MDC CONSIDERING JOINING GOVERNMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001146

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR B.WALCH
DRL FOR N. WILETT
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STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: MDC CONSIDERING JOINING GOVERNMENT

REF: A) HARARE 1145 B) HARARE 1034 C) HARARE 1139

Classified By: CDA Katherine Dhanani for reason 1.4 (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Despite indications it considered the September 15
power-sharing deal dead (Ref B),the MDC appears to be
reevaluating its position with an eye toward joining ZANU-PF
in a government of national unity. The MDC will meet in
South Africa January 5-7 to discuss next steps, including a
possible return to negotiations (Ref C). According to
confidantes of MDC president Morgan Tsvangirai, MDC
leadership has become convinced it cannot effectively address
Zimbabwe's problems from outside of government. While it
does not believe it can govern collaboratively with
Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe, it believes its
participation in government can begin the process of
political and economic stabilization and prepare the way for
new elections in which it can win the presidency. The MDC
also believes that as part of the government, and with
control of the House of Assembly, it can foment the
disintegration of ZANU-PF. To achieve a final deal, the MDC
believes it can work out compromises on the outstanding
issues of division of governorships, appointments of
ambassadors and permanent secretaries, and composition and
functions of the national security council. It is willing to
agree, as suggested by SADC, that it share the Home Affairs
ministry with ZANU-PF. Key to an agreement will be a
satisfactory division of other ministries. END SUMMARY


2. (C) MDC lawyer and Tsvangirai confidante Innocent
Chagonda told polecon chief December 29 that he and others,
including MDC secretary general Tendai Biti (Ref B),had
until recently opposed the entry of the MDC into a
power-sharing agreement with ZANU-PF. They believed the MDC
under an agreement could not achieve sufficient power, and
they loathed the prospect of attempting to work with
Zimbabwean president Mugabe and others they considered
reprehensible. Their expectation was that ZANU-PF could not
continue to govern on its own, and that the government would
collapse. Chagonda said he was now convinced that Mugabe
would find ways to maintain power and, with disregard for his
countrymen, would govern until he was "the last man alive in
Harare."


3. (C) Therefore, Chagonda continued, his position, as well
as that of Biti and other hard-liners, had evolved. While
under no illusions about being able to govern collaboratively
with ZANU-PF, they believed their entry into government would
achieve several salutary objectives: the abductions and
prosecutions of MDC members would cease; the MDC would be
able to end the politicization of food assistance, and would
be able to channel humanitarian assistance to the needy; and
the MDC could focus on the drafting of a new constitution and
preparation for new elections.


4. (C) Chagonda said the MDC had no immediate expectation
that a new government that included ZANU-PF would undertake
the necessary political and economic reforms that would
result in U.S. and other western assistance. Rather, the
goals were to address Zimbabwe's critical humanitarian needs
and set the stage for new elections that could lead to a real
democratic transition.


5. (C) With regard to the so-called outstanding issues left
to negotiate between the MDC and ZANU-PF, Chagonda first
noted that MDC negotiators were pleased with the draft of
Amendment 19 that has been gazetted (officially published for

HARARE 00001146 002 OF 002


pubic comment) and will be before Parliament in mid-Jnuary.
He though agreement could be achieved beween the parties on
division of governorships, apointment of ambassadors, and
composition and fuctions of the national security council.
The MDC as willing to take its cue from SADC and share
ladership of the Home Affairs ministry. The mostproblematic issue, according to Chagonda, would bean
equitable distribution of the remaining ministries.


6. (C) Tsvangirai advisor Jameson Timba, in a separate
meeting, concurred with Chagonda that the best option for the
MDC was a finalized power-sharing agreement. He added that
MDC participation in government, coupled with its majority in
Parliament, would allow it to establish contacts and
alliances with anti-Mugabe ZANU-PF members to weaken Mugabe
and his party.


7. (C) Both Timba and Chagonda expected Tsvangirai to return
to Zimbabwe in mid-January. Receipt of his passport had
removed one obstacle. There was concern, however, that as
leader of the MDC, Tsvangirai could be prosecuted, along with
lower-level MDC officials (Ref A),for the alleged
establishment of paramilitary training camps in Botswana.
Timba expected the MDC strategy conference in South Africa
(Ref C) to deal with the timing of Tsvangirai's return.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) During the last several months, the MDC has blown hot
and cold on an agreement and we can't be certain, despite the
comments of Chagonda and Timba, that the MDC will now push
for a finalized agreement. We may have a better idea after
the South African strategy conference January 5-7. We also
note that hard-line elements in ZANU-PF remain opposed to an
agreement and it is not clear ZANU-PF will make compromises
the MDC believes are necessary.
DHANANI