Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08HARARE473
2008-05-29 15:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:
TSVANGIRAI, MAKONI DIVIDE ON VIOLENCE, ELECTIONS
VZCZCXRO6154 OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN DE RUEHSB #0473/01 1501543 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 291543Z MAY 08 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2960 INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 2008 RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2129 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0671 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1406 RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1764 RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2185 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4616 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1269 RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000473
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S. HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI, MAKONI DIVIDE ON VIOLENCE, ELECTIONS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Glenn Warren for reason 1.4 (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000473
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S. HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI, MAKONI DIVIDE ON VIOLENCE, ELECTIONS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Glenn Warren for reason 1.4 (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY. On May 29, opposition presidential candidate
Morgan Tsvangirai and former independent candidate Simba
Makoni held separate briefings in which they discussed
violence, the June 27 run-off election, and their
perspectives on a government of national unity (GNU).
Significant differences in their respective positions
indicate that a united opposition will not be immediately
achieved. Both deplored ongoing violence, but Tsvangirai
laid the blame fully at the feet of ZANU-PF, while Makoni
stated that both ZANU-PF and the MDC were to blame. Both men
called for a government of national unity (GNU) to be
convened as soon as possible, but Tsvangirai proposed a broad
GNU under an MDC mandate, while Makoni suggested it be formed
from all "key constituencies". While Tsvangirai focused on
creating a benign electoral environment, Makoni stated
outright that holding the contest would be disastrous for the
Zimbabwean people and the country's fiscus; he advocated a
two to five-year transitional government with elections to
follow. END SUMMARY.
--------------
Tsvangirai's Diplomatic Briefing
--------------
2. (SBU) On May 29, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangirai held a briefing for
the diplomatic corps to discuss the ongoing
politically-motivated violence and the June 27 presidential
run-off. Tsvangirai strongly condemned the Mugabe regime for
perpetrating attacks against MDC supporters throughout the
countryside, which were particularly prevalent in certain "no
go areas akin to war zones," such as Mashonaland East and
Central. Vigilante abductions and targeted killings of MDC
organizers continued. Tsvangirai said he had attended the
funeral of MDC Mashonaland East provincial secretary Shepherd
Jani the previous day, who had been abducted, tortured, and
killed by suspected Mugabe supporters; he understood that
after he left mourners had been attacked by ZANU-PF thugs.
He added that the MDC was compiling a list of "hit squad"
members that it planned to submit to the Attorney General for
prosecution.
3. (SBU) Noting the militarization of rural areas, and bias
and incompetence within the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
(ZEC),Tsvangirai stated that "nothing resembling a free,
fair and peaceful election" could take place in the current
environment. SADC needed to send observers--they should have
been here by now--and make the ZEC independent. Independent
observers would not be sufficient, however, and Tsvangirai
called for a peacekeeping force. He also renewed his call to
the international community to act, including by providing
additional funds for displaced victims. Finally, with regard
to SADC, Tsvangirai said SADC needed an "end game" strategy
in the event "ZANU-PF refused to recognize an MDC victory."
4. (SBU) Looking forwar$JD1>Q{oing" to be led by the
MDC. Tsvangirai reported that he had urged South African
President Thabo Mbeki and SADC to facilitate such a meeting,
though that was "easier said than done." Noting the
significance of the Zimbabwe crisis for the region, he called
it "contagious" and observed that the xenophobic violence in
South Africa was a symptom of tensions created by millions of
Zimbabweans crossing the border and competing with South
African residents for employment and resources. (COMMENT:
While the MDC is preparing for the June 27 election,
Tsvangirai believes formation of a GNU--with the MDC at its
head--would be preferable to an election. END COMMENT.)
HARARE 00000473 002 OF 002
--------------
Makoni's Press Conference
--------------
5. (SBU) Makoni held a press conference and spoke at length
about the suffering of victims of political violence. He
bemoaned ongoing abductions, displacements, and deaths.
Significantly, he stated that while the violence was "first
attributable to ZANU-PF, lately it is more on the MDC side".
