BOUCHER,S MEETING WITH RELIGIOUS PARTY LEADER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001498 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PK SUBJECT: BOUCHER,S MEETING WITH RELIGIOUS PARTY LEADER FAZLUR REHMAN REF: ISLAMABAD 997 Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher met with religious party leader Fazlur Rehman March 28. While the maulana thanked Boucher (and Deputy Secretary Negroponte) for reaching out to all of Pakistan's political parties during their recent visit, he harangued the U.S. for not supporting his Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam party in the recent parliamentary elections, for not welcoming dialogue with the extremists, and for "occupying" Afghanistan. Rehman warned that so long as there were problems in Afghanistan, Pakistan too would face terrorist attacks; he offered himself as a channel to the Taliban (not Al Qaeda) to bring them into the political process. Boucher responded that any outreach to the Taliban "reconcilables" in Afghanistan should be done through President Karzai. End summary. ¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher met March 28 with Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman. The maulana noted positively that "for the first time in Pakistan-U.S. relations, the U.S. is trying to engage all parties." He thanked the Assistant Secretary for his one-on-one visit as well as for the visit throughout Pakistan by Deputy Secretary John Negroponte earlier in the week. ¶3. (C) Rehman claimed that the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal coalition of religious parties, including his party, had tried to play a moderate and democratic political role, particularly in its stewardship of the Northwest Frontier Province. "We served as a bridge between the Muslim world and the West," adding "and yet our efforts were not valued or reciprocated." Now that Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam had a bare number of seats in the National and Frontier Assemblies, his party would not be able to deliver as before, the maulana lamented. ¶4. (C) Rehman recounted how the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal,s government in Northwest Frontier provided security assistance to USAID-sponsored projects during its 2002-2007 rule of the province and neighboring Tribal Areas, "despite our differences with the U.S. administration." He further claimed that party talks with extremist groups almost achieved a peace accord in the Tribal Areas, but the world did not support the process. This too was a betrayal, according to Rehman. ¶5. (C) Rehman believed that the new Pakistani Government would be forced to dialogue and engage politically with these same extremist groups now. He argued that the "use of force had fanned extremism" and that terrorism had increased in Pakistan despite the war against it. This, he said, accounted for the poor showing in the polls by Musharraf's Pakistan Muslim League. Rehman further rejected the idea that dialogue with the extremists should be paired with firmness: "This is an unacceptable combination for civil society, the private sector or the state." ¶6. (C) The maulana then charged Musharraf's government with "cutting the religious parties down to size" in the last election. He intimated that this was at the behest of the U.S. He also alluded vaguely to "efforts against the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal and against the religious community, who have labeled us all as terrorists." ¶7. (C) Rehman then offered to assist the U.S. in sending "a message of political engagement" to the Taliban (not Al Qaeda, he stressed); he believed the Taliban could be convinced to engage in the political process. "There are channels." So far, he said, the U.S. is seen as "an occupier" of Iraq and Afghanistan. And so long as there were problems in Afghanistan, Pakistan would "face problems too," he warned. ¶8. (C) Boucher agreed that regional governments should address the roots of the extremists' resentment, not just the symptoms. Rehman acknowledged again the U.S.'s efforts in this regard. But the Assistant Secretary also strongly responded that violence must be dealt with head on. ISLAMABAD 00001498 002 OF 002 "Pakistanis, not just American citizens, are being targeted; this is a problem for peaceful Pakistanis as well," Boucher concluded. Any outreach to the Taliban "reconcilables" should be done through President Karzai's government in Kabul. ¶9. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher approved this message. PATTERSON