HONG KONG'S NPC AND CPPCC DEPUTIES: MORE THAN A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 002216 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM, E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2033 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL HK CH SUBJECT: HONG KONG'S NPC AND CPPCC DEPUTIES: MORE THAN A ONE-WAY BRIDGE? Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL JOE DONOVAN for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Hong Kong's delegates to the National People's Congress (NPC),and to a lesser extent, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC),have seen a gradual shift both in Beijing's and the Hong Kong people's expectations of their role and influence. Until a few years ago, the local deputies were regarded as little more than Beijing's mouthpiece, defending the central government's position and consolidating its local support base. This role continues, but Beijing has gradually come to recognize the value of the deputies' interaction with the Hong Kong public to help Beijing better understand mainstream opinion. For their part, local deputies now help their "constituents" raise grievances with the central government and report on Hong Kong developments at the annual NPC meeting in Beijing. Qw delegates elected in January 2008 hope to increase engagement with the public and give Hong Kong a voice on national-level issues. End summary. ¶2. (C) Comment: Over 500,000 people took to the streets on July 1, 2003 to protest against proposed national security legislation, as well as express dissatisfaction with the administration's handling of SARS and the economy. This watershed event likely led Beijing to rethink its approach and reassess how it could better utilize its Hong Kong supporters to help it prevent future discontent from brewing into public outrage. In many respects, the local deputies are ideal for liaison work with the Hong Kong public; they have some prestige from their roles, they know Hong Kong well and they speak the local Cantonese dialect. They may need to downplay their pro-Beijing positions at times, but as Hong Kong people increasingly look to the deputies for help in resolving Mainland-related disputes, and the deputies demonstrate they can deliver, political views will be less relevant. End comment. -------------- Background -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Prior to the 1997 handover, Hong Kong's representatives to the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) were part of the Guangdong delegation. Hong Kong delegates were nominated by the Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong office, the then de-facto representative of the Chinese government in the colony, and were elected with the rest of Guangdong's delegates by the provincial people's congress. Candidates naturally came from pro-Beijing circles and selection to these bodies were seen as a barometer of one's status with the Mainland government. Besides attending the annual NPC and CPPCC meetings in Beijing, the deputies had little else to show for their role as delegates to these national bodies. ¶4. (C) City University Professor Joseph Cheng recently told us that in the initial years after the handover, Beijing's sensitivity to accusations it was undermining "one country, two systems" led it to discourage NPC deputies from publicly commenting on local Hong Kong developments, governance or policies. Their roles were confined to either public endorsement of Beijing's policies or discussion of the SAR's relationship with the Mainland. At the annual NPC and CPPCC meetings in Beijing, the deputies faced similar constraints, which severely limited their value in the eyes of ordinary Hong Kongers. The deputies were still seen as little more than Beijing's mouthpiece and clearly part of the other "system" of the "two systems," explains Central Policy Unit member Shiu Sin-por. (Note: The Central Policy Unit is the Hong Kong government's internal think-tank. End note.) While Shiu and Cheng agree Hong Kong deputies regularly (if unofficially) discussed local issues with the Central Government Liaison Office (CGLO) in Hong Kong, they find it unlikely those exchanges significantly shaped Beijing's understanding of Hong Kong. -------------- Different Times, Different Roles -------------- ¶5. (C) In the past several years, Beijing has revised the roles of Hong Kong's local NPC and CPPCC deputies in two main ways. First, the central government no longer prefers the delegates to keep a low public profile in Hong Kong. BeiQng now encourages many of the deputies to use their prominent positions in Kong's business, academic, and political circles to actively participate in Hong Kong life and increase interaction with different sectors of society, Shiu explained. From their side, Hong Kong deputies increasingly HONG KONG 00002216 002 OF 002 provide "constituent services" to Hong Kong residents encountering problems on the Mainland. Shiu reported the NPC deputies have an office co-located with CGLO in which they receive constituents hoping delegates can intercede on their behalf with the central government. Simply having a deputy's signature on an inquiry letter prompts a relatively quick response from the government, a marked improvement from the usual long delays, or no response at all. ¶6. (C) Second, Beijing has lifted its "gag rule" on Hong Kong deputies discussing Hong Kong political, social and economic issues, whether or not they relate to relations with the Mainland. The deputies can and do advocate for Hong Kong's needs, explains Hong Kong's NPC Standing Committee member Rita Fan. Fan sees the deputies as one of the "many channels" Beijing has to help it stay abreast of Hong Kong developments. (Comment: Our contacts did not specifically mention the July 1, 2003 demonstration against proposed national security legislation as a key factor for Beijing's push for the deputies to be more active. However, we assess that event prompted Beijing's readjustment. Beijing also made changes at CGLO, with seven of its eight deputy directors either transferred from Beijing and Guangdong (presumably Cantonese speakers) or promoted internally. The protest clearly showed Beijing it needed to broaden its contacts to better understand Hong Kong society. End comment.) -------------- How Active is Too Active? -------------- ¶7. (C) Thirteen of the current 36 NPC deputies elected in January 2008 are first-time delegates, and many of them are younger, more professional, and have more mainstream appeal than previous delegates. They are eager to increase their interaction with the Hong Kong public, and almost immediately proposed setting up a formal office separate from CGLO. Although the proposal was quickly rejected by Beijing, the press reported CGLO promised to increase support staff for the deputies. Some members have proposed launching a collective website (many deputies currently use their personal websites to advertise their NPC deputy role) and holding seminars to discuss issues relevant to Hong Kong. One deputy has gone a step further and called for the deputies to focus on all national affairs. It remains to be seen whether Beijing will allow this ambitious group to serve as advocates of Hong Kong opinion on national development, but their actions thus far suggest that Hong Kong delegates intend to push the envelope of their mandate. DONOVAN