FORMER HCMC MAYOR THANH ADDRESSES PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HO CHI MINH CITY 000712 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/6/2028 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ASEC VM SUBJECT: FORMER HCMC MAYOR THANH ADDRESSES PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE, CORRUPTION AND OTHER ISSUES REF: (A) HCMC 0282 (B) HANOI 0877 HO CHI MIN 00000712 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth J. Fairfax, Consul General, U.S. Consulate General Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a periodic dinner with the CG, Vo Viet Thanh, Central Committee Member, former Mayor of Ho Chi Minh City and former Deputy Minister of Security, said that some local and provincial officials -- particularly those in the MPS -- remain deeply suspicious of "the West" and either resist or actively block policy reforms implemented by the central government in Hanoi and intended to open up Vietnamese society. He added that while top leaders in Hanoi are aware of this problem, Vietnam's cultural and political traditions prevent the central government and even the CPV from taking sudden, decisive actions. Instead, he urged patience for what he described as continuing but slow progress toward what will someday become a democratic Vietnam. After stating that corruption is "universal" among CPV leaders, Thanh also opined that even though many of Vietnam's leaders understand that the country's giant State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are highly inefficient, support for them remains strong because of the opportunities they offer for political spoils. Turning to China, Thanh remains deeply distrustful of Vietnam's giant northern neighbor and views it as an impediment to improving US-VN military ties. To circumvent Chinese interference, Thanh suggests that the USG try to engineer situations in which friendly third countries, such as Singapore, invite both the U.S. and Vietnam to participate in some exercise or event. On a personal level, Thanh described his own transformation from aspiring ARVN officer to communist insurgent. END SUMMARY. SHIFTING POLITICAL TIDES AND MPS TRICKS -------------- ¶2. (C) Using a recent incident in Tien Giang province as an example (ref A),CG asked Thanh, as former head of security in HCMC and former Deputy Minister of Public Security (MPS),what Thanh makes of such highly aggressive moves by the MPS to target the Consulate and its staff and how Thanh suggests we should respond. Thanh replied that the type of incident the CG described is not surprising at all and reflects the simple reality that there are always some police officers who exaggerate or even see crimes where they are none in a effort to "make a name for themselves." After noting that all senior police officials understand this unfortunate tendency, he added that the Consulate should not imply ignore such incidents or remain quiet about them. "You do us a favor" by pointing out such incidents quickly and at multiple levels, Thanh said. While senior police officials understand that the possibility of grossly exaggerated reports always exist, without independent feedback they don't know where to look for them and may not realize that a particular report is false or that a certain geographic area is prone to such reports. He suggested raising all such concerns with the local office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the External Relations Office or ERO) but added that it would also be helpful to raise them periodically with MPS Headquarters in Hanoi and directly with the Chairman of the local People's Committee for the province. ¶3. (SBU) Note: MPS in Tien Giang province recently demanded that the ERO call in the CG to protest "inappropriate behavior" by consular fraud prevention unit (FPU) staff in that province. In reality, FPU staff had done nothing inappropriate but local MPS had produced a report that combined gross exaggerations with outright falsehoods to paint a picture of FPU activities that bore more relation to a "James Bond" film than to reality. CG has already met with ERO to rebut the allegations in detail and to protest the nature and tone of the exaggerated MPS report. Details in ref A. Taking Thanh's advice, the next time the CG travels to Tien Giang province, he plans to raise the false report with the People's Committee Chair there. End Note. SOURCES OF TENSION AND A SHIFTING PARADIGM -------------- ¶4. (C) Moving from specific instances to the general political and security situation, Thanh offered two other observations. First, he said that there are some areas where decades of colonial and wartime history have left a legacy of mistrust that will take time to overcome. He said that in the Central Highlands, for example, various religious groups were always closely associated with foreign powers, at times even militarily. Today, leaders in Hanoi recognize that those days are past and that Vietnam has nothing to fear from religious freedom. At the local level, however, political