Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08HARARE367
2008-04-24 12:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

ZIMBABWE STATE OF PLAY--NO LIGHT AT THE END OF THE

Tags:  PGOV PREL ZI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000367 

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ZDK NUM SVC)

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S. HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ZI
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE STATE OF PLAY--NO LIGHT AT THE END OF THE
TUNNEL

REF: HARARE 337 AND PREV.

HARARE 00000367 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Katherine Dhanani for reason 1.4
(d)

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SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000367 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ZDK NUM SVC) SIPDIS AF/S FOR S. HILL ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ZI SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE STATE OF PLAY--NO LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL REF: HARARE 337 AND PREV. HARARE 00000367 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Katherine Dhanani for reason 1.4 (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The exuberance that greeted election returns over three weeks ago has given way to despair and fear among many in the wake of a seemingly interminable delay in announcement of election results and ZANU-PF orchestrated and pervasive violence. While regional and international focus has been on recounting in 23 constituencies and the announcement of results, most important now is an end to violence. Without this, there is no clear path to either of the two most likely scenarios: a runoff election or a government of national unity (GNU). The MDC has indicated it will not contest elections when its supporters are being beaten and worse by ruling party gangs; neither can it be expected to negotiate a GNU with ZANU-PF while that party is orchestrating mayhem. While the idea of a GNU has been floated by ZANU-PF, negotiation of such an agreement would not be easy. ZANU-PF and Mugabe would want a GNU on their terms, maintaining power as the dominant partner. The MDC, having won the election, would understandably be adverse to allow Mugabe to remain in power and for ZANU-PF to play the dominant role in government. ¶2. (C) The fact that ZANU-PF is even discussing a GNU is a reflection that many in the party do not see a way out of the current crisis; it is also due to increasing pressure from the region. It is crucial that the international community in general and the region in particular, continue to apply pressure for an end to violence and an adherence to constitutional processes. It is also important that MDC leaders, who have been outside of Zimbabwe for a considerable time, return to lead the party and provide focus on the events ahead. END SUMMARY. -------------- -- The Election Aftermath and the ZANU-PF Calculus -------------- -- ¶3. (C) ZANU-PF's apparent intent going into the March 29 elections was to open up democrat
ic space and allow an election that many would consider free and fair. ZANU-PF hoped in this way to secure legitimacy. Thus, it permitted the MDC to campaign with some access to media and allowed some international observers (primarily SADC). There was little to criticize on voting day itself which our observers and others said went relatively smoothly. ZANU-PF miscalculated, however, the degree of discontent in the country and the willingness of many of its former supporters to defy party and traditional leaders to vote for the MDC. Thus it was clear soon after March 29 voting that the party had lost its parliamentary majority and that MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai had won more votes than President Robert Mugabe. (COMMENT: Although the MDC and Tsvangirai claim he won an outright majority, we have no hard evidence on this. END COMMENT.) ¶4. (C) We understand from numerous conversations that in the 10 days or so after the election ZANU-PF considered several options. First, was a declaration that Mugabe had won and a state of emergency if necessary, but this would have required an obvious falsification of electoral results and would have been unacceptable even to SADC. Second, was a negotiated exit for Mugabe and a GNU headed by Tsvangirai. Mugabe may have been amenable to this according to both ZANU-PF and MDC HARARE 00000367 002.2 OF 004 sources, but some in his inner circle, including Defense Forces Chief Constantine Chiwenga, were insecure about their security and financial futures, and vetoed this approach. ¶5. (C) The last option, ultimately adopted, was a runoff election, as mandated by the Electoral Act. ZANU-PF then, stung by the election results and determined that it would not lose again and give up power, apparently decided to create conditions that would make a victory inevitable. Military units were deployed to rural areas as a symbol of strength and as a means of intimidation. And the party structures in key provinces--Mashonaland East, Central, and West; Manicaland; and Masvingo--unleashed youth militia and war vets in an orchestrated and systematic reign of terror against opposition (mostly MDC) supporters. The goal was to create an atmosphere of fear so that in a runoff election, many of those who voted for Tsvangirai and the MDC on March 29 would vote for ZANU-PF, or would not vote. While the actual numbers of victims of abduction, beating, and rape are limited, the effect of course has been widespread. ¶6. (C) We believe the original delay in