CENTRAL HIGHLANDS SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS BEHIND UNREST

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HO CHI MINH CITY 000958 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, DRL/AWH AND DRL/IRF E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI ECON VM SUBJECT: CENTRAL HIGHLANDS SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS BEHIND UNREST REF: A) HCMC 682 B) HCMC 693 (C) HCMC 517 (D) HCMC 447 and previous HO CHI MIN 00000958 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Central Highlands region of Vietnam is in the midst of an economic transformation. While only twenty years ago much of the Central Highlands was forested and cultivated by ethnic minorities using swidden (roving slash-and-burn) agricultural techniques, today the jungle is clearly in retreat in the face of an onslaught by both giant State-owned enterprises and individual peasant farmers cultivating commodity crops for world markets. While economic development is by-and-large improving living standards and modernizing the area, indigenous ethnic minorities (often collectively termed "Montagnards") are being disproportionately left behind as socio-economic, cultural, and educational marginalization disadvantages them vis-`-vis their ethnic Vietnamese neighbors. Frustration over their exclusion and exploitation is the main trigger of unrest in the area, especially when it takes the form of corruption and land misappropriation. End summary. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND NEW CROPS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Large-scale agricultural developments are immediately evident upon arrival in the Central Highlands. On all but the steepest mountains, the jungle has been replaced by orderly rubber groves that stretch as far as the eye can see. Rice, black pepper, coffee, and cashew farming are ubiquitous in more populous areas. Though rubber and coffee have been cultivated in the Central Highlands since the French colonial period, much of the large-scale transition to cash crops currently taking place occurred within the past twenty years. For example, according to official statistics, more than 117,000 hectares of rubber trees are being cultivated in the Central Highlands, and a Vietnam Rubber Industry Group's survey said 170,000 additional hectares could also be converted to rubber production by 2015. While a high percentage of small-scale farmers have shifted at least a portion of their production to export-oriented commodity crops, large-scale agribusiness in the Central Highlands is almost entirely controlled by SOEs and political insiders who often rely largely on in-migrant labor from the North and Northwest Highlands. While large agribusiness projects helped build the markets for cash crops that are increasing Vietnam's net income, NGO development studies indicate that the approval process concentrated power in the hands of the politically-connected, who are almost exclusively non-indigenous Kinh-majority Vietnamese. ¶3. (SBU) While rubber production remains almost exclusively the domain of large plantations, black pepper and coffee have emerged as "engines of change" for small farmers in the region. With reasonably modest capital investment, even small land holders can take advantage of cash-crop markets to supplement lower income traditional products such as rice, yams, and corn. GVN programs encourage the cultivation of these cash crops through loan programs, training, and subsidies. Gia Lai Provincial and Chu Se District officials highlighted the new prosperity that cash crops had brought their people and planned to continue to promote their cultivation. ¶4. (SBU) On the conceptual level, both NGOs and the GVN have expressed interested in introducing new crops -- notably cacao -- to the area to increase the local value-added. Economic planners believe cacao cultivation in the Central Highlands, accompanied by cacao-to-chocolate processing capacity, could bring not just increased profits but create new fields of economic opportunity in processing and industry. Local officials and farmers of other cash crops alike also see the advantage of crop diversification via cocoa as a shield against sometimes fickle international commodity markets. ETHNIC MINORITIES LEFT BEHIND -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Ethnic minorities have not been nearly as successful as native Vietnamese immigrants to the Central Highlands in benefiting from the dramatic economic growth so evident throughout the Central Highlands. The historical dependence of ethnic minorities on a swidden agriculture way of life makes sedentary agriculture, let alone agribusiness farming, culturally foreign. Accustomed to a very difficult but independent lifestyle, ethnic minorities frequently find work in organized enterprises unattractive. This has led some mangers of SOEs to complain that ethnic minorities have such a poor work ethic that they were forced to replace them with ethnic Vietnamese