Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ISLAMABAD1273
2008-03-24 14:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

ADMIRAL MULLEN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUSHARAFF

Tags:  PGOV PK PREL 
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PP RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #1273 0841420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241420Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6063
INFO RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 9353
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 5150
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 3847
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 8337
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3016
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 001273 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2028
TAGS: PGOV PK PREL
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL MULLEN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUSHARAFF

REF: ISLAMABAD 822

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 001273 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2028 TAGS: PGOV PK PREL SUBJECT: ADMIRAL MULLEN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUSHARAFF REF: ISLAMABAD 822 Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a March 4 meeting with CJCS Admiral Mullen, Musharraf commented on perceptions of India's growing role in Afghanistan and cautioned his visitors with regard to overly optimistic assessments of the peace jirga process. He also gave his view of the post-election political situation in Pakistan and discussed implementation challenges associated with developing the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant General Carter Ham, J3 U.S. Joint Staff, and Major General James R. Helmly U.S. Defense Representative to Pakistan, met March 4 with President Pervez Musharaff, his personal secretary Mr. Mohsin Hafeez and Military Secretary, Major General Shafqat Ahmad. ¶3. (C) Musharraf began by discussing reports of Afghan-Indian intelligence operations against Pakistan. He cited the growing number of Indian consulates in Afghanistan and continued Indian involvement in adverse activities in Pakistan. Musharaff wondered whether increased Taliban action in Afghanistan and extremist acts in Pakistan were not "acts of desperation" on the part of militants. Musharraf offered a sober view of the "peace jirga" process, noting that even if able to reach an agreement the jirga's ability to implement signed agreements were uncertain. The President expressed concern that premature reports of "deals" could lead to dashed expectations and ultimately to cynicism over efforts to achieve stability in the border regions. ¶4. (C) Musharraf was reasonably optimistic about the potential for positive developments at the national level in the aftermath of the February parliamentary elections. He said that the main issue now was forming a government which involves trying to build an effective coalition. He expressed concern over problems associated with food and cooking oil prices. Musharaff stated that the PML-N "doesn't want to join the government" and that they are on a "confrontation course", referring to the expected formation of the new government by late-March. ¶5. (C) Musharaff discussed Pakistan's three pronged strategy for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),saying he felt that it could still be applied successfully within the new political environment. He again cited his view that NGOs were "ineffective" in the FATA. He had previously offered the same view during an Ambassador led briefing on US support for Pakistan's FATA Development Plan (reftel),asserting that the FATA Development Authority was not well organized and did not compare favorably to the Earthquake Relief Authority that proved successful in 2005. Admiral Mullen responded by noting the relative success of Provincial Reconstruction Team's in Iraq. ¶6. (C) Musharraf described the continuing role of the Army in Pakistani society in ways that were broadly analogous to that of the U.S. military in the United States. He also expressed concern over the state of the Pakistani economy, noting that this year the government was expected to run a deficit of approximately 7 percent. He closed by noting that the most difficult thing to do is to make a decision when the chips are down. PATTERSON

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