INTERNAL DISSENT HAMPERS HONG KONG DEMOCRATIC PARTY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HONG KONG 000053 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER DEPT FOR EAP/CM E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2033 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SOCI CH HK MC SUBJECT: INTERNAL DISSENT HAMPERS HONG KONG DEMOCRATIC PARTY REF: A. HONG KONG 2855 ¶B. HONG KONG 1447 ¶C. HONG KONG 2949 ¶D. HONG KONG 3008 ¶E. HONG KONG 458 ¶F. HONG KONG 3118 ¶G. HONG KONG 3103 Classified By: E/P Chief Laurent Charbonnet. Reasons: 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: "Reformist" members of the Hong Kong Democratic Party (DP) recently sent an internal memorandum to the party's leaders, expressing deep concern over the party's poor showing in the November 18 district council election (ref a) as well as its overall strategic and policy direction. The reformers also were disappointed that they were not included in an internal review of the party's performance in the election. Calling for a thorough review of "inadequacies" in the party, the group offered eight recommendations for recruiting young political talent, improving the organization of the party, and directly linking funds to community-oriented programs. End summary. ¶2. (C) Comment: The existence of the internal DP memorandum, and the fact that two members of the "reformist" group provided it to us, suggest that the party's poor showing in the district council election has sharpened internal, largely generational differences over strategy and tactics. While the victory of independent pro-democracy candidate Anson Chan in the December 2 Legco by-election may have temporarily soothed some of Hong Kong's pan-democrats, that situation in many ways was unique and may not reflect any broader or longer term improvement in the ability of the democratic camp to coordinate and cooperate against their better organized and funded rivals in the DAB. Indeed, the Democratic Party seems to have dissipated whatever momentum Anson Chan's election might have brought. In the wake of the December 29 National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) decision authorizing Hong Kong to move ahead toward universal suffrage (refs f, g),and concurrently the run-up to the hugely important September 2008 Legco general election, the ability of the DP to heal itself and to work with like-minded colleagues in the pan-democratic camp will be crucial. ¶3. (S//NF) Comment, continued: The challenges to the pan-democratic camp are stark -- Beijing seems to have scored a public relations coup with the NPCSC decision ruling out universal suffrage in 2012 but establishing the possibility of full suffrage for the chief executive election in 2017. Chinese University conducted a public opinion poll shortly after the NPCSC decision and found that 72 percent of respondents found the decision "acceptable," even if a majority would have preferred 2012; 69 percent believed that Beijing is sincere about implementing universal suffrage and is responsive to Hong Kong's aspirations for democracy. Perhaps more telling for the pan-democrats, 56 percent of respondents did not support continued struggle for universal suffrage in 2012, in the aftermath of the NPCSC decision. (Septel will analyze this and other local reactions to the NPCSC decision.) ¶4. (C) Comment, continued: We are not certain of the reformists' motivations in revealing to us internal Democratic Party documents. Clearly, they were trying to spin us and get us involved in the internal factional disputes of the Democratic Party -- which we have no intention of doing. During a meeting in August, the same contacts appealed to the U.S. Government for help in "saving the party from its own demise," and explicitly asked that we speak well of them to DP Chairman Albert Ho and former DP Chairman and sitting Legislative Council (Legco) member Martin Lee. Similarly, at our meeting in early December, they asked if we had met with party leaders following the district elections and if we could shed light on what the leadership's sentiments were following the party's widespread defeat, and asked that we convey or otherwise endorse their views when meeting with DP leaders. Regardless of their motivations, the memorandum provides detailed insight into the divisions in the party organization and weaknesses of its policy approach which are widely seen in Hong Kong as damaging to the party's efforts to fight for increased democracy for the Hong Kong people. End comment. Reform or Bust -------------- HONG KONG 00000053 002 OF 003 ¶5. (S//NF) Hong Kong District Councilor and Democratic Party (DP) member Jimmy Wong (strictly protect) and the party's public relations consultant Raymond Luk (strictly protect) recently told us that in the wake of the DP's failures in the district council elections on November 18 (ref a),reformists in the party -- led by Chan King-ming, founding member and former party vice chairman -- sent an internal memorandum to the party "central leadership" to express their deep concern over recent failures as well as the overall direction of the party. (Note: Wong and Luk passed a copy of the memo to poloffs at a lunch meeting. End note.) The following DP members drafted the letter and identified themselves as "The Reformist Faction of the Democratic Party": Chan King-ming, Fan Kwok-wai, Ho Suk-ping, Kwan Wing-yip, Kwong Kwok-chuen, Lee Wai-man, Lo Yun-ming, Luk Yiu-man (Raymond),Wong Chun-wai (Jimmy),Yum Kai-bong, and Yung Ming-chau. During our meeting with them on December 11, Wong and Luk also posited that a DP-Civic Party merger, which has been publicly suggested since the establishment of the Civic Party in March 2005, would have certain merits. Background on DP Divisions -------------- ¶6. (S//NF) In recent years, the Democratic Party has been plagued by division into two main camps: "the mainstreamers" and "the reformists," though smaller, yet divisive factions also exist within the party leadership. Political pundits in Hong Kong often cite these divisions as the root cause of weakness in the DP. In March 2006, responding to concerns that "PRC infiltrators" had penetrated the party in an attempt to gather information and possibly disrupt party activities, the Democratic Party's Central Standing Committee assembled a five-member "special panel." After an eight-month investigation, the panel's report to the party (released internally in November 2006 -- see ref b) labeled Chan King-Ming, Jimmy Wong and Raymond Luk as "PRC infiltrators." The report included copies of emails between Luk and contacts on the mainland, which it characterized as clear evidence that Luk was an "infiltrator." For example, the report asserted that Luk had reported minutes of politically sensitive DP meetings to contacts on the mainland immediately after they were held. Chan King-ming also was singled out for attending many meetings with mainland officials -- including from propaganda, public security and liaison departments/offices -- without properly reporting his contacts as stipulated in DP by-laws. (Comment: The DP report on infiltration, while compelling, does not provide completely solid evidence that mainland functionaries have infiltrated the DP. It may have served as a tool for political jockeying within the DP, possibly in an attempt to deter efforts by reformists to oust the party's more "mainstream" senior leadership. End comment.) Shape Up or Ship Out -------------- ¶7. (C) Among other concerns, the reformist faction, in its letter to central party leaders ("mainstreamers"),expressed "extreme disappointment" over not being invited to a DP meeting to review lessons learned after widespread defeats in the November 18 district council elections. They claimed this lack of coordination reflected the leadership's "perfunctory attitude, and lack of sincerity and commitment." The group also called for a thorough review of "inadequacies" in the party, and stressed that party leaders should be introspective rather than put blame on factors external to the party. The document noted the steady decline in the "July 1 effect" (alluding to political momentum the pan-democratic camp enjoyed following widespread demonstrations held on July 1, 2003, protesting national security legislation and advocating universal suffrage): "Following the conclusion of the last district board election, we simply must not take a passive stance dreaming for such miracles as the 'July 1' incident to occur again. If the leadership had had vision, they would have been aware, three or four years ago, of the adverse battle scene today in the absence of the 'July 1 effect,' and they ought to have been a lot more cautious about the election." The drafters also questioned whether the DP central leadership had ever seriously attempted to foster party development at the community level, especially in light of the magnitude of resources at the disposal of the pro-establishment parties in Hong Kong. ¶8. (C) The authors argued that increasingly savvy Hong Kong voters will tend to cast their ballots in accordance with the actual attributes of individual candidates, rather than HONG KONG 00000053 003 OF 003 strictly along party lines. They provided a table showing the percentage of votes secured in select constituencies in the district council election and the Hong Kong Island Legco by-election held on December 2 (ref C),indicating that voters did not vote along party lines. The average percentage of votes earned by the DP candidates in the district council elections was approximately 40 percent, whereas Anson Chan, the pro-democracy candidate in the Legco by-election, earned an average 57 percent in the same areas. A Way Ahead -------------- ¶9. (C) The authors suggested that the "rival camp" (Hong Kong's pro-establishment parties) has been successful largely because it has focused on recruiting young political talent, maturing the organization of the party, and directly linking funds to community-oriented programs. They offered eight "concrete suggestions" for the DP leadership to consider. The party should: a) Begin a "rejuvenation" of party leaders and power decentralization; b) Not allow party members to hold concurrent seats in Legco and district council from 2011 onwards; c) Reconstitute a party school to attract and train young members; d) Set up a district strategic development task force to prepare for the 2011 DC election and fine tune the party's long-term election strategy; e) Allocate resources for overseas travel by district councilors to study campaign strategies in other democratic countries; f) Enhance communication with non-democrats; g) Strengthen the party's Youth Committee and enhance liaison with young students; h) Review the DP's district policies (especially in the areas of education, welfare, medical and conservation) to focus on community concerns. ¶10. (S//NF) In August 2007, when Wong and Luk sought meetings with us to voice concerns over the leadership and direction of the party, Wong speculated that the pan-democrats stood to lose many seats in the district council elections (this came to pass),and that those losses together with the party's perceived failures over the Green Paper (electoral reform) consultation process would lead to huge losses in the September 2008 Legco election. He also said he was satisfied with the substance and function of the Green Paper, and suggested that the Hong Kong people were more than capable of using it as a platform to decide how best to move forward with universal suffrage. Cunningham