and security officials remember those days and continue to distrust various religious groups. In addition, he said that distrust between ethnic Vietnamese (Kinh) and the many ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands is deeply entrenched, creating a volatile HO CHI MIN 00000712 002.2 OF 003 environment. As an example of the pitfalls inherent in working in the region, Thanh said that while he was Deputy Minister of MPS he recommended that one way to help defuse the ethnic tensions being stoked by the increasing movement of Vietnamese settlers and business people into the traditional homelands of various ethnic groups would be for the GVN to bar ethnic Vietnamese from buying land areas traditionally home to the minorities. While intended as a measure to protect the traditional homelands that the minorities hold so dear, many ethnic minorities -- including overseas relatives and activist groups -- interpreted the proposal as a plan to impoverish the minorities by forcibly cutting them off from the mainstream economy. Thus, an initiative intended to calm protests over land issues sparked protests over economic rights. ¶5. (C) Speaking even more broadly about changes within the GVN in general and the MPS in particular, Thanh offered his view that over the past five years Vietnam has undergone a paradigm shift concerning openness to foreigners. In the past, the central government in Hanoi mandated numerous security and other policies designed to restrict the movement of foreigners -- including diplomats -- and inhibit their ability to interact with local Vietnamese. The groups primarily pushing for more openness toward the outside world were officials and business people from various provinces who understood the importance of opening to the world for economic development as well as to promote desirable change within Vietnam. Today, he says that the situation has reversed itself. The central government in Hanoi -- including the MPS -- has implemented policies to make Vietnam more open and to encourage rather than discourage foreigners and overseas Vietnamese to come to visit and do business. The source of resistance to increased openness has now shifted from Hanoi to the provinces, particularly those provinces where either provincial officials or MPS officials continue to harbor animosity and/or suspicions toward the USA. ¶6. (C) Thanh offered as an example an unnamed province in the Central Highlands where the Party Secretary is himself a member of an ethnic minority and whose deep-seated hatred of "the West" is palpable. Thanh revealed that during a recent meeting held in conjunction with the Party Plenum in Hanoi (ref B),PM Dung was speaking of the importance of cooperating with foreign governments and NGOs on development projects when this particular provincial Party Secretary launched into such a crudely worded diatribe against "Western imperialism" that PM Dung publicly rebuked him. (Comment: While Thanh never mentioned any names other than PM Dung's or even hint at the province in question, he was most likely referring to Dak Lak Party Secretary Nie Thuat. End Comment.) Unfortunately, Thanh added, people like that provincial Party Secretary are not uncommon in a number of provinces and are particularly common in provincial MPS offices. Within the Vietnamese political and cultural framework, Thanh cautioned, these people cannot simply be retired/fired or moved en masse to new positions. Within the MPS, he exclaimed, this would mean firing roughly half of all local level chiefs! Their numbers are already declining, he stated, but the process will take years since progress must be very gradual in order to avoid a backlash from political sub-groups within the CPV and its leadership. ¶7. (C) Thanh summarized his views of Vietnam's gradual political transition by stating that he is confident that the Vietnamese people want democracy and that all of the changes in Vietnam are leading toward this eventual goal. He once again cautioned that patience is needed, however, stating that Vietnam simply is not ready for democracy today. He expressed the fear that a premature jump to democratic institutional norms such as open elections and unfettered freedom of speech would lead to divisiveness and ultimately unrest or chaos. To have a stable democracy, Thanh stated, the people of Vietnam must first learn to that rights comes with responsibilities as well as the need to respect others' rights. CORRUPTION IS EVERYWHERE -------------- ¶8. (C) Following up on a theme he has raised in previous meetings, Thanh offered his view that corruption within the CPV ranks is "universal" and that inherent imbalances between responsibilities and official pay force party members and government officials to become corrupt. He offered numerous examples of corruption that he has encountered, highlighting the way in which mutual knowledge of each other's corruption serves to keep everyone in the system bound together. Despite his apparent openness on this topic, Thanh's examples