AMBASSADOR MEETING WITH GOZ MINISTER AND MUGABE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000085 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF/S FOR S. HILL, ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC ZI SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETING WITH GOZ MINISTER AND MUGABE INSIDER NICHOLAS GOCHE Classified By: Amb. James D. McGee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Ambassador met January 28 with Nicholas Goche, the Minister of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare. Goche is also one of the ZANU-PF negotiators in the SADC mediation process. He promised the Ambassador he would attempt to facilitate a one-on-one meeting between the Ambassador and President Robert Mugabe. On substance, Goche said the SADC mediation was finished, and ZANU-PF was focusing on the upcoming elections which it was confident of winning. He stated international observation was a possibility, but Mugabe would make the decision. ZANU-PF remained united as a party, although it was riven by corruption. Goche believed reengagement with the West was desirable, but the land issue remained an obstacle, particularly with the UK. He questioned why the U.S. had refused to deal with Mugabe, while engaging African despots such as Sudan's Bashir. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador's meeting took place at the home of Fred Mutanda, the president of the American Business Association of Zimbabwe, whose business dealings include ownership of local Western Union and Volkswagen franchises. The meeting was friendly, and began with a discussion of the Washington Redskins, whom Goche rooted for after opening up the Zimbabwean Embassy in Washington as a junior diplomat in ¶1980. -------------- Possible Meeting with Mugabe -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador told Goche he wanted to meet one-on-one with Mugabe to deliver a personal message to Mugabe. Referring to a prior meeting the Ambassador had had with Minister for Lands and State Security Didymus Mutasa and CIO Director Happyton Bonyongwe, Goche said they were obstructionist and had recommended against a meeting between the Ambassador and Mugabe. Goche said he himself thought dialogue was important and he would attempt to facilitate such a meeting. -------------- --- SADC Finished, ZANU-PF Confident in Election Win -------------- --- ¶4. (C) Goche told the Ambassador that although there might be one more SADC mediation meeting for public consumption, the SADC negotiations were effectively finished. ZANU-PF was confident it would win the March election and would consider allowing international observers. The party had nothing to hide and would welcome early observation to verify that the run-up to the elections was fair. In response to the Ambassador's question as to the meaning of "international," Goche said this would include the U.S. Embassy--but not the UK--and could include the Carter Center (proposed by the Ambassador in meetings with UNDP and with Mutasa and Bonyongwe). The Zimbabwean Cabinet was now discussing the issue of observers; Goche stressed that he and other ministers were supportive of international observation, but that Mugabe would make the final decision. -------------- ZANU-PF United -------------- ¶5. (C) Goche averred that ZANU-PF was entering the elections HARARE 00000085 002 OF 002 as a united party. Referring to reports that Simba Makoni would lead an anti-Mugabe movement either within the party or as a "third way," Goche stated that Makoni was a "coward" who talked big to the press but remained silent at party meetings. Goche acknowledged that there was significant corruption within ZANU-PF. -------------- On Reengagement with the U.S. and UK -------------- ¶6. (C) Pointing out that Zimbabwe had been a long-time ally of the U.S., and had even supplied troops to Somalia in the early 1990s, Goche lamented the deterioration in RELATIONS between the U.S. and Zimbabwe. International reengagement was important to correcting Zimbabwe's economy. Goche did not blame Zimbabwe's economic plight on the bugaboo of sanctions, but said he could not understand why the U.S. engaged in dialogue with leaders such as Bashir in Sudan, Kibaki in Kenya and Meles in Ethiopia, who he implied were worse than Mugabe, but not with Mugabe. Why did the U.S. send negotiators to North Korea, he asked rhetorically, but refuse to negotiate with Zimbabwe? ¶7. (C) Implying that the land issue was the root of all troubles, Goche said there would be no give on the question of GOZ compensation to white farmers. This was a nuclear issue between Zimbabwe and the UK and there would be no way forward with the British until it was sorted out. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Goche's protests to the contrary, his comments about Mutasa and Bonyongwe, as well as comments about others within ZANU-PF, are indicative of divisions within the party. For now, however, Mugabe has been able to mask these differences, and it appears ZANU-PF will present a united front in the March elections. ¶9. (C) Goche is close to Mugabe--he was a former Minister of State Security and was selected by Mugabe to represent him in the SADC negotiations. We will continue to pursue contact with Goche and other ministers both as a window on ZANU-PF, and to deliver our message that the U.S. is ready to help the people of Zimbabwe after there is fundamental POLITICAL and economic change. End Comment. MCGEE