Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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08HARARE329 | 2008-04-15 15:13:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Harare |
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000329 |
1. (C) ZANU-PF had placed itself in a difficult position, newspaper publisher Trevor Ncube, an ally of Simba Makoni, told the Ambassador on April 14. The only way it can win a runoff election is through fear and violence, but a victory under these circumstances will not be accepted by SADC. SADC is the best hope to achieve change. It has shown some independence on the Zimbabwe issue during the summit April 12 in Lusaka, and the U.S. should publicly support SADC. South Africa is aware of the situation in Zimbabwe and there is growing frustration with Mugabe. The MDC has failed to take advantage of the March 29 election to look strategically forward. Of particular note is its unwillingness to forge an alliance with Makoni. END SUMMARY. -------------------------- On SADC and Simba -------------------------- 2. (C) Ncube related Makoni's impressions of the April 12 SADC Summit on Zimbabwe. Makoni and MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai addressed the SADC leaders for about two hours. SIPDIS He believed that they understood the issues, and he believed by their questions to Makoni and Tsvangirai that they were testing the allegations of ZANU-PF leaders who had made presentations to them earlier. According to Makoni, Tsvangirai was inconsistent on whether the MDC would SIPDIS participate in a runoff election or boycott the election, and did not clearly indicate how a decision would be made. 3. (C) According to Ncube, Makoni believed the SADC meeting had been positive. Ncube agreed and highlighted the SADC Communique which suggested that party agents and observers be present at any recounting, and that SADC observers be present before, during, and after a runoff election. 4. (C) Ncube, noting that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) had ordered a recount in 23 constituencies, questioned how a valid recount could take place. There had been no chain of custody of ballot boxes, and ZANU-PF had had access to them. -------------------------- Scenarios on the Way Forward -------------------------- 5. (C) Ncube gave the Ambassador his analysis of possible scenarios from this point on: --Coup by vote rigging: Ncube thought that SADC would not accept an outright theft of the election. The fact that most important SADC leaders, except for Kikwete of Tanzania who was in India, had attended on short notice demonstrated a shifting SADC wind with respect to Zimbabwe. Other than denounce a fraudulent electoral outcome, Ncube thought there was little SADC could do. Still, he believed that Mugabe cared about SADC's position and would not risk condemnation. --ZANU-PF concession of defeat: ZANU-PF would not concede, according to Ncube. There were too many entrenched interests, including the military. --Negotiated settlement: This was unlikely, believed Ncube. ZANU-PF would negotiate, but only as top dog. Negotiations HARARE 00000329 002 OF 003 would also be complicated by difficulty in knowing where the power centers were, both within ZANU-PF and within the MDC. It was not clear whether either Mugabe or Tsvangirai had the power to negotiate on behalf of their respective parties. --Runoff between Mugabe and Tsvangirai or rerun of the entire election: Ncube opined that ZANU-PF would never go into a rerun or runoff it could not control. It could not win in a fair election. Therefore, it would need to revert to its tactics in 2002, including violence and the use of "war vets" to invade white farms. Yet, this would not be accepted by SADC. It would also be more difficult to carry out such tactics than in 2002, particularly in Manicaland, Matabeleland, and Midlands which have substantial opposition support. 6. (C) Ncube opined that ZANU-PF had dug a hole and did not know how to extricate itself. It would not relinquish power, but any scenario allowing it to remain in power would not be acceptable to SADC. -------------------------- South Africa Takes More Interest -------------------------- 7. (C) Ncube said he had spoken with South African foreign affairs officials Aziz Pahad and Kingsley Mamabolo and that both were aware of the situation in Zimbabwe. Despite Mbeki's statement before the SADC Summit that there was no crisis in Zimbabwe, Ncube believed there was a lot going on behind the scenes, particularly within the ANC. -------------------------- MDC Unstrategic and Arrogant -------------------------- 8. (C) Ncube complained that the MDC was behaving as if it had won a landslide; the election numbers suggested the MDC should consider a coalition. There had been no structured coordination with Arthur Mutambara, Makoni, and Jonathan Moyo who had been elected as an independent. Tsvangirai would gain much--and lose little--by sharing a platform with others. But the MDC was acting arrogant and failing to reach out. Ncube believed stumbling blocks to a coalition were Strive Masiyiwa and Tsvangirai advisor Melinda Ferris. -------------------------- The U.S. Role -------------------------- 9. (C) Ncube urged the U.S. to take a strong, high-profile position and support the Lusaka SADC Communique which suggested constructive steps regarding the electoral process, such as party agents and observers at the vote counting and verification process, and SADC observers at the pre-election, election, and post-election phases in the event of a runoff. Without being specific, he thought the U.S. needed to do more than take symbolic steps such as the imposition of targeted sanctions. -------------------------- COMMENT -------------------------- 10. (C) As noted Reftels, Tsvangirai and the MDC have apparently decided not to do business with Makoni and Ncube. If there is a runoff election, we believe Makoni and Ncube will support Tsvangirai. We also believe Tsvangirai is making a mistake in not strategizing with them to form a united opposition as ZANU-PF reverts to form in attempting to suppress the opposition. HARARE 00000329 003 OF 003 11. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: SADC may be losing patience with Mugabe, and we agree with Ncube that Mugabe does not want to alienate SADC. Ultimately, however, he will be willing to do so if that's what it takes for ZANU-PF to remain in power. END COMMENT. MCGEE |