GOC ADMITS IT CAN'T HANDLE HURRICANE DAMAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000761 SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018 TAGS: ECON PGOV PINR PREL CU SUBJECT: GOC ADMITS IT CAN'T HANDLE HURRICANE DAMAGE REF: A. HAVANA 739 ¶B. HAVANA 760 HAVANA 00000761 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Government of Cuba (GOC) admitted in state run media on September 12 that it is impossible to resolve the magnitude of the catastrophe from Tropical Storm Fay, Hurricane Gustav, and Hurricane Ike with available resources. On September 15, the GOC published an official preliminary damage assessment claiming the loss of around USD 5 billion. Some international non-governmental organizations and the United Nations Development Program have informally estimated losses to be as high as USD 10 billion. While some parts of the island were much more directly affected than others, all of Cuba will bear the burden of these new and additional shortages in housing, food, and basic infrastructure (electricity and water) that will last for days, months, and years to come. End Summary. -------------- HOUSING -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The GOC claims more than 444,000 homes (about 13 percent of all the homes in Cuba) were damaged by Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, with more than 63,000 completely destroyed. Although the hurricanes affected the entire island, these national totals are mostly concentrated in a few provinces. Only a handful of houses and apartments were affected in the major population centers of Havana and Santiago de Cuba. For example, over 25 percent (120,000) of the homes damaged were in the province of Pinar del Rio; over 110,000 homes were damaged in the central province of Camaguey; over 65,000 homes in Las Tunas; and nearly all of the 28,000 homes in the special municipality of the Isle of Youth. As of September 15, the International Red Cross estimates that 400,000 Cubans remain in shelters (the GOC estimates 200,000). Anecdotal reports, such as the report from the head of the Methodist Church that 80 percent of their congregation on the Isle of Youth had lost their homes, are consistent with these estimates. ¶3. (U) These new losses are on top of an existing deficit of 500,000 to 1 million houses that the GOC had promised to build at the unrealistic rate of 50,000 per year. The president of the Cuban National State Reserves Institute said on September 12 that "homeless families are the first priority for delivery of resources...The losses caused by the two storms in barely 10 days are so great that it is impossible to reach every place simultaneously. The areas where the greatest damage has been done are the priority." In addition, the GOC's focus is on repairing damaged homes rather rebuilding destroyed homes, thus further adding to its deficit. -------------- FOOD -------------- ¶4. (C) For a cash-strapped country that already imports over 80 percent of its food and has publicly announced its intention to increase the productivity and efficiency of the agricultural sector, the hurricanes were a disaster. The GOC and UN have reported details of the damage to Cuban staples, including: 80,000 acres of banana plantations, over 25,000 acres of yucca, more than 500,000 chickens, 40 million eggs, and 12,000 tons of pork meat. 5,300 tons of food in storage was damaged. According to the UN, 700,000 tons of foodstuffs were affected. To provide some perspective, the much publicized four Russians planes delivered only 100 tons of supplies (mostly tents and construction material). ¶5. (U) All food production was affected in one way or another. Of the sectors most affected, the 2009 sugar harvest is in danger with 22 percent of the area devoted to sugar production flattened and another 74 percent flooded. HAVANA 00000761 002.2 OF 002 Only about 60,000 acres went untouched. Cuba needs to harvest about 380,000 acres to meet domestic demand and almost 220,000 acres to meet an export commitment to China. Much of the flattened area (380,000 acres) may be salvaged, but only the part of the flooded area bailed out within 2 weeks will survive. In addition to the actual harvest, 7,500 acres of newly planted sugar canewas lost and 40,000 tons of stored sugar was soaked and will need to be refined again. Furthermore, damage to sugar mills, factories, transport, warehouses, and access roads will all affect availability of sugar in the near to medium term. -------------- INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUPPLIES -------------- ¶6. (C) The GOC has publicly focused on clearing roads, restoring electricity, and delivering potable water to those in need - or at least to those near a camera. Still, many regions remain without electricity and water. The GOC reports that only 30 percent of Las Tunas, Camaguey, and Holguin provinces have electricity. The GOC threw a lot of manpower and resources at restoring electricity to Pinar del Rio and Isle of Youth after Gustav, only to have Ike roll back many of its gains. As of September 15, the GOC reports that 55 percent of Pinar del Rio and 67 percent of Isle of Youth have power. However, consular and civil society contacts report that most people in these two regions remain without electricity, water, and gas. In Havana, where the GOC reports 92 percent of the city has electricity, several poorer neighborhoods remain without any electricity or water and major hotels still experience frequent blackouts. Although there is now more than enough water in the country's reservoirs, delivery sys tems have been damaged and storage systems are at risk of bursting. ¶7. (C) Despite an extensive government effort to publicize its relief efforts, we continue to hear from contacts that no food or construction supplies are reaching the most desperate areas of Pinar del Rio, Isle of Youth, and Holguin. A few civil society contacts reported police confiscating cameras in Pinar del Rio. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) While we continue to digest the flurry of government figures with a teaspoon of salt, it is clear that damage to Cuba's housing, food supply, and infrastructure is well beyond anything the GOC can handle on its own. In addition, the GOC has been more open to non-USG foreign assistance than usual (Ref B) and surprisingly bleak in its assessment of damages and the long road ahead. While the average Cuban in the affected provinces waits for government assistance and the official media highlights the hard work of the Cuban Civil Defense System, residents of Havana swarmed the stores and produce markets last weekend to stock up in anticipation of future shortages and higher prices. FARRAR