ACTION REQUEST: OCHA ZIMBABWE NEEDS HELP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HARARE 000593 SIPDIS AF/S FOR S. HILL ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN DCHA/AA FOR MIKE HESS AFR/AA FOR KATE ALMQUIST AND FRANKLIN MOORE AFR/SA FOR ELOKEN, LDOBBINS, JKOLE DCHA/OFDA FOR KLUU, ACONVERY, TDENYSENKO, LTHOMAS DCHA/FFP FOR JBORNS, JDWORKEN, LPETERSON, ASINK DRL FOR JKRILLA, KGILBRIDE IO FOR RGOLDENBERG PRETORIA FOR JWESSEL, PDISKIN, GJUSTE PRM FOR BFITZGERALD, MMCKELVEY, MLANGE USUN FOR FSHANKS, ZKHALILZAD, RHAGEN, JDELAURENTIS GENEVA/RMA FOR NKYLOH, KPERKINS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2018 TAGS: EAID PHUM PREF PGOV PREL ZI SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: OCHA ZIMBABWE NEEDS HELP REF: A. A: HARARE 553 ¶B. B: HARARE 503 HARARE 00000593 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Ambassador James McGee for reason 1.4(d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In the wake of the Mugabe regime's continued crackdown on political and humanitarian space, it is increasingly clear that the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Zimbabwe are ill-equipped for the significant challenges presented by the current operating environment. Post is concerned that OCHA is not prepared to respond to destabilization, population displacement, and other consequences of worsening violence. The establishment of full humanitarian access to IDPs in secure and depoliticized locations, which may be achieved through UN leadership and advocacy, is essential to meeting the current challenge and helping stabilize the fluid situation in Zimbabwe. High-level USG discussions with OCHA in New York and Geneva may help prompt improvements in OCHA/Zimbabwe's strategy, leadership, and capacity. Impact may be boosted if the demarche is made jointly with other key donors. Prompt multilateral action now, while Zimbabwe remains high on the agenda of political institutions and in the media spotlight, may encourage OCHA to approach this challenge with greater commitment and assertiveness. An action request and suggested points are offered in paragraph ¶10. END SUMMARY. -------------- Humanitarian crisis continues -------------- ¶2. (SBU) More than 30,000 people have been displaced for perceived or actual support of the opposition, and many of these have arrived in Harare seeking assistance. Given the government ban on NGO humanitarian activity and the UN's inability to respond, in addition to two police raids on some 2600 IDPs who had sought shelter at opposition headquarters in Harare, many have nowhere left to turn. IDPs -- almost all opposition members -- and individuals helping them, continue to approach the U.S. Embassy daily for help or advice on which NGOs, churches, or organizations can provide assistance (Ref A). The NGOs' supply of safe houses has now been exhausted, and most churches are unable or unwilling to provide sanctuary or to distribute food in light of the GOZ-imposed ban on food distribution (Ref B). Because of their political affiliation, even groups of IDPs that have managed to gather in safe houses struggle to get access to food, blankets, and other non-food items from NGOs that fear being seen as too close to the opposition. -------------- UN response slow, passive -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The UN Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA have the unenviable job of advancing humanitarian interests in a HARARE 00000593 002.2 OF 005 political environment fraught with obstacles put up by an obstinate host government bent on diverting or blocking humanitarian aid. The GOZ views the UN more as an adversary than a resource, often lumping the UN specialized agencies in with the NGOs and donor agencies that it seeks to curtail. Nonetheless, OCHA has been resistant to actively advance its mandate: to improve coordination, efficiency, and advocacy for the humanitarian agencies working in Zimbabwe. With a staff of eight persons (four international),its capacity has been stretched. OCHA's Head of Office has taken a more passive approach to coordination and preparation than would be expected in such an emergency situation. ¶4. (C) In the period of state-sponsored violence that followed the March 29 elections, OCHA assumed the passive role of mediator between the GOZ and the humanitarian community, neglecting its advocacy role to protect humanitarian principles and working space. Joint field trips involving both NGOs and UN agencies were scheduled for April 26-27 to monitor protection concerns, but OCHA doomed the trips by seeking last-minute clearance from the Department of Social Welfare, even though OCHA had earlier told participating agencies that the GOZ would simply be "advised" of the trips. In another case, OCHA served as a "mail service" for the Ministry of Social Welfare by distributing its June 4 blanket NGO suspension letter - a directive with questionable legal authority and whose dissemination adversely impacted both NGOs and beneficiaries, country-wide. Post believes that OCHA should have clarified the meaning of the letter prior to dissemination and pushed back on the GOZ to convey the consequences of the blanket suspension prior to simply passing it on to NGOs. ¶5. (C) On June 17, the GOZ abruptly deported a representative of the UN Office of the High Commission on Human Rights who was in Zimbabwe to investigate the spiraling violence. Apparently rattled by the action, and in a move particularly indicative of OCHA's tendency to give in to government pressure, OCHA curtailed the visit of a protection-focused humanitarian affairs officer, who departed on June 18 after being in the country less than one week. OCHA also postponed the deployment of a protection standby capacity (PROCAP) representative who was scheduled to arrive during the week of June 16. These missions were planned to strengthen the UN capacity to organize better protection for victims and vulnerable communities. (COMMENT: OCHA's voluntary reduction of its staff presence and protection capacity at the very time they are most needed seems incredibly misguided. END COMMENT.) -------------- Response lacks leadership -------------- ¶6. (C) Post is especially concerned with the lack of coordination of assistance and protection for IDPs fleeing violence and intimidation. Groups of IDPs remain in perpetual states of flight, fear, and vulnerability in urban and rural areas. Despite donor requests, OCHA and the HC have not provided evident leadership, advocacy, or coordination