SUPPORTING "FRIENDS OF AMERICA" IN IRAN (IPRO PD YEAR 1,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000001 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA/IR PLEASE PASS TO ECA/FO E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/16/2018 TAGS: OEXC PGOV PINR SUBJECT: SUPPORTING "FRIENDS OF AMERICA" IN IRAN (IPRO PD YEAR 1, PART II) REF: 2007 RPO DUBAI 70 RPO DUBAI 00000001 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, Dubai. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: As reftel details, the Department restarted US-Iran official exchanges in August 2006, featuring the flagship USG exchange program, the IVLP. The Iranian government became aware early on of USG funding for the IVLP and, even for the first program in November of 2006, issued written and oral warnings against IVLP participation. Iranian government attention continued in varying degrees, largely depending on the subject matter and institutions involved, throughout the year. Attrition for various reasons, particularly anxiety over Iranian government reaction, thinned the participant field for some of the programs. Despite these obstacles, Iranians participated in record numbers and spread the word widely about their positive experience with America after returning home. Some alumni faced IRIG retaliation for being "friends of America", but continued to strongly support the positive impact of continued US-Iran exchanges. The experience of returning alumni also helped reveal fissures within Iranian society which can help inform future PD programming. End summary. ¶2. (C) As soon as IRPO was anounced, generalized IRIG paranoia about IRPO and US policy towards Iran led them to label our exchange programming as part of US "regime change" efforts aimed at fostering a "velvet revolution" in Iran. (As recently as November 2007 the Iranian government specifically referred to the US government's Dubai office as the focal point of the USG regime-change program.) Given this context, and the novelty of reestablishing such exchanges after a 27-year hiatus, the number of Iranian IVLPs in our first year nonetheless exceeded expectations to become the top IVLP program in the NEA region and third worldwide (see ref). Program participants have been effusive in their praise of the quality and value of their exchange programs, and have been key supporters of further engagement with the Iranian people. Alumni have both suggested future participants and volunteered to help organize future programs. In addition, they have spoken in glowing terms about the American people they met and institutions they visited. ¶3. (C) We expect IRIG scrutiny to remain in FY2007, possibly increasing or decreasing based upon the state of bilateral tensions and the subject matter of the program. We also expect Iranians to continue to participate, although recruitment under current conditions will remain challenging. To offer a more textured view of the impact of and challenges to US-Iran exchange programs, we offer the following in-depth discussion with an IVLP alumnus detailed below. It offers useful insights into how exchanges can help to mobilize and empower "friends of America" within Iran and help identify and exploit fissures within Iranian society to advance USG policy goals. "Friends of America" - An IVLP Case Study -------------- ¶4. (C) In late November 2007, one of last year's International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) participants, Dr. Farhad Towfighi (strictly protect) came to Dubai to discuss his post-exchange experience with IRPO. Tofighi had been an employee of the Iranian Red Crescent Society's Relief Services branch. He played an active role in delivering emergency medical care after the 2003 Bam (Iran) earthquake and the 2004 Samarra (Iraq) mosque bombing. Nonetheless, the IRC leadership retaliated forcefully against him after he participated in the April/May 2006 Disaster Response Management IVLP. On the other hand, other government officials and organs were neutral to supportive of Dr. Towfighi and the program generally, reflecting nuanced diversity among different elements of the Iranian government towards engaging with the US. ¶5. (C) As told to IRPO, when Dr. Towfighi - then still an IRC employee - was invited to the IVLP, he arranged to meet with the IRC President, Dr. Seyed Massoud Khatami (no relation to former President Khatami),to explain the program and solicit his support. He even brought a copy of the IVLP program description for review. The IRC Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) liaison officer was present. A representative from President RPO DUBAI 00000001 002.2 OF 003 Ahmadinejad's Office, Dr. Biroudian (FNU),also attended. While Dr. Biroudian was "very supportive" of the program, IRC President Khatami angrily rejected any such engagement with America and remained opposed to the program. He was reportedly skeptical about the intent of the "L" (leadership) in IVLP, asking why the Americans were trying to recruit leaders in Iran. (Note: Tofighi suggested dropping the L from future program materials if possible.) Dr. Towfighi noted to IRPOff that Khatami was a former IRGC officer, and like the rest of the senior government officials with IRGC backgrounds appointed under Ahmadinejad, he was ideologically hostile to the