Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08HELSINKI562
2008-12-11 14:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Helsinki
Cable title:  

FINLAND TO INCREASE ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

Tags:  FI MARR PGOV PREL 
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VZCZCXYZ0015
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0562/01 3461418
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111418Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4702
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0078
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 8666
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000562 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018
TAGS: FI MARR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: FINLAND TO INCREASE ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Ambassador Barbara Barrett for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000562 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018 TAGS: FI MARR PGOV PREL SUBJECT: FINLAND TO INCREASE ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN Classified By: Ambassador Barbara Barrett for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. According to Finnish officials, the revised Afghanistan policy to be presented to the Finnish Parliament in February 2009 will call for increased civilian and military personnel, as well as greater development assistance. Debate within the government (GOF) about increasing support or maintaining current levels appears to have resulted in the broad consensus to increase, deferring until a later date specifics - and possibly renewed debate with skeptics - about the timing and extent of increases. The top priorities for the GOF will be (1) civilian personnel; (2) support for the 2010 elections; and (3) Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) contributions. The focus on civilian personnel will be on police trainers. The GOF foresees an increase in the OMLT contribution from 10 to 30 (with some possibly at the battalion level). Assuming leadership of the Mazar-i-Sharif PRT from the Swedish government appears unlikely, though the GOF remains interested in leading a PRT. The GOF offers few specifics on increased development assistance; they have pursued training opportunities in Finland and welcome suggestions on future opportunities, e.g., utilizing their expertise on (re)forestation matters. A clearer picture of the situation in Afghanistan might allay concerns among skeptics about the utility of pursuing development in the current security environment, and assist the GOF in more clearly articulating and implementing increased assistance. To that end, S/CA intends to send experts to brief key Finnish officials in early 2009 on the situation in Afghanistan. END SUMMARY. GOF to support greater involvement in Afghanistan -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a December 6 meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary Krol and Ambassador Barrett, Foreign Ministry Director General Elina Kalkku (Department of Asia and the Americas) and Political Department Deputy Director Anu Laamanen shared the GOF,s "decision in principle" to increase its civilian, military and development assistance in Afghanistan. The decision, part of the GOF's Parliament-mandated review of its Afghanistan policy, follows a debate within the government between those who wish to increase support and those who believe current levels are sufficient. According to Kalkku, those in the latter group point to deteriora
ting security in Afghanistan and assert that the situation is "almost lost," so why spend more. After her visit to Afghanistan last October, Kalkku issued an internal report noting the grim security situation but advocating that the GOF do more, a report that appears to be the basis of the decision in principle. As the GOF looks to increase engagement, its top priorities will be (1) increasing civilian personnel; (2) support for the 2010 presidential elections; and (3) increasing contributions to an OMLT. The GOF also will examine more funding to the Afghan Trust Fund and border police training. ¶3. (C) While the GOF will present to Parliament a revised Afghanistan policy advocating increased engagement, doubts linger within the government regarding the security situation in Afghanistan and the ability to effectively carry out development projects. Such doubts also exist in the Parliament. Kalkku welcomed DAS Krol's offer of information from U.S. interlocutors regarding the security situation in Afghanistan, hoping that such information would help ease concerns amongst those who have advocated maintaining the current level of engagement. (NOTE: S/CA has decided that an expert team headed to Moscow in January will also visit Helsinki in order to brief Finnish officials on the situation in Afghanistan. END NOTE.) Increasing civilian contribution a challenge -------------- ¶4. (C) Laamanen said the GOF has encountered difficulties in recruiting civilians to work in Afghanistan (in a prior meeting Laamanen pointed to competition with recruitment for police trainers in a (considerably safer) Kosovo as part of the problem). Given concerns about the security environment in Afghanistan, and the difficulties in recruiting, Laamanen emphasized that the GOF will carefully consider what roles to fill before they send more personnel. Generally, they are looking to increase police trainers, but will consider other roles. OMLT increase; renewed PRT leadership discussions -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Kalkku said Finland's OMLT contribution would increase from 10 to 30 (Laamanen acknowledged that the original commitment for 10 has not been filled yet, with only 2 currently on the ground). While there is no firm decision yet, Kalkku said the intention is that part of this additional contribution be at the battalion level, not just garrison. ¶6. (C) Regarding the possibility of Finland assuming leadership of the currently Swedish-led PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif, Kalkku said the topic had arisen again within the GOF, after having faded when Finnish-Swedish discussions earlier in the year led nowhere. According to Kalkku, the "Swedes won,t give up" the Mazar PRT, which "is a comfortable place to be." She emphasized Finnish interest in leading a PRT, adding that if Lithuania can run a PRT then Finland could. Regarding troop requirements for a PRT, Laamanen said that the GOF anticipates withdrawing approximately 60 troops from Operation Althea in Bosnia, and that in Kosovo they expect to go down to 350 from 450. (NOTE: Staff of the Parliamentary Defense committee subsequently told PolChief that the number in Kosovo could decrease to 250 over the next two years. END NOTE.) Increase in overall development assistance -------------- ¶7. (C) Kalkku, noting that Finland lags behind the other Nordic countries in overall development assistance, said that the GOF supports a doubling of its assistance, albeit "over the long term." With the "funding curve going up" and not a flat line, assistance to Afghanistan would also increase, though again Kalkku offered no specifics. As funding levels increase, Kalkku said they will consider how they deliver assistance: typically the GOF works through trust funds, as limited resources require that they try to avoid "cumbersome bilateral programs," but they will consider bilateral funding, given that there are a number of good organizations in Afghanistan with whom they could partner. ¶8. (C) DAS Krol raised the possibility of training opportunities for Afghans in Finland, for example, training that capitalizes on Finnish expertise in (re)forestation. Kalkku mentioned a planned "pilot project" for rule-of-law training to court officials and police, and good governance and human rights training offered to Afghan parliamentarians. They look to repeat the training to parliamentarians. Kalkku welcomes any suggestions regarding training in Finland, as the government has funding available. Regarding forestry-related assistance, Kalkku stated that currently the ministry of trade and development is focusing on water sanitation and renewable energy projects, but that they could consider forestry projects. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Whether flowing from Nordic Cooperation or Nordic Rivalry, the Finns have seen their neighbors commit to increased troops or development assistance to Afghanistan, and it seems that they have concluded that they too must do more. (The Finns also seek a seat on the UN Security Council in 2013-14, and realize that actions taken now and over the next few years will impact that candidacy.) According to Kalkku, this revised policy will be more streamlined than last year's, described by her as too cumbersome, a decision that might also allow a broad consensus within the governing coalition on increased support while still deferring disagreements and debate about the timing and substance of increases to a later time. Our engagement, e.g., through briefings to key officials and parliamentarians that provide a clearer picture of the situation in Afghanistan, can help allay concerns and assist the GOF in articulating the extent and pace of its increased assistance. END COMMENT. BARRETT

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