DOES RAUL HAVE A PLAN FOR CUBA?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000818 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2013 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS PINR CU SUBJECT: DOES RAUL HAVE A PLAN FOR CUBA? REF: A. HAVANA 592 ¶B. HAVANA 608 ¶C. HAVANA 752 ¶D. HAVANA 790 Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Raul Castro's July 26 speech gave little promise of change or progress on any front. The real impact of four tropical storms/hurricanes in the intervening two months is now beginning to be felt strongly throughout the island. Whether Raul thought the time was propitious to move forward with changes or reforms in July, events are making it obligatory to take action of some sort. However, the Cuban government under Raul seems incapable of taking any action that goes beyond tried (and usually failed) approaches from the past. It is worth asking whether Raul even has a plan, and if so, is he being thwarted by his seemingly resurgent brother Fidel. We doubt that the present dithering and resort to half measures, combined with a notable increase in repression of the public, is likely to lead to greater stability in the long run. We have argued that the GOC under Raul has no long term vision in any case, but thanks to the stormy weather, the future is now. End Summary. ¶2. (C) As reported in REFs A and B, Raul Castro disappointed many with his July 11th and 26th speeches when he failed to announce any significant reform measures. At that time, it appeared that Raul was content to work around the edges of reform--e.g., eliminating some of the "absurd prohibitions" that characterize life in Cuba, taking some initial steps that could lead to broader land reform, and continuing the process of decentralizing the GOC decision making apparatus. At the same time, the GOC had begun to tighten its grip on the populace, harassing and detaining not only the well-known dissidents, but all Cubans who stepped even slightly out of line. The latter effort focused on removing unemployed youth from urban streets and shutting down as many informal businesses as could be found. The combination of the two strategies seemed designed to keep Raul and his cohort comfortably in power for the next few years. Planning for the more distant future was not evident. Those who follow Raul and Co. in power would have to find their own way. ¶3. (C) It was not clear to us precisely why Raul was taking this essentially conservative approach. Assuming he had any interest in reform at all--and that is not a given by any means--it may have been that he still felt unable to act while brother Fidel remained alive and spouting pronouncements through his occasional "Reflections" pieces in the official press. It could be that he believed that there was nothing to be gained through any proactive effort while the U.S. elections remained in the balance, and a future USG a wild card in the planning process. It could be that he felt there was no need to rush things in advance of the fall 2009 Communist Party Congress, which is expected to play an important role in any reforms in Cuba. It could be a combination of all of these and other factors. Whatever the reason, among Cubans the lack of action was discouraging at best. The only saving grace, if it could be called that, is that Cubans had grown accustomed to being disappointed and to long waits during the 50 years of the Castro regime. ¶4. (C) The situation might have remained static for some time were it not for the series of tropical storms (Fay and Hannah) and hurricanes (Gustav and Ike) which pummeled the island from one end to the other from late August to early September. Like the political disaster that has afflicted Cuba for 50 years, tropical storms and hurricanes are nothing new. Cubans cope, and the GOC usually does a commendable job of evacuating people and protecting key infrastructure. However, in normal years, even when there are multiple storms, they arrive at broader intervals and dispersed across the island. In this year (and the hurricane season is not yet over),the storms came in quick succession and hit virtually all parts of the island. As a result, the GOC was unable to "rob Peter to pay Paul" as it had in the past, and the island lost a significant portion of its limited agricultural production while the highway and bridge system, power grid, and potable water systems all suffered serious damage. Add to these strategic blows the damage suffered by thousands of ordinary Cubans who lost houses and possessions, and you have a disaster of truly historic proportions. HAVANA 00000818 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) The above would seem to argue for immediate and energetic action to address urgent national needs by the GOC. That has not been the case, however. While accepting some "politically correct" offers of assistance from partners such as Russia, China, Venezuela, and even East Timor, Cuba kept the EU and virtually all of its member states (except Belgium and Spain) at arms length, and turned US offers of assistance into another anti-US propaganda campaign. Domestic policy has not been any more innovative. The GOC accelerated the already-announced land distribution program (REF D) and announced that as many as 16,000 people may have signed up to get parcels, but did nothing to overcome the weaknesses inherent in that program. Even if the land distribution program were to work smoothly and efficiently--which is highly unlikely--it would be several months at a minimum before any food produced on the formerly vacant lands would be begin to reach markets. Other announcements such as those raising fuel prices (REF C) and freezing food prices (REF D) address genuine problems in traditional Cuban ways that ignore market forces entirely. Rather than improving the current situation, they are more likely to create an even more lively black market and lead to further shortages. To deal with that prospect, the GOC ratcheted security up another notch and has been going after everyone who might even think of working around the official distribution system. The predictable result has been that produce items have virtually disappeared from the markets. ¶6. (C) On the leadership side, Raul has been almost invisible. He visited the hard hit areas of Isla de la Juventud and Pinar del Rio briefly, and then only after two weeks had passed. While the hands-on crisis management that characterized Cuba under Fidel is gone, the old man has been more evident than his brother of late, issuing almost daily "Reflections" pieces about the situation. These pieces have been vintage Fidel, ranting about US attempts to spy on Cuba via the proposed disaster assessment teams and threatening dire consequences for those who might "profit" from the disaster. In many cases they included suggestions for action that read more like direct orders. ¶7. (C) On the foreign policy front, it is business as usual, as if there were no crisis at home. The annual full court press to gather UN votes against the US embargo is in full swing. FM Perez-Roque is in Europe putting conditions on any assistance the EU would send to the island in order to re-open dialogue with the Europeans on Cuba's terms. The persistent campaign to build support for action against the US on the issue of the 5 Cuban spies is as active as ever throughout the world. ¶8. (C) All of this would seem to indicate a country that is supremely confident in its ability to continue without change--at least in the short to medium term--or completely clueless. But if the GOC has demonstrated anything clearly, it is that, in spite of the demonstrated failure of its economic system, it still has a world class network to repress all popular domestic activity and an enviable propaganda machine both here and abroad. With the addition of Fidel's charisma, this combination has kept the GOC comfortably in power for 50 years. Even without the public presence of Fidel, the GOC seems able to retain significant control. ¶9. (C) That said, we do not believe this situation can last forever. If Raul has all of his eggs in the basket of the Communist Party Congress a year from now or is waiting for a new US administration to give him a break, he may come up short, especially if his brother passes from the scene in the meantime. At the moment, the Cuban populace is unhappy and resentful, but it also seems to be resigned to its fate. This is a population that has suffered greatly over decades and knows that it has survived worse. That fact, the existence of an escape valve through emigration to the US, and the continued vitality of the internal security systems, are keeping the lid on. However, the longer the country lurches along with no clear direction forward, the more likely it is that popular frustration could build to dangerous levels. FARRAR