Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ISLAMABAD1499
2008-04-08 09:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

BOUCHER'S MEETING WITH MUTTAHIDA QUAMI MOVEMENT

Tags:  PGOV PK PREL 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001499 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PK PREL
SUBJECT: BOUCHER'S MEETING WITH MUTTAHIDA QUAMI MOVEMENT
LEADERS

Classified By: Peter W. Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001499 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV PK PREL SUBJECT: BOUCHER'S MEETING WITH MUTTAHIDA QUAMI MOVEMENT LEADERS Classified By: Peter W. Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On March 28, Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) leader Farooq Sattar met with Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher to discuss the party's plans for sitting in opposition of the new government. Sattar expressed satisfaction with the credibility of the recent elections and explained his party is still working to improve their international image. The Muttahida Quami Movement remained interested in working with the Pakistan People's Party but feared Nawaz Sharif's influence could negatively impact the government's efforts to subdue religious extremism. Sattar disapproved of steps that place the government at odds with President Musharraf, commenting that the President was uniquely positioned to provide a bridge between the new government and the Army. He concluded with a discussion about Pakistan's economy, noting that he would like to see Pakistan achieve greater agricultural self-sufficiency. End summary. Expanding Its Influence -------------- ¶2. (C) On March 28, Assistant Secretary Boucher and PolCouns met with Muttahida Quami Movement Deputy Convenor Farooq Sattar, National Assembly member Haider Rizvi, and Provincial Assembly member Sardar Ahmed. Sattar agreed the election was credible and noted his party improved its performance in this election, increasing its popular vote in Sindh from 6 percent to 9 percent. ¶3. (C) Sattar explained the Muttahida Quami Movement is attempting to distance itself from its violent reputation of the 1990s, as it now hopes to be considered a legitimate and serious political party. He asked for support in addressing allegations by the U.S. Government that the Muttahida Quami Movement was a terrorist organization. The party, he stressed, followed democratic processes in intra-party dealings during the 2002-2007 government. Sattar said it is actively involved in health, education, and social work. The party sponsored fundraising campaigns for the victims of Hurricane Katrina and the Southeast Asia tsunami and helped NATO bring relief goods to the Pakistani earthquake victims in 2005. The Muttahida Quami Movement was the only party in Pakistan to hold a solidarity rally for the victims of September 11, Sattar added. ¶4. (C) Sattar told Boucher that the pr
oblem with militancy in Pakistan is that "a Pakistani has the gun, and a Pakistani chest takes the bullet; we have to fix both." He said his party had attempted to play a role in countering militancy by working with Karachi madrassas to update their registration, syllabi, and curricula. Still Waiting for People's Party Call -------------- ¶5. (C) In Sattar's opinion, the best outcome of the election was the marginalization of the religious parties. Sattar, however, commented that the conservative religious vote was "camouflaged," going instead to the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. Sattar accused Nawaz Sharif of having connections with Osama Bin Ladin and extremist groups, and he worried Nawaz was attempting to take the Pakistan People's Party down that road. ¶6. (C) Sattar commented that People's Party co-chair Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif make strange bedfellows; Sattar believes Sharif wants to force elections in a year, so that he can become Prime Minister. Sattar believed this plan would marginalize the People's Party but the Muttahida Quami Movement probably would retain its seats. The People's Party could have formed a government without Nawaz, Sattar commented, but the Nawaz's party succeeded in isolating the People's Party by preventing the Muttahida Quami Movement from joining the new government. ¶7. (C) Sattar said the Muttahida Quami Movement, allied with the Pakistan Muslim League in 2002 after the People's Party rejected its advances. Now, the Muttahida Quami Movement is again eager to work with People's Party and has been ordered by party leader Altaf Hussein to respect the People's Party ISLAMABAD 00001499 002 OF 002 mandate. However, Sattar worries the People's Party is not serious about taking them on board as partners. Sattar stressed that even if the Muttahida Quami Movement remains in the opposition, it will be a constructive and positive opposition party which will support the People's Party legislation as long as it moves Pakistan in a positive direction. His party intends to vote issue-by-issue, Sattar said. Its last minute decision to vote for People's Party Prime Minister Gillani was a gesture of good faith. Sattar explained the Muttahida Quami Movement hoped to see the new government focus on counterterrorism, the economy, improving education, Kashmir, eradicating feudalism, and obtaining provincial autonomy. A strong federal government, in Sattar's opinion, was no guarantee of a strong Pakistan. We Should Engage Musharraf -------------- ¶8. (C) Sattar stressed that the new government should refrain from confrontation with President Musharraf and should instead try to engage him on key issues. He feared the new government was taking steps toward a collision with the President, and said he did not know how long Musharraf would continue to engage the political parties. Sattar commented that Musharraf, especially given his clear policy on the war on terror, could be a "perfect bridge" between the Army and the new civilian government. Sattar opined that this connection could be quietly used to make Musharraf understand the need for his honorable exit. Sattar, however, said his party remained undecided on whether to vote to curtail the President's constitutional authority to dissolve parliament (Section 58 2(b)) and would decide their stance as matter of convenience and suitability for his party. Economy the Biggest Issue -------------- ¶9. (C) Sattar explained how the energy and economic crisis is the most crucial issue facing the new government: oil prices are soaring, trade is unbalanced, a budget deficit exists, and inflation continues, including for food. Sattar blamed rising wheat prices on the supply side; he said that there was a bumper wheat crop this year but the government fixed the wheat price lower than market value, causing suppliers to sell to private middlemen rather than the government. If Pakistan must import foodstuffs, Sattar commented, they should not shy away from Indian imports. Sattar would like to see Pakistan move toward a policy of greater agricultural self-sufficiency. Agriculture is sorely neglected in Pakistan, Sattar claimed, and he suggested increased land reforms, more easily obtainable credit, and continual development of agricultural industry. He also criticized the feudal landowners for inflexibility on irrigation sharing schemes. Sattar also suggested that the United States more openly show its economic support for Pakistan. ¶10. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher approved this message. PATTERSON

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