BOUCHER,S MEETING WITH RELIGIOUS PARTY LEADER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001498

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PK
SUBJECT: BOUCHER,S MEETING WITH RELIGIOUS PARTY LEADER
FAZLUR REHMAN

REF: ISLAMABAD 997

Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary for South and Central
Asian Affairs Richard Boucher met with religious party leader
Fazlur Rehman March 28. While the maulana thanked Boucher
(and Deputy Secretary Negroponte) for reaching out to all of
Pakistan's political parties during their recent visit, he
harangued the U.S. for not supporting his Jamiat
Ulema-e-Islam party in the recent parliamentary elections,
for not welcoming dialogue with the extremists, and for
"occupying" Afghanistan. Rehman warned that so long as there
were problems in Afghanistan, Pakistan too would face
terrorist attacks; he offered himself as a channel to the
Taliban (not Al Qaeda) to bring them into the political
process. Boucher responded that any outreach to the Taliban
"reconcilables" in Afghanistan should be done through
President Karzai. End summary.


2. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher met March 28 with Jamiat
Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman. The
maulana noted positively that "for the first time in
Pakistan-U.S. relations, the U.S. is trying to engage all
parties." He thanked the Assistant Secretary for his
one-on-one visit as well as for the visit throughout Pakistan
by Deputy Secretary John Negroponte earlier in the week.


3. (C) Rehman claimed that the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
coalition of religious parties, including his party, had
tried to play a moderate and democratic political role,
particularly in its stewardship of the Northwest Frontier
Province. "We served as a bridge between the Muslim world
and the West," adding "and yet our efforts were not valued or
reciprocated." Now that Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam had a bare
number of seats in the National and Frontier Assemblies, his
party would not be able to deliver as before, the maulana
lamented.


4. (C) Rehman recounted how the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal,s
government in Northwest Frontier provided security assistance
to USAID-sponsored projects during its 2002-2007 rule of the
province and neighboring Tribal Areas, "despite our
differences with the U.S. administration." He further
claimed that party talks with extremist groups almost
achieved a peace accord in the Tribal Areas, but the world
did not support the process. This too was a betrayal,
according to Rehman.


5. (C) Rehman believed that the new Pakistani Government
would be forced to dialogue and engage politically with these
same extremist groups now. He argued that the "use of force
had fanned extremism" and that terrorism had increased in
Pakistan despite the war against it. This, he said,
accounted for the poor showing in the polls by Musharraf's
Pakistan Muslim League. Rehman further rejected the idea
that dialogue with the extremists should be paired with
firmness: "This is an unacceptable combination for civil
society, the private sector or the state."


6. (C) The maulana then charged Musharraf's government with
"cutting the religious parties down to size" in the last
election. He intimated that this was at the behest of the
U.S. He also alluded vaguely to "efforts against the
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal and against the religious community,
who have labeled us all as terrorists."


7. (C) Rehman then offered to assist the U.S. in sending "a
message of political engagement" to the Taliban (not Al
Qaeda, he stressed); he believed the Taliban could be
convinced to engage in the political process. "There are
channels." So far, he said, the U.S. is seen as "an
occupier" of Iraq and Afghanistan. And so long as there were
problems in Afghanistan, Pakistan would "face problems too,"
he warned.


8. (C) Boucher agreed that regional governments should
address the roots of the extremists' resentment, not just the
symptoms. Rehman acknowledged again the U.S.'s efforts in
this regard. But the Assistant Secretary also strongly
responded that violence must be dealt with head on.

ISLAMABAD 00001498 002 OF 002


"Pakistanis, not just American citizens, are being targeted;
this is a problem for peaceful Pakistanis as well," Boucher
concluded. Any outreach to the Taliban "reconcilables"
should be done through President Karzai's government in Kabul.


9. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher approved this message.
PATTERSON