, but the Baloch may not yet be

ready to be reconciled. The Baloch Liberation Army, which

has repeatedly targeted Punjabi-speaking professionals,

claimed credit for the April 22 assassination of the Vice

Chancellor of the University of Balochistan.



11. (S) Comment: We are not yet persuaded that the

government's hearts and minds campaign will succeed but agree

that they believe it is a necessary first step in formulating

their own anti-terrorism policy. To roll back a growing

insurgency, the GOP will need popular support, and if this

initiative creates the groundwork required for more robust



ISLAMABAD 00001655 003 OF 003





military action in the future, it may be worth the effort.

However, we remain deeply concerned that militants will

continue to use the lull in military operations to regroup

and launch attacks into Afghanistan. We are even more

skeptical over the merits of another South Waziristan peace

deal and have made these concerns clear to the new GOP.

PATTERSON

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