SNAPSHOT OF CUBA ON THE EVE OF FIDEL'S ANNOUNCEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000164



SIPDIS



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2013

TAGS: CU, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PINS

SUBJECT: SNAPSHOT OF CUBA ON THE EVE OF FIDEL'S ANNOUNCEMENT



REF: A. (A) 07 HAVANA 0717

B. (B) 08 HAVANA 028

C. (C) 08 HAVANA 023



Classified By: COM Michael E. Parmly for reasons 1.2 (b) and (d)



THE FOLLOWING WAS DRAFTED ON 16 FEBRUARY, BEFORE FIDEL'S

ANNOUNCED STEP DOWN. WE HAVE EDITED IT SLIGHTLY TO TAKE

ACCOUNT OF THE FIDEL ANNOUNCEMENT, BUT OTHERWISE TRANSMIT IT

AS DRAFTED.



1. (C) SUMMARY: The newly "elected" Cuban National

Assembly will meet on February 24 to select a new Council of

Ministers and a new Council of State creating speculation

about whether or not Fidel Castro will be elected President

again. We believe that, regardless of the DECISION OF THAT

BODY, there will be no substantive change in Cuban

government management in the short term, or at least until

Fidel Castro dies. Nevertheless, while the government may

only change the players but not the rules, the rest of Cuba

is moving. Voices of opposition are being heard more loudly,

individual Cubans are preparing themselves to succeed in a

new regime, and all segments of society are beginning to

focus on a Cuba without Fidel. Still, trapped by the

ever-present image of Fidel hovering over it, the government

is neither able to respond to this movement in a way that

satisfies the frustrated Cuban population, nor is it able to

stop the movement. Movement toward change at various levels

of Cuban society--and with little or no coordination among

them--is likely to continue and grow. The probable result in

the medium term will be a gradual opening of the economy, but

a stagnant political landscape. More radical scenarios are

possible, and certain areas, such as illegal migration, are

certain to deteriorate. End Summary



The Question of Succession

====================



2. (C) The newly elected National Assembly will meet for the

first time on February 24, and, in accordance with the Cuban

constitution, will select a new Council of Ministers (the

cabinet) and the new Council of State (the ruling executive

body). As a member of the National Assembly Fidel Castro can

be elected again as President in the Council of State. HE

NOW HAS ISSUED A SHERMAN STATEMENT DEMURRING FROM SUCH AN

ELECTION. ALREADY in Cuba there HAD DEVELOPED a widespread

view that he wOULD not/not emerge as President this time.

There are many possible scenarios for this, including his

election by an overwhelming majority followed immediately by

his refusal to take the job. Some other names have surfaced

as possible presidential candidates, including current

National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon and VP Carlos

Lage. In our view, whatever artifice is designed by the

powers that be and given to the National Assembly to rubber

stamp, as long as he draws a breath (or as long as one neuron

fires as one dissident leader put it),Fidel Castro will

retain the ultimate authority. If an arrangement is devised

that creates a new head of government, that decision will

become more interesting once Fidel is dead and gone, but in

and of itself, it will not change overall policy. Even those

Cubans who speculate about the various interesting

permutations agree that no matter what happens, Castro will

retain the real power--his ego will not allow anything less.



Moving Toward Change on the Island

===========================



3. (C) As we have noted in previous reporting, Raul Castro

set the tone for change, principally in his July 26, 2007

speech (REF A),but even in his much more conservative

December 28 address to the outgoing National Assembly (REF

B). In his own words he has described failings that all

Cubans recognize and he has called on Cubans to discuss these

problems. However, in spite of his trumpeting of 5 million

participants in the "debates" he set in motion, there have

been no changes implemented that address the needs of the

Cuban people. Recent actions such as the imposition of an

income tax on the informal hard currency earnings of a small,

but potentially influential, part of Cuban society (REF C)

focus only on further control rather than opening new

opportunities. Measures to open the agricultural sector,

improve investment, and permit freer travel are discussed but

never implemented.



4. (C) The result of this has been twofold. In the first

place, ordinary Cubans are losing whatever ability they may

have had to accept their lot in life. Generations have faced

scarcity of basic goods, and lack of freedom to speak and act

as they pleased, but they survived and found a way to

"resolver" the problems of daily life. There is now much

greater frustration about the government's failure to create

the conditions necessary to improve the economy, and

willingness to accept the status quo is evaporating.

Secondly, thanks to Raul's call to debate, Cubans are

becoming much bolder and more willing to criticize the

government for its inability or unwillingness to provide them

access to goods, and the most basic of rights such as the

ability to travel freely, even domestically, and find a

suitable place to live. This growing public pressure

combined with less-focused government efforts to suppress

individual activity is leading many in Cuba to simply take

matters into their own hands and do whatever they deem

necessary to take care of their own needs.



5. (C) At the moment anyway, there is no central focus to

these efforts. Some individuals have come together in

organizations, but by and large these groups are disparate

themselves and unable to attract large followings in what is

still a very repressive society. Dissident leaders continue

to expand their activity in the face of occasional

crackdowns, and challenge the regime to shut them down. But

none of the dissident leaders is poised to take on a broader

leadership role. Several political parties, in fact several

Liberal Parties alone, have begun to work quietly, though

none of them can claim any significant membership. Even

societal groups with close connections to the regime, such as

artists and intellectuals, are becoming more open to meeting

with USINT (though not with other groups, especially

dissidents present),and clearly are preparing for a time

when they will no longer need to bow in the direction of the

regime. All recognize that the real chance to flourish in

their field will come through contacts with colleagues in the

U.S., and that the opportunity to do so is closer than ever.