for the sporadic, ad-hoc, underground efforts to HARARE 00000593 003.2 OF 005 help these groups. Donors are looking for ways to assist in these efforts, but find it difficult to link with haphazard, small-scale initiatives that must contend with oppressive GOZ restrictions. Donor assistance and the success of initiatives are dependent in part on OCHA's ability to coordinate activities, prioritize needs, and create humanitarian operational space with the GOZ, particularly in terms of identifying safe areas to shelter IDPs and allow for systematic dispersal of supplies. ¶7. (C) In addition, with the absence of robust OCHA planning, leadership, and advocacy, donors and humanitarian organizations are not ready to ramp up programs in a coordinated manner if the situation deteriorates further. Incidents of urban and rural violence have continued since the June 27 runoff election, and any increased violence could prompt more forced displacement, exacerbated by a dismal harvest and food shortages. Post has seen a weak OCHA contingency plan still in draft form updated in March. OCHA reporting (sitreps and meeting minutes) reflects significant self-censorship, and its officers have lacked discretion when handling sensitive information with the GOZ, putting humanitarian organizations and affected populations at great risk. OCHA has tended to look to NGOs for direction and advocacy, instead of taking initiative. In sum, the present OCHA system in not prepared to respond effectively to the demands that a deteriorating situation would require. ¶8. (C) The humanitarian community in Zimbabwe believes that OCHA's difficulties and questionable decision-making may be traced to the management style and initiative of the Humanitarian Cordinator (HC). The traditional division of authority between the HC (sitting at UNDP) and the OCHA head of office presents some typical structural problems for communication and leadership, as experienced in other complex emergencies. Further, there are substantial political and strategic differences between Zimbabwe's donor/humanitarian community and the HC, as the HC in the past enjoyed a "cozy" relationship with the GOZ and tends to take on a mediation role rather than a more aggressive of humanitarian principles embodied in the UN mandate. (COMMENT: It should be noted that since the current onslought of violence the HC has taken a more active role in lobbying for an end to violence and assistance to its victims. He has, nevertheless, been ineffective. END COMMENT.) ¶9. (C) USAID Mission Director and several like-minded donors plan to schedule a meeting this week with the HC and OCHA to express concern about the quality of coordination and the UN advocacy of humanitarian space with the GOZ. The intended message is that the UN should play a more assertive role with various GOZ representatives who can influence policy and permissions for humanitarian organizations to help provide protection and assistance to IDPs. Given the fractious nature of GOZ decision making at this time, if UN discussions with one ministerial-level official prove ineffective, efforts should shift to other officials who may be able to influence decisions to allow greater humanitarian access to affected populations in need. -------------- HARARE 00000593 004.2 OF 005 Suggested points for discussions -------------- ¶10. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Post also recommends that the USG approach OCHA leadership in New York and Geneva to reinforce our field efforts to prompt greater performance and assertiveness from the UN Country Team in Zimbabwe. The message to OCHA may be strengthened by employing a multilateral, joint demarche with other key donors, such as UK/DFID and the EU. Post offers the following points for use in discussions with OCHA: -- The USG realizes that the Zimbabwe situation presents significant challenges for the humanitarian community. -- These challenges are particularly serious for the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA because they are in the unenviable position of de facto intermediary between the humanitarian agencies and the cause of the crisis - the Government of Zimbabwe. -- Several concerns stand out: GOZ-restricted access of humanitarian agencies to affected areas/populations; inadequate social protection mechanisms; ongoing violence; looming food crisis; and lack of preparation for potentially widespread violence-induced forced migration. -- Our USG team in Zimbabwe has also expressed concern about OCHA's and the UN Country Team's ability to respond to the deteriorating humanitarian conditions and political environment. -- Further, we would like to register our concern that OCHA and the Humanitarian Coordinator have not/not taken a stronger position with the GOZ to defend humanitarian principles, to facilitate the operations of the humanitarian community, and to protect at-risk Zimbabweans. -- A case in point is OCHA's voluntary withdrawal of two protection specialists at the most crucial time of their work and Zimbabwe's great need. The dissatisfying reason given to the humanitarian community by the OCHA representative was that "OCHA did not want to provoke an incident." -- OCHA's relative weakness in Zimbabwe is uncharacteristic of OCHA's typically adi Rzttle in support of humanitarian operations. The USG has provided support to OCHA which can be used to this end. -- We hope to see evidence soon that the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA's field operations are supported with appropriate direction, the right personnel, and sufficient resources to engage the GOZ and the humanitarian challenges with more concerted action. -- The USG remains a strong supporter of OCHA's mandate and HARARE 00000593 005.2 OF 005 mission, and we stand ready to assist your efforts. -------------- Crisis should be manageable -------------- ¶11. (C) COMMENT: Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the ongoing crisis is that humanitarian needs could be immediately addressed in the right operating environment. NGOs and donors in Zimbabwe are willing and able to provide tents, shelter, food, blankets, and other items to the IDPs that are now - literally - left out in the cold. If the international community, through UN leadership, insisted the GOZ allow for safe, temporary facilities to shelter IDPs, this crisis could - at least partially - be alleviated. The UN has a mandate to provide coordination, assistance, and leadership in addressing humanitarian crises; they should be using it. END COMMENT. McGee