MUSHARRAF ON RELEASE OF TALIBAN/AQ DETAINEES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001609



SIPDIS



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2018

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PK

SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF ON RELEASE OF TALIBAN/AQ DETAINEES



REF: A. ISLAMABAD 1583 (NOTAL)

B. ISLAMABAD 1586



Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)



1. (S) Summary: President Musharraf told Ambassador April

17 he would follow up on the planned release of 27 Taliban/Al

Qaeda detainees with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Musharraf believed the conditions for the "peace agreement"

with South Waziristan are now more propitious than in 2006

and said the Army would not be withdrawn from South

Waziristan. Musharraf has confidence in Northwest Frontier

Province (NWFP) Governor Ghani to ensure the plan is

enforced. Musharraf's mood seemed good, despite the recent

resurgence of the restoration of the judges issue. He said

he had developed a good relationship with Foreign Minister

Qureshi on his recent trip to China and had briefed him on

terrorism and the situation in the Federally Administered

Tribal Areas (FATA).



2. (S) Summary continued: The "peace deal" raises lots of

red flags. It is hard for us to envision a "peace agreement"

in South Waziristan that did not reflect some concessions to

Baitullah Mehsud, who is emerging as Pakistan's most serious

domestic terrorist. End summary.



3. (S) Ambassador and DCM called on President Musharraf

(accompanied by his Military Secretary, Major General

Shafqaat Ahmed) April 17 to discuss the pending release of 27

Taliban and Al Qaeda affiliated detainees. Ambassador

explained the pending release had come to the attention of

President Bush and the USG did not want any of the prisoners

to be released. Musharraf replied that he thought only

seven were dangerous. Ambassador clarified that we had

considerable derogatory information about seven of them but

the others, if their release had been requested by Baitullah

Mehsud, were unlikely to be friends of the U.S. or to

Pakistan. Many, if not most of them, had been apprehended

with American assistance, both operational and financial.

Moreover, it seemed as if some Taliban detainees released

earlier had reached back to identify their still detained

associates for release. Ambassador also raised our concerns

about the late March release of Shaukat Ali, allegedly

seriously ill, and the pending release of Abu Mus'ab

al-Baluchi.



4. (S) Musharraf seemed concerned and said he would be in

touch with ISI and review the issue. He asked the Ambassador

to convey that message to President Bush.



5. (C) When questioned, Musharraf was positive about the

pending South Waziristan "peace deal" (Ref. A) which he said

(correctly) had been in the works before the new government

took office. Musharraf said the most important elements

were: (1) expelling foreigners, particularly Arabs from South

Waziristan; (2) no cross-border raids; and, (3) no retreat

of the Army. Ambassador thanked him for Ambassador Durrani's

briefing but said we were concerned that extremists would be

exchanged as part of the deal, that there would be no

enforcement of the agreement's provisions, and that it would

allow extremists time to regroup, as they had during the

failed peace agreement signed in 2006.



6. (S) Musharraf said he was certain Chief of Army Staff

General Kayani would not pull back the Army. Musharraf noted

that Kayani had briefed the civilian government a few days

ago and asked the new ministers for guidance. But he had

received no reaction or any subsequent reply. Musharraf

suggested that Awami National Party (ANP) leader Asfundyar

Wali Khan talked tough on terrorism in private but publicly

talked about cutting deals and implied the Musharraf

government had used force recklessly. "Of course force

should only be used as a last resort; only an idiot would

think otherwise," said Musharraf. But Musharraf indicated he

was getting tired of hearing this statement from the new

government.



7. (S) When we asked what was different between this peace

agreement and others in the past, Musharraf noted that NWFP

Governor Ghani was in charge of this deal and "he would not

be afraid to use force." In fact, the Pakistani Army had put

military pressure on the tribes, which had forced them to



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negotiate. He explained at length the background of the

economic blockade of the Mehsuds. Musharraf argued the peace

agreements that he put forward in North Waziristan had been

successful.



8. (S) Musharraf seemed in a relaxed mood and did not raise

the ongoing political negotiations regarding possible

reinstatement of the deposed judiciary, including the former

Chief Justice. He made a few comments about Nawaz Sharif

and his political statements but largely (and accurately)

suggested the civilian government did not know much.

Musharraf said he had taken advantage of his trip to China to

brief FM Qureshi on a range of issues.



9. (S) Comment: Both Musharraf (indirectly) and Durrani

(directly) implied the release of the 27 extremists had

nothing to do with the pending peace deal. Subsequently

(septel),Prime Minister Gillani and Pakistan People's Party

leader Zardari reiterated there was no connection between the

peace agreement and the 27; both said flatly that the 27

would not be released. In our view, it would be hard to have

a peace arrangement in South Waziristan without the

concurrence of Baitullah Mehsud, which means that some

concessions have been made or soon will be made. Embassy

will continue to raise red flags about the peace deal and the

appeasement of terrorists with the Prime Minister and with

ANP leader Asfundyar Wali Khan. End comment.



PATTERSON