What is Going on Inside the Regime?

===========================



6. (C) With years of practice at secrecy and deception, the

regime and its internal workings remains an enigma. But just

as many ordinary Cubans have begun to move beyond Fidel in

spite of his continued manipulation of events, it appears

that many in more privileged positions near the center of

power also are beginning to look beyond mere dependence on

the benefits that accrue to occupants of those positions.

The departure of celebrities like Carlos Otero (and possibly

singer Silvio Rodriguez next),diplomats and artists is one

manifestation of this. Numerous sources close to or in the

regime have told us of actions by various friends and

neighbors that indicate that they are trying to find a way to

protect themselves and their families from fallout when

Castro does die.



7. (C) While we do not believe any serious change will come

out of the National Assembly meeting on February 24, there

nevertheless appear to be machinations taking place among

potential leadership. We found it odd, but certainly not

coincidental, that a Politburo member like current National

Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon would appear, and be very

professionally recorded, while being roasted by a hostile

audience of students--even if those students did come almost

exclusively from the nomenklatura itself. Adding to the

puzzle was the clearly put-up drama of the supposed detention

of one of the students and his subsequent recanting of his

grilling of Alarcon. Somebody is being set up to be

embarrassed and possibly run out of their job--clearly

Alarcon being one--but it is not clear whose hand is behind

the conflicting shows. Obscure, but highly critical articles

have appeared in the official press in the past week--mostly

in Juventud Rebelde--attacking "liars within the Party" and

individuals who promote change without understanding that

change is in the nature of the revolution. We assume the

targets of these screeds know who they are, though their

identity is in no way clear to us. All of these actions

would seem to be those of individuals or groups within the

ruling structure struggling either to position themselves to

take power, or to grab what is left and run. In neither case

do these forces appear to be planning anything that will

address the fundamental ills of Cuban society.



Outlook for the Rest of 2008

=====================



8. (C) The sum of all of these disparate indicators is an

island that is beginning to burst with suppressed

expectations and frustration. To be sure, there are large

swaths of the population, especially outside of Havana, with

no access to any information except that provided to them by

the regime. These people are no less in need, and no less

frustrated by the difficulties of their lives, but with

nothing else to go on, they are more willing to accept the

government propaganda that all of the ills in their lives can

be blamed on the U.S. embargo. By the same token, however,

they are not likely to remain so content when Fidel does pass

on and life continues as before, or worsens as internal

factions struggle over the "right" path to take. Those more

"in the know," like the employees of ACCOREC and CUBALSE who

now find themselves taxed and receiving no services in

return, are likely to be emboldened to protest even more

strongly. They represent a tiny segment of the population,

but as several Cuban intellectuals have reminded us, it is

the segment that has traditionally started revolutions on the

island. If genuine protests by students were to begin to

spread, something the regime clearly fears and acts to

suppress at every opportunity, the challenge to the

government could become even greater.



9. (C) More important than the upcoming National Assembly

meeting would be an as-yet-unscheduled Communist Party

Congress. These are supposed to be held every five years,

but there had not been a PCC Congress in ten years. One of

the last sub-congresses, UNEAC, the union of artists and

intellectuals is scheduled to have its meeting April 1. If

the Federation of Cuban Women (FEM) formerly headed by Raul's

wife Vilma Espin before her death in 2006, holds a meeting

soon -- and the 18 february edition of the daily "Juventud

Rebelde" reported that preparations have begun, the way would

be clear to hold another full Party congress. That body

might actually take actions that could change the course of

GOC policy. But such a congress has not been scheduled, it

is not clear if Fidel would be around when it occurs, and

life and frustration go on. The GOC may believe, as CUBINT

chief Bolanos told the press, that it can wait until there is

a new administration in Washington and then bet everything on

negotiations with the U.S. that Raul has called for, but as

time goes by without action, such a policy will only

contribute to further frustration on the island that will not

be sated by calls for greater labor discipline.

Nevertheless, however much the country may need new

leadership and a new direction, our bet would be that those

in the current power structure will focus all of their

efforts on retaining power and take only those remedial

actions that they might view as supportive of that higher

goal. Economic measures may be announced, political

prisoners may even be released, but all will be done in an

effort to buy time, not to make the fundamental political and

economic changes that are needed in Cuba.



10. (C) While pressure on the island is building, our view

is that WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE IS NOT/NOT LIKELY ON THE ISLAND,

no matter what transpires on February 24, or whenever Fidel

dies. However, WE CANNOT EVEN BE FULLY CERTAIN OF THAT. One

thing that does seem SURE: absent any change or hint of

change, Cubans will increasingly vote with their feet and

head north, or anywhere that will get them out. We expect

that defection by Cubans traveling legally will continue to

rise (the comportment of Cubans at the Beijing Olympics will

be interesting to watch),but so will the numbers willing to

risk all and throw themselves into the sea in the hopes of

improving their life.



PARMLY