all focused on fairly minor "administrative corruption" such as taking gifts (that re then resold for profit) or demanding bribes. When the CG asked specifically about large-scale corruption involving the misuse of the billions of dollars in State funds channeled into Vietnam's giant State-owned enterprises (SOEs),Thanh replied that the inherent weakness of the SOEs are well understood by many in the GVN and CPV but that support for continued State HO CHI MIN 00000712 003.2 OF 003 support for the SOEs remains strong for two reasons. First, there are still a number of senior CPV members who have a deep-seated ideological conviction that the State should directly control a majority of the economy, including all public services and "strategic industries." Since the start of the "doi moi" reforms, he added, this faction of the CPV has been willing to allow the growth of private small and medium enterprises (SMEs) but argues in favor of the State controlling all large-scale industries. ¶9. (C) Thanh's second reason why support for the SOEs remains strong despite widespread knowledge of their abuses and inefficiency is precisely because they provide an ideal avenue for finding lucrative positions and business opportunities for the family, friends and political supporters associated with senior CPV leaders. SUGGESTION FOR INCREASING MIL-MIL COOPERATION -------------- ¶10. (C) As in previous meetings, Thanh was critical of China's policies and deeply suspicious of China's intentions toward Vietnam. He blamed the slow pace of expansion of U.S.-Vietnam direct military to military ties on China, stating that not only does China directly protest direct US-VN military contacts, knowledge among GVN leaders that "China is watching" and may demand "equal treatment" with the USA serves to weaken support for enhancing US-VN mil-to-mil cooperation. While there are still a number of pro-Chinese CPV members with senior leadership positions, Thanh said that their relative strength is greatly increased by the realization by those with "a more realistic view" of Vietnam's security needs that Vietnam cannot afford to unduly anger its giant northern neighbor. To expand mil-mil cooperation without unduly raising China's ire or leaving Vietnam open to demands for "equal treatment," Thanh suggests working through friendly third nations such as Singapore or Malaysia. If the military of Singapore were to invite both Vietnam and the USA to participate in some exercise, Thanh offered, it would be much easier for the GVN to accept than if the invitation came directly from the USG. BIO NOTE -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Turning to his own background, Thanh stated that he lived in Hanoi as a young child. In 1954, he and his parents moved to Saigon while his two older brothers, who were already out of school and employed, stayed in Hanoi. Thanh's father moved to Hanoi to continue working with the same French producer, importer and distributor of meat products where he had been employed in Hanoi. While the family in Saigon was comfortable, they learned via letters sent from Hanoi via Phnom Penh that his two brothers were having a very difficult time in Hanoi. At one point, Thanh's parents arranged to send the two sons watches so that they could be sold to raise money to by bicycles. Just before Thanh graduated near the top of his high school class, South Vietnamese police arrested his parents as traitors. Thanh had been intended to join the officer training program of the ARVN, which he described as the tradition for top graduates from his particular high school, but following his parents' arrest he had no hope of becoming an ARVN officer. After hearing from friends in the ARVN that his parents were being tortured for information and that he would soon be arrested as well, Thanh fled Saigon and made his way to a "liberated zone" where he says that he joined guerillas and quickly rose in the ranks to become an officer. ¶12. (SBU) Following the war, Thanh says that he was chosen as chief of security for the renamed Ho Chi Minh City by his war-era commander, Vo Van Kiet (the Viet Cong guerilla leader who had been appointed the city's communist party secretary and who later became Vietnam's Prime Minister). He said Kiet recruited him because he wanted a southerner who understood the complexities of life in the south to keep an eye on all the northerners who had been sent to the south to police the city they neither understood nor trusted. As chief of security for HCMC, Thanh said that he was able to locate the read arrest for his parents and learned that their correspondence with his brothers in Hanoi had been interpreted by South Vietnamese security agents as "coded messages" and that the gift of the two watches categorized as "material support for communist insurgents." After Vo Van Kiet became Prime Minister, Thanh was promoted to Deputy Minister of MPS and later returned to HCMC as People's Committee Chairman. ¶13. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Hanoi. FAIRFAX