AN IMPERFECT DEAL BUT THE ONLY ONE ON OFFER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000828 SIPDIS AF/S FOR G. GARLAND DRL FOR N. WILETT ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM ZI SUBJECT: AN IMPERFECT DEAL BUT THE ONLY ONE ON OFFER REF: HARARE 793 AND PREV Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On September 11 Mbeki announced a deal was reached in Zimbabwean power-sharing negotiations. On Septeptember 12 Tsvangirai briefed Ambassador and UK Ambassador Pocock on the deal. Tsvangirai was extremely confident that his chairmanship of a newly-created Council of Ministers will allow him to control government, despite President Mugabe's continued chairmanship of Cabinet. Although the deal has serious deficiencies, it could represent an opportunity for progress. The test will be to see whether Tsvangirai manages to push through his agenda in the next few weeks. End summary. -------------- THE DEAL -------------- ¶2. (C) On September 11, Thabo Mbeki, SADC-appointed Facilitator of Zimbabwe's political negotiations, announced that an agreement had been reached between President Robert Mugabe, Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara. Mbeki said the agreement would be formally signed on Monday after further decisions were reached over the weekend concerning the composition of an "inclusive government." ¶3. (C) On September 12, an ebullient Tsvangirai briefed Ambassador and UK Ambassador Pocock. The new government will include two new bodies. In addition to the cabinet, there will be a "Council of Ministers" that Tsvangirai will chair. The Council of Ministers will formulate policy which it will then pass to the Cabinet for implementation. It appears that the Cabinet and Council will have similar composition, with one significant exception: Mugabe and his Deputy Presidents will not be members of the Council of Ministers. Mugabe will chair the Cabinet, which is supposed to implement policy on the basis of consensus. Tsvangirai will serve as Deputy Chair of the Cabinet. The third organ will be a National Security Council, which will include Tsvangirai, his two Deputies, Mugabe, his two Deputies, and unspecified others, presumably to include the Ministers of Defense and Home Affairs. ¶4. (C) The government will include 31 Ministers (15 ZANU-PF, 13 MDC-T and 3 MDC-M) and 15 Deputy Ministers (8 ZANU-PF, 6 MDC-T and 1 MDC-M). Arthur Mutambara has been allocated one of the two Deputy Prime Minister positions. Tsvangirai told Ambassador that decisions on the division of Ministries will be concluded over the wekend, but that he would insist on MDC-M control of Home Affairs, which is in charge of the police. Tsvangirai also indicated that he wants Finance, Communications and Social Affairs, but focused on Home Affairs as a "deal-breaker." ¶5. (C) A 19th Amendment to the existing Zimbabwean constitution will be enacted immediately to create this new structure; an entirely new constitution will be agreed and presented for ratification in 18 months. At that same time, a decision will be reached on whether to allow the "inclusive government" to fulfill a normal 5-year term, or whether to go to new elections. -------------- TSVANGIRAI'S CONFIDENCE -------------- ¶6. (C) Tsvangirai expressed confidence that he will be able to effect a fundamental change in the culture of government despite the admitted imperfections of this structure. He HARARE 00000828 002 OF 003 said that the Council of Ministers would be the driver of policy, and that even ZANU-PF members of government would welcome the opportunity to discuss policy issues freely without President Mugabe in attendance. Tsvangirai said that his willingness to make the compromises necessary to conclude this agreement was influenced by "the plight of the people," but admitted that implementation will be key. He also expressed awareness that he would be held politically responsible for government nonperformance in areas such as lifing of sanctions and the swift turn around of the economy. ¶7. (C) Tsvangirai described the immediate priorities for the government and for international assistance as: --Provision of food to the hungry; --Distribution of agricultural inputs in time for planting, even if AIR lifting supplies is required; --Assistance to social service providers, e.g. provision of medicines to hospitals; and --Assistance to reform (and downsize) the security services. Additional priorities for the next few months include: --Reform of the economy; --Restoration of the rule of law; and --Reintroduction of freedom of the press. Tsvangirai said among the first measures he would seek would be the conduct of a forensic audit of the reserve bank and a National Security Council review of the functioning of the Central Intelligence Organization. -------------- CAUTIOUS RESPONSE APPROPRIATE -------------- ¶8. (C) Ambassador and Ambassador Pocock told Tsvangirai that he should expect our governments to respond cautiously. Tsvangirai said he fully understood that we would need to see evidence of successful implementation, given our justified distrust of Mugabe. Pocock told Tsvangirai that we would seek to support him personally, but if he should strive to demonstrate to the international community that he is in control. Tsvangirai agreed. Ambassador and Pocock reiterated our policy of reengagement only on the basis of performance. ¶9. (C) Comment: Our initial impression is that this deal has holes in it big enough to drive a tank through. Tsvangirai said he had no idea what the attitude to this was of the JOC (Joint Operations Command--the security FORCE body that has dominated government since March elections). The division of Ministries has not yet been determined. And Tsvangirai was unable to reconcile the notion that the cabinet would act by consensus, yet Mugabe would not have a veto. Tsvangirai told Ambassador that in his view, this deal leaves Mugabe with only ceremonial powers. This is an odd perspective, since in fact Mugabe remains both head of state and head of government. (Mugabe may have already demonstrated a degree of disdain. Tsvangirai and Mugabe were scheduled to meet at 11 am Friday to discuss government details; Mugabe postponed the meeting.) In addition, Tsvangirai (not for the first time) is failing to take into consideration the possibility that at least some members of the Mutambara faction of the MDC may not always align themselves with him. Comment cont.: Nevertheless, this deal does provide opportunities. Tsvangirai now has an opportunity to drive a wedge between ZANU-PF hard-liners and moderates. If Tsvangirai takes immediate steps to launch initiatives such as an audit of the Reserve Bank or a review of the CIO functions, we'll have clear indications early on of whether or not this represents a real change and how much power Mugabe and his cronies have ceded. Post believes our best HARARE 00000828 003 OF 003 policy to try to make this work remains our standing policy of principles-based reengagement. MCGEE