CUBA: REACTIONS FROM RAUL CASTRO'S SPEECH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000187 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018 TAGS: ECON PGOV PINR PREL CU SUBJECT: CUBA: REACTIONS FROM RAUL CASTRO'S SPEECH REF: A. HAVANA 182 ¶B. HAVANA 183 Classified By: Charge: Buddy Williams: For reasons 1.4 b/d ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Average Cubans seem unconvinced that Raul will be able -- or willing -- to improve their daily lives, but most seem to be willing to wait and see if changes materialize. Members of Cuban civil society are decidedly more negative about the future. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Most well-known members of Cuban civil society were interviewed by the international press, either through correspondents on the island or by phone from overseas. Their views overall reflect a belief that very little is going to change in Cuba, as reinforced by the hard-line makeup of the new Council of State. ¶3. (C) Poloff spoke to Vladimiro Roca, who had been flooded with interview requests (from Los Angeles, New York, New Jersey, and Florida, from Spain, Colombia, Mexico and Argentina). Roca stressed that he sees no possibility of any major changes. He also said that as long as Fidel is alive that there will be no significant new directions in foreign or domestic policy and even if he were to die the government would still preserve continuity. That said, he does think that there will be "minimal" economic reforms. He does not believe Raul gets on well with Chavez and believes Raul wants to direct more effort in getting Brazilian and Mexican investment, but believes that this intention will encounter difficulties. He added the government will probably try to expand private ownership of land and may try to build homes in the countryside to stem the tide of people leaving for the cities. As far as the portion of Raul,s speech dealing with diversity of opinion, he stated that Raul in general is more willing to listen to others than Fidel, but he did not expect the government to entertain a broad range of proposals. On human rights, Roca does not expect the government to do more than a few token releases of prisoners to keep up the hopes of the Europeans. He believes that the government will continue the tactic of using short term detentions (that last a few hours or days) rather than long term arrests. As other persons have indicated, Roca believes arrests of young people for "peligrosidad" (dangerous behavior) have increased significantly in the last year. Just in his neighborhood, he has heard of six cases recently of people prosecuted for "peligrosidad." ¶4. (C) COM Parmly spoke to Martha Beatriz Roque (MBR) who felt the speech was a reaffirmation of the regime,s hardline stance and that the election of the old guard to the Council of State confirmed that same reality. She felt that the call for a critical debate is strictly meant "for the revolutionaries" and that there will be no tolerance of real dissent whatsoever. Asked whether the dissidents would be tempted to "take Raul at his word" and speak out, MBR replied that the last time she tried that, she got three-and-a-half years in prison as a result. MBR thought the GOC is frenetic in their pursuit of the dissidents and recommended to "lay low for a while and see if the GOC ends up doing anything." She anticipates some, very minor economic steps, but repeated her long-standing position that re-uniting the two currencies would be too hard. She thought there would be some, very minor steps towards agriculture reform, but it would go nowhere near addressing the main problem. MBR did not think the GOC feels itself in a weak position, and explains, in her view, the confidence with which the hard-liners took control. MBR also thought that Fidel is running the entire show and that Raul,s language should be taken at face value: He will consult (and submit to the judgment of) Fidel on every little detail of governing. ¶5. (C) Poloff spoke to Elizabeth Guerra Garcia of the Movimiento Cubano por la Liberacion Homosexual, a dissident organization that frequently reports on discrimination against homosexuals. Before the speech, Guerra and all of her friends expected a larger organizational change. After Raul,s speech and not seeing what they expected, neither she nor her friends expect any significant changes. She did not think that the part of the speech about different opinions was a signal that the government would try to accommodate HAVANA 00000187 002 OF 002 truly diverse points of view. She thought that decision making will be as closed as ever. ¶6. (C) PD Counselor asked 15 Cuban independent journalists, during a previously-scheduled training event, for their reactions. Some of their responses follow: -- Raul clears away some of the dust and cobwebs, but the room remains the same. -- The Council of State is mostly formed from the dried up old historic revolutionary guard. It is doubtful that they intend to restore the economic base of the country. -- Raul is not Fidel and his plans for the short and long term will be to dismantle the reins of power. -- The speech was a contradiction for Raul because those named to the Council stand for orthodoxy, meaning that Fidel is still in charge. -- More of the same. -- The new Council does not represent anything that will benefit the people of Cuba and was not directly elected by them. -- Cuba's future is dark and repression against opposition figures will grow. -- The speech was media-driven. -- This amounts to nothing more than the continuation of the dictatorship. -- The events of February 24 represent the first step toward a preconceived dialectic and the beginning of sweeping change. -- The powers within the regime are maneuvering for survival. -- The regime will continue to maneuver and make the promises it is obliged to make, but in reality it will try to maintain total control and continue the failed totalitarian model. -- This was a succession of the Castro brothers that was manipulated from the start and demonstrates the lack of democracy in our government. I don't expect, nor does the population, that any change in the policies will follow. -- There is a marked skepticism on the streets of Havana with regard to the "supposed" new government. -- The new Council is made up of hard-liners who are close to Raul and as a result should have no trouble imposing their political designs. There are expectations of economic modernization and other reforms that benefit the public, but no political reforms. -- We can only hope that what Raul has promised, he will fulfill; but only time will tell. ¶7. (C) USINT's Drug Interdiction Specialist reported a significant lull in migration departures since Fidel Castro's February 19 resignation announcement. There has been no variation to this lull since Raul's speech. ¶8. (C) Comment: The international press interviewed a fairly representative cross-section of Cubans about the events of February 24. Their reactions seemed to fall mostly into two attitude categories: Pessimistic more-of-the-same and cautiously optimistic wait-and-see. Among members of civil society the reaction has been decidedly less optimistic. The vast majority fall into the more-of-the-same category, although acknowledge the possibility of some economic reforms. Very few, however, entertained positive interpretations about the new composition of the Council of State and none believe political change is being contemplated. As was the case after Raul's July speech, we suspect that the temporary lull in migration departures will soon subside and resume normal levels. PARMLY