Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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08ISLAMABAD1609 | 2008-04-18 11:44:00 | SECRET | Embassy Islamabad |
VZCZCXRO1725 OO RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHIL #1609/01 1091144 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 181144Z APR 08 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6570 INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 8470 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7734 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3133 RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 9577 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 5328 RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 4061 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001609 |
1. (S) Summary: President Musharraf told Ambassador April
17 he would follow up on the planned release of 27 Taliban/Al Qaeda detainees with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Musharraf believed the conditions for the "peace agreement" with South Waziristan are now more propitious than in 2006 and said the Army would not be withdrawn from South Waziristan. Musharraf has confidence in Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Governor Ghani to ensure the plan is enforced. Musharraf's mood seemed good, despite the recent resurgence of the restoration of the judges issue. He said he had developed a good relationship with Foreign Minister Qureshi on his recent trip to China and had briefed him on terrorism and the situation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 2. (S) Summary continued: The "peace deal" raises lots of red flags. It is hard for us to envision a "peace agreement" in South Waziristan that did not reflect some concessions to Baitullah Mehsud, who is emerging as Pakistan's most serious domestic terrorist. End summary. 3. (S) Ambassador and DCM called on President Musharraf (accompanied by his Military Secretary, Major General Shafqaat Ahmed) April 17 to discuss the pending release of 27 Taliban and Al Qaeda affiliated detainees. Ambassador explained the pending release had come to the attention of President Bush and the USG did not want any of the prisoners to be released. Musharraf replied that he thought only seven were dangerous. Ambassador clarified that we had considerable derogatory information about seven of them but the others, if their release had been requested by Baitullah Mehsud, were unlikely to be friends of the U.S. or to Pakistan. Many, if not most of them, had been apprehended with American assistance, both operational and financial. Moreover, it seemed as if some Taliban detainees released earlier had reached back to identify their still detained associates for release. Ambassador also raised our concerns about the late March release of Shaukat Ali, allegedly seriously ill, and the pending release of Abu Mus'ab al-Baluchi. 4. (S) Musharraf seemed concerned and said he would be in touch with ISI and review the issue. He asked the Ambassador to convey that message to President Bush. 5. (C) When questioned, Musharraf was positive about the pending South Waziristan "peace deal" (Ref. A) which he said (correctly) had been in the works before the new government took office. Musharraf said the most important elements were: (1) expelling foreigners, particularly Arabs from South Waziristan; (2) no cross-border raids; and, (3) no retreat of the Army. Ambassador thanked him for Ambassador Durrani's briefing but said we were concerned that extremists would be exchanged as part of the deal, that there would be no enforcement of the agreement's provisions, and that it would allow extremists time to regroup, as they had during the failed peace agreement signed in 2006. 6. (S) Musharraf said he was certain Chief of Army Staff General Kayani would not pull back the Army. Musharraf noted that Kayani had briefed the civilian government a few days ago and asked the new ministers for guidance. But he had received no reaction or any subsequent reply. Musharraf suggested that Awami National Party (ANP) leader Asfundyar Wali Khan talked tough on terrorism in private but publicly talked about cutting deals and implied the Musharraf government had used force recklessly. "Of course force should only be used as a last resort; only an idiot would think otherwise," said Musharraf. But Musharraf indicated he was getting tired of hearing this statement from the new government. 7. (S) When we asked what was different between this peace agreement and others in the past, Musharraf noted that NWFP Governor Ghani was in charge of this deal and "he would not be afraid to use force." In fact, the Pakistani Army had put military pressure on the tribes, which had forced them to ISLAMABAD 00001609 002 OF 002 negotiate. He explained at length the background of the economic blockade of the Mehsuds. Musharraf argued the peace agreements that he put forward in North Waziristan had been successful. 8. (S) Musharraf seemed in a relaxed mood and did not raise the ongoing political negotiations regarding possible reinstatement of the deposed judiciary, including the former Chief Justice. He made a few comments about Nawaz Sharif and his political statements but largely (and accurately) suggested the civilian government did not know much. Musharraf said he had taken advantage of his trip to China to brief FM Qureshi on a range of issues. 9. (S) Comment: Both Musharraf (indirectly) and Durrani (directly) implied the release of the 27 extremists had nothing to do with the pending peace deal. Subsequently (septel), Prime Minister Gillani and Pakistan People's Party leader Zardari reiterated there was no connection between the peace agreement and the 27; both said flatly that the 27 would not be released. In our view, it would be hard to have a peace arrangement in South Waziristan without the concurrence of Baitullah Mehsud, which means that some concessions have been made or soon will be made. Embassy will continue to raise red flags about the peace deal and the appeasement of terrorists with the Prime Minister and with ANP leader Asfundyar Wali Khan. End comment. PATTERSON |