TSVANGIRAI DISCUSSES ENDGAME WITH AMBASSADOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000674 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (LINE HIT) SIPDIS AF/S FOR G. GARLAND ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM KDEM ZI SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI DISCUSSES ENDGAME WITH AMBASSADOR REF: A. HARARE 669 ¶B. HARARE 661 HARARE 00000674 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) A confident Morgan Tsvangirai told the Ambassador August 8 that he is unwavering in his position that Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe should not retain executive power as part of a power-sharing agreement between ZANU-PF and the MDC. Tsvangirai expects South African president Thabo Mbeki to arrive in Harare Saturday, August 9 or Sunday, August 10 to facilitate a one-on-one meeting between Mugabe and Tsvangirai on August 10. The principal issue to be resolved, according to Tsvangirai, is his and Mugabe's respective roles and powers. If an agreement is reached, Tsvangirai expects it to be signed sometime next week. END SUMMARY. -------------- Balance of Powers -------------- ¶2. (C) In the face of rumors, newspaper and online reports, and concerns from Tsvangirai's fellow MDC members that he was prepared to cede some degree of executive power to Mugabe as part of a ZANU-PF-MDC power-sharing agreement, the Ambassador pointedly asked Tsvangirai what his position was. Tsvangirai firmly reiterated (Ref B) that he would insist on full executive powers for himself. What was important was that the will of the people be observed. This meant he should be fully in control of government and that a program of political and economic reform should be undertaken. Mugabe would be a ceremonial president with responsibilities such as convening parliament and representing Zimbabwe internationally as head of state; these responsibilities should be clearly defined in the agreement. ¶3. (C) Those who argued for power-sharing between Mugabe and Tsvangirai were defying reality, said Tsvangirai. Mugabe had not won anything, while he (Tsvangirai) had won the March 29 election. In fact, Tsvangirai added, he was being magnanimous in allowing Mugabe a position in government. -------------- The Security Chiefs and Gono -------------- 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern to Tsvangirai that the security chiefs could prevent or undermine an agreement and asked if we could be helpful in any way. Tsvangirai responded that he had heard from a number of sources that the military was becoming more conciliatory. Further, he had met with Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor Gideon Gono who had stated his preoccupation about his own future and that of the security chiefs. Tsvangirai said he had reassured Gono that with a good agreement in place there would be no witch hunt; he understood from Gono that this message was relayed to Defense Forces chief Constantine Chiwenga. ¶5. (C) Tsvangirai said that Gono had a close relationship with the security chiefs and that Gono would be a useful conduit to send a message about the benefits of supporting a good agreement as proposed by the MDC, and the consequences of not doing so The Ambassador plans to meet with Gono later today to make the point. -------------- Other Outstanding Issues HARARE 00000674 002.2 OF 003 -------------- ¶6. (C) In addition to the executive power issue, Tsvangirai told the Ambassador other unresolved--but more tractable--issues included a transitional constitution, the size of the cabinet and allocation of ministries, the duration of the government, and the scope of amnesty. ¶7. (C) Although not an immediate topic of inter-party discussions, we asked Tsvangirai his thoughts on the Reserve Bank. He replied that an independent bank was essential, and that there were a number of possibilities for governor, including Leonard Tsunga, Gono's predecessor, who spent the last year at Trinity College in Connecticut. -------------- Prospects for an Agreement -------------- ¶8. (C) Tsvangirai said that based upon his conversation with Mugabe at the time of the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, and information he had received from Mugabe confidantes, he thought Mugabe was ready to make the necessary concessions, specifically to give up executive power. Contrasted with earlier criticisms of Mbeki, he now thought the South African president would be "helpful" in pushing Mugabe to make these concessions. -------------- Timetable -------------- ¶9. (C) Tsvangirai said he expected Mbeki to arrive in Harare Saturday, August 9, or Sunday, August 10. He would help define the issues to be discussed by the two principals on Sunday and would minute specific agreements that were reached. If an agreement was reached, it might be announced on August 11, Heroes Day, while fine tuning would be carried out by the negotiating teams. The agreement could be signed later in the week in Harare, at the SADC Troika Summit in Luanda on August 13, or at the SADC Summit in Durban on August 16 when South Africa and Mbeki assume the reins of SADC. ¶10. (C) We asked Tsvangirai if he would attend the Heroes Day celebration if an agreement had been concluded. (NOTE: Heroes Day and Independence Day are Zimbabwe's two most important holidays. END NOTE.) He said Heroes Day was a national day and it would be "nice" to attend after years of seeing the ceremonies used as a platform to bash him and the MDC. But it might be premature and presumptuous to participate before the MDC had approved the agreement and it had been signed. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) The Internet and media are full of rumors about the details of an agreement and whether or not Mugabe will cede all executive power. What is clear to us is that Tsvangirai is firm in his conviction that he will not sign an agreement that does not give him full executive power. What is much less clear is whether Mugabe and ZANU-PF will accept, as Tsvangirai believes they will, his position. Tsvangirai's leverage is the increasing international isolation of Zimbabwe, declining support for Mugabe in the region, and the crashing economy. He can walk away from the talks and let Mugabe and ZANU-PF go down with the country. But it is still difficult to believe that Mugabe, who has craftily defeated numerous enemies over the years, will willingly give up all power. END COMMENT. HARARE 00000674 003.2 OF 003 MCGEE