PAKISTAN: REFOCUSING SECURITY ASSISTANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000105 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PK SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: REFOCUSING SECURITY ASSISTANCE REF: A. ISLAMABAD 5288 ¶B. ISLAMABAD 4817 ¶C. ISLAMABAD 4369 Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request - see Paras 3 and 5. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY. Over the past year, militant extremists in Pakistan have sharply increased attacks, both in tribal areas along the Pak-Afghan border and into settled areas. While these attacks do not represent a medium-term threat to Pakistan's sovereignty, they are undermining regional stability and effective prosecution of the war on terror by Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. Emboldened by successful suicide attacks against high-profile targets like Benazir Bhutto, these insurgents are developing a still more aggressive agenda for 2008. This trend must be reversed, and Pakistan forces must move to neutralize these militant groups. However, the military is hindered by significant capability gaps and fears of civilian casualties, which could undercut already weak public support for offensive operations. ¶3. (C) To ensure Pakistan has sufficient resources and direction to effectively target extremists and degrade insurgent capability, Post believes the U.S. must reformulate our security relationship. In the days following 9/1l, we successfully re-engaged with Pakistan using fast-track programs that now need to be regularized and re-shaped to better meet both our near- and long-term objectives. Post has offered previous recommendations regarding security assistance to Pakistan (reftels). We now request that a high-level military official travel to Pakistan to convince the Pakistani leadership that our military assistance relationship must undergo some fundamental adjustments. END SUMMARY. RISING INSURGENCY ¶4. (C) Reeling from the past year's domestic political events, the Musharraf government has failed to focus on the security situation. This domestic turmoil has given militants the perfect opportunity to organize and execute terrorists acts. Suicide attacks, which were almost unheard of in Pakistan two years ago, took over 600 Pakistani lives this year. The situation in North and South Waziristan has deteriorated, and the insurgency has spread into settled areas. The Army was ultimately able to dislodge insurgents from the Swat valley, after paramilitary forces proved unable to do so, but its hold remains tenuous. NEED FOR SENIOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENT ¶5. (C) Our primary goal must be to enhance the ability of the Pakistan military and law enforcement to beat back the extremists and, over the long-term, more efficiently prosecute the war on terror. Since 2002, the robust U.S. security assistance relationship with Pakistan has produced a more capable and better-equipped partner in the war on terror. Still, profound capability gaps continue to plague Pakistan's military. Pakistan needs urgently to begin addressing these gaps as it prepares for the inevitable spring offensive. We believe a senior level dialogue is needed to promote this effort. Therefore, Post requests a visit by a high-level military official to Pakistan soon after the February 18 parliamentary elections. RESHAPING THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP ¶6. (C) Two disparate factors may have created a favorable environment for recasting U.S. military engagement. First, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto sent shockwaves throughout Pakistan, rattling the general complacency with which most Pakistanis have regarded the extremist threat. The other factor is the appointments of General Kayani, Chief of Army Staff, and General Tariq Majid, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Kayani and Majid are competent, savvy and thoughtful - they are aware of the threat the militants pose to Pakistan's long-term security and understand the negative impact that a perceived lack of cooperation could have on future U.S. assistance. ISLAMABAD 00000105 002 OF 002 PROPOSED VISIT AGENDA ¶7. (C) Post can flesh out this agenda with working papers that explain these issues in greater detail. What We Want: -------------- -- (1) Coalition Support Funds (CSF): We are spending over $1 billion a year on CSF, but the monies are not going where they are needed to support COIN operations. We must convince Pakistan to accept targeting of CSF for specific purposes, e.g., helicopter maintenance. We also need assistance from OSD to ensure that CSF is not merely a reimbursement tool, but one that directs U.S. resources to enhance Pakistan's counter-insurgency capabilities and secures the border in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Post is anxious to work with DOD to implement changes that will allow greater flexibility with CSF. -- (2) FMF: We now essentially give Pakistan a check and allow their Joint Chiefs to allocate FMF based on their wish list. It is time to impose additional oversight and make this a needs-based program allocated to enhance USG goals. -- (3) WAR ON TERROR: Pakistan needs to appoint a czar (preferably a serving or retired general) to coordinate joint security and development in the tribal areas (FATA). They have yet to agree on establishing a Border Coordination Center (BCC) on the Pakistan side of the Afghan border. Separately, we can provide a list of outstanding requests on CT intelligence cooperation needed to enhance our security objectives. -- (4) SOFA: Pakistan often suggests our relationship is short-term and based on our CT goals, but they have yet to agree to a SOFA. Let's set a date for beginning talks. Much needed MOUs (or similar agreements) to secure access for U.S. aircraft to Pakistani airspace and airfields, and to ensure uninterrupted fuel and cargo transport through Pakistan to Afghanistan could be facilitated by a SOFA. What We Can Offer: -------------- -- (1) ENHANCING SDP: Brief on the new SDP, offer additional special forces training, counter-insurgency doctrine training, follow up on Ministry of Defense's request for establishing and training Civil Affairs missions. Discuss delivery of assistance in Swat and review current programs to train and equip the Frontier Corps. -- (2) F-16 SALE. Renew assurances of U.S. commitment, but lay down a specific marker that Pakistan will have to adhere to agreed upon payment programs and cooperate with the pending NDPC survey. -- (3) IMET: Today's Pakistani colonels missed IMET opportunities during the 12 years of Pressler sanctions; without a significant program enhancement, we will soon face generals with little or no knowledge of U.S. doctrine or democratic values. We want to offer the GOP a doubling of IMET opportunities. -- (4) INCREASING ODRP FOOTPRINT. We now are implementing our third largest military assistance program in the world with six permanent ODRP staff and approximately 25 TDY (including the chief) staff. Offer Pakistan evidence of our increased commitment by increasing the ODRP presence. (ODRP staffing needs will be addressed septel.) COMMENT: ¶8. (C) We need to act now to reverse a growing expansion of extremist militancy in Pakistan. This requires a hard look at our military relationship and a frank dialogue with the Pakistanis on the need to improve our counter-terrorism cooperation. PATTERSON