Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08HARARE552
2008-06-26 15:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

"SPIRAL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE": SADC OBSERVERS

Tags:  PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM KDEM ZI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000552 

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S. HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM KDEM ZI
SUBJECT: "SPIRAL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE": SADC OBSERVERS
SPEAK OUT

REF: A. MBABANE 189

B. HARARE 546

Classified By: Ambassador James McGee for reason 1.4(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000552 SIPDIS AF/S FOR S. HILL ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM KDEM ZI SUBJECT: "SPIRAL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE": SADC OBSERVERS SPEAK OUT REF: A. MBABANE 189 ¶B. HARARE 546 Classified By: Ambassador James McGee for reason 1.4(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Following the withdrawal by opposition candidate Morgan Tsvangirai from Zimbabwe's June 27 presidential run-off, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) observer mission held a June 25 press conference to comment on the current electoral environment. SADC Head of Mission and Angolan Youth Minister Jose Marcos Barrica confirmed widespread politically-motivated violence, condemned it, and inferred that it was perpetrated by government forces, but also suggested that Zimbabwean "authorities" should and could address the situation by June 27, the date of the scheduled election. In what appeared to be a reference to a government of national unity, Barrica stated that regardless of the outcome of Friday's contest, both sides would need to work together. When asked about the discrepancy between the mission's intent to proceed with monitoring the election and the SADC Troika's call for the election to be delayed (reftel A),Baricca suggested that the Troika had superseded Zimbabwean authority. Emboffs also spoke earlier in the day with Tanki Mothae, SADC Director of the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security, who has served as the SADC Mission's administrative head and who has also participated as an observer. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) At a June 25 press conference, Mission head Barrica confirmed through an interpreter that SADC had deployed about 400 observers throughout Zimbabwe's ten provinces and that observers were regularly meeting with stakeholders, including government officials, opposition leaders and civil society. Barrica noted SADC's "limited" mandate to observe the election based on the SADC Principles Governing Democratic Elections with the "objective of building a common view of the process." ¶3. (U) Barrica stated that since arriving on June 1, the observers, including Mission leadership, had been put in an "uneasy position" and witnessed a "spiral increase of political violence" resulting in "no political tolerance and a situation which can endanger human rights and destroy property of
citizens." He confirmed that as a result of "political tension, some SADC observers had become victims of psychological and emotional threats." Barrica blamed the violence on "political leadership," and said that "whether it was a result of direct guidance by the State or independent incidents, acts of violence had been perpetrated by uniformed people...This is a political crisis." When asked if the SADC mission supported this week's UN Security Council statement on Zimbabwe, Barrica retorted that "every person with mental health should condemn violence; therefore we condemn it just as the UNSC did." ¶4. (U) As a result, Barrica stated that the Mission was using its "one weapon, the word" to "intensify our position through statements to the ruling party and main opposition figures." He reported that the Mission was also appealing to the "Zimbabwean authorities who have the task of protecting the lives of the people for them to use all the mechanisms at their disposal to ensure the security of citizens and rule of law." Calling Tsvangirai's withdrawal a "new fact in the political scenery that has created concerns, even panic," Barrica highlighted the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission's (ZEC) role as "managers" of the election process. He stated that ZEC had the responsibility to act with "justice and fairness to decide the correct way forward with regard to democratic principles, while safeguarding national interest and expectations." HARARE 00000552 002 OF 002 ¶5. (U) In what may have been a veiled reference to a government of national unity, Barrica stated that regardless of the results of the June 27 election, which SADC intended to monitor, both sides would need to work together for the future of Zimbabwe. He called on political leaders and electoral authorities to utilize the "wisdom of Africa to find a platform for mutual understanding that will drive toward a conclusion of the process." Barrica relayed his belief, stemming from meetings that day, that there was a "light at the end of the tunnel for the disagreeing parties to come together" and that "elections or not, Zimbabwe will open a new page of its history" on June 28. ¶6. (U) When asked about the discrepancy between the SADC mission's intent to proceed with monitoring the June 27 election and news of the June 25 statement by the SADC Troika's emergency summit calling for the election to be delayed (reftel A),Barrica suggested that the Troika had superseded a report from the Mission and ZEC's authority, and that Mbeki's absence from the summit, as the SADC negotiator on Zimbabwe, raised questions as to whether it was a legitimate SADC meeting. ¶7. (C) Earlier on June 25, polchief and poloff met with SADC Director of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Affairs who has been responsible for administrative aspects of the Mission and who has observed as well. Mothae candidly stated that despite ZANU-PF efforts to influence the observers' opinion, there was a general consensus amongst the various member-state mission heads that made up the SADC team that a free and fair election was not possible under current conditions, including government-sponsored violence targeting the opposition. However, Mothae indicated that Barrica might be under significant political pressure from Angolan leadership to refrain from condemning the election process outright. Mothae stated that given the Mugabe regime's violation of both SADC election principles and domestic election law (Zimbabwe being one of the few member states to codify the SADC election principles into its Electoral Act), SADC observer mission members would "not allow Minister Barrica to defeat the mission of the observation" and publicly obscure the reality on the ground, even if it resulted in "serious fractures" within the delegation. Mothae stressed the importance of the Mission's mandate to focus on Zimbabwe's conformity, or lack thereof, to the SADC election principles, regardless of rumors of international influence or domestic politicking. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Barrica's welcome condemnation of the violence was somewhat surprising in light of Mothae's skepticism that he would be objective about violence and the electoral environment. We note that the press conference represented an interim evaluation; what will be most important is SADC's final report. In that regard, Mothae told us that he and other observers would not support a report that did not accurately portray the lectoral environment that made it impossible to old a fair election. Key will be pressure by theAngolan government on Barrica to support an objecive report. END COMMENT. McGee

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