announcing results was aimed at giving ZANU-PF time to consider options. After having apparently decided on a runoff election, further delay occasioned by recounting allowed ZANU-PF to initiate and continue its campaign of violence. The combination of the delay and violence has, in addition to fear, caused many Zimbabweans to doubt that there can be a fair electoral outcome. -------------- The MDC's Response -------------- ¶7. (C) The MDC initially announced that, based on its electoral analysis, Tsvangirai had won and there was no need for a runoff election. MDC leaders added, however, that if official results showed Tsvangirai had not received a majority, he would contest a runoff under protest. ¶8. (C) As violence escalated, the MDC national council voted to boycott the election and Tsvangirai told regional leaders that he would not participate as violence and intimidation made chances of a fair election impossible. In his talks with these leaders, Tsvangirai has urged UN and AU intervention to deal with the crisis. Tsvangirai also addressed the April 13 SADC Summit in Lusaka. ¶9. (C) Tsvangirai is coming under increasing criticism from his supporters, allies, and from civil society, for remaining outside the country at a time of crisis and at a time when MDC supporters are being attacked. Momentum from the March 29 results has dissipated. There is little internal leadership with Tsvangirai and secretary general Tendai Biti gone for the last two weeks; MDC supporters are unaware of the MDC's strategy and are becoming despondent. Apart from international intervention to end the violence, Tsvangirai and the MDC have not articulated what they see as the resolution of the crisis. Is it an internationally supervised election or a negotiated GNU? This is not clear. -------------- Toward a GNU? -------------- ¶10. (C) With the crisis deepening, we understand some regional leaders have urged consideration of a GNU. The government newspaper The Herald carried an op-ed April 23 suggesting a GNU, albeit with Mugabe remaining in power during a transitional period and a lifting of western sanctions. (NOTE: The Herald later in the day pulled the HARARE 00000367 003 OF 004 op-ed from its website and a government spokesman denied the government was considering a GNU. END NOTE.) A business source with strong ties to the ruling party told us Mugabe insiders Nicholas Goche, Patrick Chinimasa, and Emmerson Mnangagwa were now interested in a GNU with an interim leader other than Mugabe. Last week, Simba Makoni suggested a GNU to the Ambassador (Reftel). And regional leaders have suggested a coalition government may be the best way out of the crisis, most recently yesterday the ANC's Jacob Zuma. ¶11. (C) The ZANU-PF interest in a GNU appears to be the result of several factors. First, Mugabe and his party have always been able to shrug off western criticism by noting support from SADC and the region. Of late, however, SADC and the region have demonstrated their unease with the current situation. The fact that the April 13 Summit was called was a clear signal. The Summit implicitly criticized the electoral process by calling for enhanced participation by party agents and observers in future electoral processes. Despite South African president Thabo Mbeki's proclamation that there was no crisis, ANC president Jacob Zuma and COSATU pointedly said otherwise. Zambian president Levy Mwanawasa opined that the Chinese ship with armaments destined for Zimbabwe should not be allowed to dock and offload in neighboring countries. Secondly, ZANU-PF is now aware of its lack of support and party insiders realize the party could lose a runoff election. Thirdly, another election would be expensive and logistically difficult. Finally, many in ZANU-PF realize that under present circumstances it is incapable of governing and turning around the economy. ¶12. (C) Whether ZANU-PF is serious about negotiating a GNU is as of now subject to serious question. Goche, Chinimasa, and Mnangagwa represent one power center, Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono another, and the military, particularly Defence Chief Chiwenga, a third. Finally, it is unlikely any deal can be negotiated without the assent of Mugabe, and his feelings on the matter are not known. ¶13. (C) As highlighted in The Herald op-ed, ZANU-PF believes it should dominate a GNU.Q+l}QU~ppression and violence over the years. We expect a GNU to be a continuing subject of discussion both in Zimbabwe and among regional leaders, but as of now the concept should be viewed with at least a dose of skepticism. -------------- FINAL COMMENTS -------------- ¶14. (C) Both apparent options are fraught with problems. A runoff election at this time cannot be free and fair. Yet if the MDC boycotts, ZANU-PF will proclaim victory and the MDC will be forced to attempt negotiations from a weaker position than it occupies now. A GNU appears difficult to achieve unless ZANU-PF and the MDC agree to make concessions they are not now willing to make. ¶15. (C) Perhaps most important is for Tsvangirai to return to Zimbabwe and, with Simba Makoni, Arthur Mutambara, and others, establish a united front and coordinate strategy: Will they participate in elections and, if so, under what conditions? An immediate end to violence, space to campaign, and pre-electoral international observers? Or do they want to pursue a GNU, and if so, under what conditions? ¶16. (C) Finally, the situation on the ground has dramatically changed. The March 29 elections went relatively HARARE 00000367 004 OF 004 N

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