US. ¶6. (C) Despite the IRC President's opposition to the program, Towfighi went ahead and secured official leave to participate in the program, based somewhat on reassurances from Dr. Biroudian. He also briefed the Ministry of Health regarding the program and was told that the MOH had "no reaction". The MFA was apparently supportive. During the first week of the IVLP in Washington, Dr. Towfighi and his colleagues attended a dinner with the head and deputy head of the Iranian Interests Section. At this event, Dr. Rahmanian of the Interests Section (title unknown) told the group that the communication offered by the program was "interesting", and that he was "very supportive" of the program. ¶7. (C) According to Towfighi, the IRC remained angry about his participation and waited to retaliate after his return to Iran in early May. First, he was summoned to the IRC security office and coercively interrogated for nine hours. A few weeks later he was required to appear at an administrative hearing which resulted in him being fired him from his position with the IRC and banned from teaching. The authorities also forced him to repay all income he had derived from teaching over the past year (upwards of 15,000 USD, a large sum in Iran, even for a doctor). According to Tofighi, the IRC security officials offered him more lenient treatment if he agreed to denounce another IVLP participant, Dr. Noorbala, who was the President of the IRC during President Khatami's administration and the de facto leader of the IVLP group. Dr. Towfighi refused to do so. When IRC officials asked him specifically about his exchange experience, he described the trip as professionally useful, and the Americans he met as professional, kind, generous and friendly. The IRC President grew even more displeased. ¶8. (C) Taking their retaliation a step further, the IRC then reportedly banned possession or distribution of any of the eight books Dr. Towfighi had written on disaster relief operations, including sending notices to all 600 IRC offices throughout Iran's 30 provinces to remove these materials. The IRC even visited IRC offices countrywide to ensure his books were removed from shelves. He learned later from colleagues that while removing the books, IRC security officials warned staff that "this is what happens to friends of America". ¶9. (C) Dr. Towfighi fought back. He hired a lawyer and appealed the IRC's ruling to the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Court awarded him damages for lost income from the banning and removal of his books. He is currently appealing the other aspects of the IRC ruling as well. Dr. Tofighi's story confirms that at least some means of redress are available through the Iranian courts. Also, he reported that lobbying influential government and NGO officials can be at least somewhat effective in curbing hardliner conduct. Dr. Towfighi said that he had argued his case with the Swiss Embassy, the MFA, the International Red Cross, and the Ministry of Justice about his case. In addition, he was planning to speak with the Presidential Office official who had been supportive of the exchange at the outset. Dr. Towfighi reported that ICR colleagues had responded very negatively to the ICR's crackdown on such a long-serving and respected member of their ranks (Towfighi had worked for IRC for 23 years),and many within the organization were rallying to his support and against the IRC President. He claimed that a teaching colleague had even thrown a student out of his class when he learned that the student was an IRC employee in anger over Towfighi's plight. Towfighi now works in a low-profile part-time teaching position. RPO DUBAI 00000001 003.2 OF 003 ¶10. (C) Comment: Towfighi's case is not the only example of problems faced by returning IVLP participants. A few other participants have lost their positions or had their passports confiscated upon return. Fortunately, they seem to be the exception rather than the rule, and even some of these people continue to keep in contact with us and help organize further exchanges. The Towfighi case offers key insights into methods of suppressing dissent, or even engagement with the outside world, used by hardliners in Iran. It further illustrates that redress through the courts and lobbying with influential figures can be effective to some extent in defending one's rights. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it suggests that attitudes towards engagement with the West, in particular the US, vary within the government, both among (and within) different Ministries, and between senior leadership and the rank and file. We should use our public diplomacy tools to strengthen the hand of those supportive of engagement. The primary fault line exists between the mass of the Iranian people and even a large portion of Iranian officialdom who want engagement with the outside world versus hardliners and their supporters opposed to any opening which risks their monopoly on power and their vision of a pure Islamic society. As the Towfighi case illustrates, PD tools can meaningfully influence changes within Iranian society of benefit to American policy goals. Part III of the IRPO PD Year 1 series will offer concrete recommendations for most effectivly using these tools to advance our Iran policy goals in 2008 and beyond. BURNS