migrants. These cultural difficulties are compounded by generally minimal levels of education (ref septel) among ethnic minorities, geographic isolation, years of war, mutual suspicion, and FULRO separatism. ¶6. (SBU) Basic structural and historical imbalances work to the economic disadvantage of ethnic minority groups native to the HO CHI MIN 00000958 002.2 OF 002 Central Highlands. Starting in 1954 under President Diem's South Vietnamese government, Catholic refugees from the north were encouraged to resettle in the South, including the Central Highlands. Under Diem, lands traditionally belonging to Montagnards was decreed "Sovereign Territory" and reallocated to the new Kinh (ethnic Vietnamese) immigrants for cultivation. After the Vietnam War, the central government continued the policy of encouraging Kinh resettlement to the Central Highlands in the hopes it would spur economic development and increase national security. Ethnic minority community leaders relayed that the in-migration of Kinh with access to capital and experience in banking has led to a steady transfer of land from ethnic minorities to Kinh migrants. This is a tricky problem to address, because (as noted ref C) well intentioned policies to restrict land transfers from ethnic minorities to ethnic Vietnamese bred resentment and charges that the GVN was purposefully marginalizing ethnic minorities by not allowing them a share in Vietnam's economic boom. The domination of local government by Kinh officials has exacerbated the problem as SOEs and other Kinh-led enterprises have used sometimes questionable land appropriation schemes to strip ethnic minorities of their traditional land. Anger over land appropriation and misappropriation seems to be the leading cause of unrest in the region (ref D). ¶7. (SBU) In a replay of the clash of aboriginal and modern culture that has been replayed in the USA, Canada, Australia and elsewhere, differing conceptions of land ownership and land rights have also played a significant role in breeding resentment among ethnic minorities. In Vietnam's case, ethnic minority individuals frequently complain that the GVN "confiscated" their lands on the pretext of being "unused." Within the tradition conceptions of land and territory among Central Highlands minorities, the "territory" of one village or ethnic group consists not just of the land where they live and farm at any given time. Instead, it includes the entire forest region in the area where the group lives, areas where they have lived and areas where they might live again in the future, as over time they abandon one area to be slowly reclaimed by the forest and relocate their dwellings and farms to newly cleared forest land. Ethnic Vietnamese immigrants, in contrast, typically viewed tribal lands as consisting only of those lands actively used for farms and homes by the ethnic minorities at the time the immigrants arrived. The immigrants -- and GVN officials charged with distributing land rights -- viewed all other surrounding forest land as "vacant." ¶8. (SBU) While government loan programs (such as Programs 134 and 135) target ethnic minorities for microfinance loans, their Kinh counterparts frequently out-compete them with their greater access to capital. According to some ethnic minority members who have returned to Vietnam after fleeing to Cambodia in search of a better life, ethnic minorities can generally borrow only 4-20 million dong (240-1200 USD),while their Kinh neighbors can borrow up to 100 million dong (6000 USD). Such differences are not necessarily the result of prejudice. Banks are reluctant to loan more to ethnic minorities because they both generally do not have sufficient collateral and have history of fleeing to Cambodia, a sad but true factor. Minorities' relative lack of access to capital, however, serves to further compound the growing gap between them and ethnic Vietnamese both by allowing ethnic Vietnamese to profit more from the most profitable cash crops and by perpetuating an environment in which ethnic minorities do not learn the skills needed to interact with modern banks or manager larger-scale operations. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (SBU) As long as substantial numbers of Montagnards feel marginalized and angry, the Central Highlands will remain a tense and potentially unstable region. While some in the GVN continue to see FULRO separatism in every dark jungle corner, ethnic minority discontent is primarily rooted in economic deprivation and fears -- well-founded fears, based upon the unfortunate history of aboriginal peoples in other nations -- that the clash of aboriginal and modern cultures will lead to a loss of ethnic traditions and ultimately even ethnic identity. Defusing this volatile situation will be very challenging even if the GVN is successful in eradicating corruption and other forms of active discrimination against ethnic minorities. End Comment. ¶10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Hanoi. FAIRFAX