This caused a stir among some members of the press corps who
repeatedly pushed Makoni for examples of ZANU-PF victims of
MDC violence. Makoni refused to answer, noting only that he
did not "want to get caught up in labels whU9Q.A:elections "the calm
before the storm," Makoni referenced Kenya's violent
post-election period and warned that, in Zimbabwe, the
ongoing "violence bodes ill for a free and fair election."
Makoni went on to state that "the last thing Zimbabweans need
is another election; Zimbabwe cannot afford (in human terms
or fiscally) another election." He therefore believed that
the only way to end the political, economic, and humanitarian
crisis was to establish a transitional national authority
made up of all "key constituencies" including ZANU-PF, the
MDC, and his "new dawn" movement. Such an authority would
last two to five years and ultimately lead to elections.
7. (SBU) When asked hypothetically what position he would
take in the event of a run-off election (assuming a GNU was
not formed),Makoni said he would make his preference known
before the election. He reiterated that his first priority
remained "saving Zimbabweans from violence and that all
national leaders should also be seized with it." Makoni
confirmed that he had not met personally with either
Tsvangirai or Mugabe since the March election, but that he
had been "in communication" with both.
8. (SBU) Makoni called on both Tsvangirai and Mugabe to meet
each other in order to chart a way forward for the country.
He also said he continued to plan for his movement to become
an official third party and that a steering committee to
guide the process had been established.
9. (C) COMMENT. For some time, the Ambassador has urged
Tsvangirai to meet with Makoni and discuss formation of a
united opposition. We had received word that a meeting
between the two was planned for early this week followed by a
joint press conference. This meeting never took place;
Makoni informed the Ambassador on May 28 that he was still
waiting for a call from Tsvangirai. Tsvangirai appears to
have missed an important opportunity to unify the opposition
with the result that Makoni decided to pursue an independent
strategy.
10. COMMENT CONTINUED: Makoni's remarks (which were not
received well by the press and diplomatic community) placing
blame for violence equally on ZANU-PF and he MDC are
regrettable and divorced from reality. They are certain to
alienate Tsvangirai and make an alliance difficult. We
believe that Makoni will ultimately support Tsvangirai in his
electoral bid, but a joint press conference now condemning
violence and pledging unity in the election might have served
to stem the violence by showing widespread opposition to it,
and provided an important psychological boost to the MDC and
its supporters. END COMMENT.
Warren
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S. HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI, MAKONI DIVIDE ON VIOLENCE, ELECTIONS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Glenn Warren for reason 1.4 (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY. On May 29, opposition presidential candidate
Morgan Tsvangirai and former independent candidate Simba
Makoni held separate briefings in which they discussed
violence, the June 27 run-off election, and their
perspectives on a government of national unity (GNU).
Significant differences in their respective positions
indicate that a united opposition will not be immediately
achieved. Both deplored ongoing violence, but Tsvangirai
laid the blame fully at the feet of ZANU-PF, while Makoni
stated that both ZANU-PF and the MDC were to blame. Both men
called for a government of national unity (GNU) to be
convened as soon as possible, but Tsvangirai proposed a broad
GNU under an MDC mandate, while Makoni suggested it be formed
from all "key constituencies". While Tsvangirai focused on
creating a benign electoral environment, Makoni stated
outright that holding the contest would be disastrous for the
Zimbabwean people and the country's fiscus; he advocated a
two to five-year transitional government with elections to
follow. END SUMMARY.
--------------
Tsvangirai's Diplomatic Briefing
--------------
2. (SBU) On May 29, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangirai held a briefing for
the diplomatic corps to discuss the ongoing
politically-motivated violence and the June 27 presidential
run-off. Tsvangirai strongly condemned the Mugabe regime for
perpetrating attacks against MDC supporters throughout the
countryside, which were particularly prevalent in certain "no
go areas akin to war zones," such as Mashonaland East and
Central. Vigilante abductions and targeted killings of MDC
organizers continued. Tsvangirai said he had attended the
funeral of MDC Mashonaland East provincial secretary Shepherd
Jani the previous day, who had been abducted, tortured, and
killed by suspected Mugabe supporters; he understood that
after he left mourners had been attacked by ZANU-PF thugs.
