PM GILLANI SAYS NO TO RELEASING 27 AQ/TALIBAN DETAINEES

VZCZCXRO2056
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #1614/01 1091550
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181550Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6579
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 8478
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7740
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3141
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 9585
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 5336
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 4069
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001614 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2018 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PK 
SUBJECT: PM GILLANI SAYS NO TO RELEASING 27 AQ/TALIBAN 
DETAINEES 
 
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 1609 
 B. ISLAMABAD 1586 
 
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b),(d) 
 

>Inter-Intelligence Services (ISI) with cash payments for

others. We understood that some of them may be swapped for

captured Frontier Corps personnel and/or the kidnapped

Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan. Others had been

identified by Baitullah Mehsud, so they could not be friends

of either the U.S. or Pakistan. Some we understood had been

identified by Mehsud operatives who had been released before.

Ambassador said she had discussed the issue with President

Musharraf, Interior Minister Rehman Malik, Pakistan People's

Party Co-Chair Asif Zardari and others. Our Embassy had

raised the issue repeatedly with ISI. The possible release

had come to President Bush's attention, and our government

was very concerned about the implications of this proposed

release.



5. (S) Gillani said he had been briefed on the issue by

Durrani and had already spoken to Zardari. "I told them

categorically -- no -- we will not release these people,"

said Gillani. My leader (Benazir Bhutto) was killed by

terrorists; how could we possibly support such things, he

asserted. "Our commitment is to fight terrorists."

Referring to the pending South Waziristan peace agreement,

Gillani added "if there is any agreement between tribes, it

has nothing to do with this." Ambassador noted that Durrani

had said the same thing (Ref B). Gillani added that he had

insisted that the U.S. be briefed on the Waziristan agreement

so there would be no misunderstandings about its purpose.



6. (S) Ambassador said we understood why the new government

wanted to secure the support of the tribes, but it was

important to understand the basis of our concerns. The 2006

agreement had no enforcement provisions and did not stop

cross-border attacks on our forces. We appreciated that the

new agreement has provisions relating to cross-border raids

and expulsion of Arabs. We know force is not the only

option, and we are spending a great deal on economic

development of the tribal areas. But there had to be

enforcement mechanisms.



7. (C) Ambassador noted that she had met several times with



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Finance Minister Dar. We understood the scope of the

financial crisis and would do what we could to help. We were

trying to expedite processing of Coalition Support Fund

claims and were exploring ways to possibly provide some food

aid to Pakistan. Gillani stressed the importance of raising

the income support price for farmers now so the country does

not face even greater wheat shortages next season. There was

also the energy crisis; there had been riots in his home town

of Multan because people had no electricity for 14 hours a

day. Ambassador Durrani noted the still pending proposal to

add agriculture as a topic for the Strategic Dialogue.



8. (S) At this point, PPP Co-Chair Zardari joined the

meeting and all the Pakistani participants except the Prime

Minister and Durrani left. Apparently expecting Zardari's

arrival, Gillani appeared unfazed by this surprising breach

of protocol. Zardari wasted no time getting to the point.

He wanted to be sure President Bush understood immediately

that the 27 terrorists would not be released. Zardari had

spoken to ISI, and later to "the big boss" (presumably

Musharraf) and had made it clear the terrorists would not be

released. He continued, "we cannot be blackmailed by this

soft war. Everyone knows where everyone is. The U.S. says

one thing; the Pakistanis say another. Outside experts state

their views. But in the end Pakistan's reputation is

blackened by all this." Zardari added that the release

issue was unrelated to the South Waziristan agreement.



9. (S) Expounding, Zardari said he had given Awami National

Party (ANP) leader Asfundyar Wali Khan the go-ahead to

proceed with his initiative to reach out to tribal leaders.

"You (the U.S.) agreed we should support Wali Khan because he

can talk to the Pashtuns, so we are giving him a chance. The

DCM noted that the problem was the way the 2006 agreement had

broken down over the lack of enforcement. Zardari said, "If

Wali Khan doesn't deliver, then we can try other options."

Explaining further, Zardari said there was a trust problem

between tribes and military or government leaders who come

and go. Wali Khan is a known entity, and he lives there,

said Zardari, so his word will be trusted.



10. (S) Ambassador predicted a likely confrontation with

the terrorists. Zardari agreed, saying the militants were

out to get the new government. Referring obliquely to

Musharraf's recent visit to China, Zardari then said there

were those "who get caught up with little ships and planes.

We can't change them, but we know the relationship with the

United States is more important. We need to be with you more

rather than less."



11. (C) In closing, the DCM mentioned that he had just met

with his Indian counterpart, who had complained of a lack of

access to the new government. We hoped that situation could

be improved as there was a real opportunity to improve

Indo-Pak relations with the new government. Zardari and

Gillani agreed.



12. (S) Comment: Zardari's abrupt entry (and the fact that

Gillani was nonplused by it) was a stark display of the power

relationships at work in the new government. The good news

is that Zardari and Gillani have received our message,

evaluated their equities, and concluded it is decidedly not

in Pakistan's interest to release these terrorists. Despite

Zardari's assurances, we will have to wait and see how this

decision affects the proposed South Waziristan peace

agreement. In a concurrent, separate meeting with CG

Peshawar, Wali Khan said the agreement was not his idea but

had been briefed to the political parties by Chief of Army

Staff General Kayani (septel). This confirms what Musharraf

told us--that his government, not the new Gillani government,

had proposed the agreement (Ref A). It appears that Zardari

is trying to make the most of a difficult fait accompli by

pinning his hopes on Wali Khan's ability to enforce the new

agreement.









PATTERSON