He added that the MDC was compiling a list of "hit squad"
members that it planned to submit to the Attorney General for
prosecution.
3. (SBU) Noting the militarization of rural areas, and bias
and incompetence within the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
(ZEC),Tsvangirai stated that "nothing resembling a free,
fair and peaceful election" could take place in the current
environment. SADC needed to send observers--they should have
been here by now--and make the ZEC independent. Independent
observers would not be sufficient, however, and Tsvangirai
called for a peacekeeping force. He also renewed his call to
the international community to act, including by providing
additional funds for displaced victims. Finally, with regard
to SADC, Tsvangirai said SADC needed an "end game" strategy
in the event "ZANU-PF refused to recognize an MDC victory."
4. (SBU) Looking forwar$JD1>Q{oing" to be led by the
MDC. Tsvangirai reported that he had urged South African
President Thabo Mbeki and SADC to facilitate such a meeting,
though that was "easier said than done." Noting the
significance of the Zimbabwe crisis for the region, he called
it "contagious" and observed that the xenophobic violence in
South Africa was a symptom of tensions created by millions of
Zimbabweans crossing the border and competing with South
African residents for employment and resources. (COMMENT:
While the MDC is preparing for the June 27 election,
Tsvangirai believes formation of a GNU--with the MDC at its
head--would be preferable to an election. END COMMENT.)
HARARE 00000473 002 OF 002
--------------
Makoni's Press Conference
--------------
5. (SBU) Makoni held a press conference and spoke at length
about the suffering of victims of political violence. He
bemoaned ongoing abductions, displacements, and deaths.
Significantly, he stated that while the violence was "first
attributable to ZANU-PF, lately it is more on the MDC side".
This caused a stir among some members of the press corps who
repeatedly pushed Makoni for examples of ZANU-PF victims of
MDC violence. Makoni refused to answer, noting only that he
did not "want to get caught up in labels whU9Q.A:elections "the calm
before the storm," Makoni referenced Kenya's violent
post-election period and warned that, in Zimbabwe, the
ongoing "violence bodes ill for a free and fair election."
Makoni went on to state that "the last thing Zimbabweans need
is another election; Zimbabwe cannot afford (in human terms
or fiscally) another election." He therefore believed that
the only way to end the political, economic, and humanitarian
crisis was to establish a transitional national authority
made up of all "key constituencies" including ZANU-PF, the
MDC, and his "new dawn" movement. Such an authority would
last two to five years and ultimately lead to elections.
7. (SBU) When asked hypothetically what position he would
take in the event of a run-off election (assuming a GNU was
not formed),Makoni said he would make his preference known
before the election. He reiterated that his first priority
remained "saving Zimbabweans from violence and that all
national leaders should also be seized with it." Makoni
confirmed that he had not met personally with either
Tsvangirai or Mugabe since the March election, but that he
had been "in communication" with both.
8. (SBU) Makoni called on both Tsvangirai and Mugabe to meet
each other in order to chart a way forward for the country.
He also said he continued to plan for his movement to become
an official third party and that a steering committee to
guide the process had been established.
9. (C) COMMENT. For some time, the Ambassador has urged
Tsvangirai to meet with Makoni and discuss formation of a
united opposition. We had received word that a meeting
between the two was planned for early this week followed by a
joint press conference. This meeting never took place;
Makoni informed the Ambassador on May 28 that he was still
waiting for a call from Tsvangirai. Tsvangirai appears to
have missed an important opportunity to unify the opposition
with the result that Makoni decided to pursue an independent
strategy.
10. COMMENT CONTINUED: Makoni's remarks (which were not
received well by the press and diplomatic community) placing
blame for violence equally on ZANU-PF and he MDC are
regrettable and divorced from reality. They are certain to
alienate Tsvangirai and make an alliance difficult. We
believe that Makoni will ultimately support Tsvangirai in his
electoral bid, but a joint press conference now condemning
violence and pledging unity in the election might have served
to stem the violence by showing widespread opposition to it,
and provided an important psychological boost to the MDC and
its supporters. END COMMENT.
Warren