Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08HARARE1117
2008-12-12 10:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

MDC MAPS STRATEGY

Tags:  PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM ZI 
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FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3814
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 2492
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2615
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1108
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1884
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 2239
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2664
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1756
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001117 

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR B.WALCH
DRL FOR N. WILETT
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: MDC MAPS STRATEGY

REF: HARARE 1065

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Don Curtis for reason 1.4 (d)

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SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001117 SIPDIS AF/S FOR B.WALCH DRL FOR N. WILETT ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM ZI SUBJECT: MDC MAPS STRATEGY REF: HARARE 1065 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Don Curtis for reason 1.4 (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Polecon chief met separately with MDC negotiators Tendai Biti and Elton Mangoma and talked by phone with Tsvangirai advisor Strive Masiyiwa on December 12 about MDC strategy. The MDC, which held a strategy meeting in Gaborone this week, will continue to engage in negotiations with ZANU-PF, but as a "Plan B" will attempt to mobilize internal and international pressure on the Mugabe regime. The goal is elections. Tsvangirai will remain in Botswana for the indefinite future. Most MDC officials believe there is a leadership void in the party because of his absence from Zimbabwe which has prevented the MDC from more effectively responding to increasing ZANU-PF violence. END SUMMARY. -------------- MDC Strategy -------------- ¶2. (C) Biti told us that at an MDC strategy meeting in Botswana earlier this week, the MDC discussed development of a "Plan B" in the event negotiations with ZANU-PF break down and the MDC does not participate in government. Elements would include increased efforts at mass action within Zimbabwe such as protests and demonstrations, increased global pressure such as speeches and perhaps concerts to dramatize Zimbabwe's predicament, advocacy of more SANCTIONS (which he maintained had hit ZANU-PF "hard"),efforts at UN involvement, and more engagement with non-state actors at the regional and national level such as COSATU. Not concealing his contempt for ZANU-PF--and also for the MDC-M formation--, and repeating what he has told us on a number of occasions, Biti said the MDC would not pull out of negotiations to avoid being blamed for failure of the negotiations. Nevertheless, he thought the September agreement was dead. ¶3. (C) The "Plan B" strategy, according to Biti, is aimed at new, internationally-supervised elections. As a prelude to elections, there could be a transitional authority. Either scenario would be dependent on pressure on ZANU-PF to create a level playing field. ¶4. (C) Mangoma presented a different and (we believe) a less &#x
000A;widely-held view within in the MDC. He opined Amendment 19 contained a significant circumscription of presidential powers because it enumerates powers and requires agreement with the prime minister or parliament on important appointments. Therefore, he believed the MDC could achieve major power as part of a government. We asked him about continuing to negotiate with ZANU-PF while it was engaged in abductions of MDC officials. He replied that the MDC should not allow ZANU-PF to drive it from the negotiating process, which it may be trying to do by its attacks on the MDC, and should focus on achieving power. -------------- Negotiations and Amendment 19 -------------- ¶5. (C) Biti and Mangoma said that they had met with South African facilitators Frank Chikane and Sydney Mufamadi in Harare earlier this week. The MDC had previously told the facilitators while negotiating the Amendment in South Africa (Ref) that agreement was dependent on ZANU-PF acceptance of language contained in the September 11 agreement rather than HARARE 00001117 002 OF 003 the ZANU-PF changes contained in the September 15 document. The facilitators, according to Biti and Mangoma, said they had talked to Zimbabwean president Mugabe this week, and were awaiting a decision from him. ¶6. (C) If Mugabe accepts the MDC position on Amendment 19, according to Biti, it can then be gazetted (published officially for public comment.) (NOTE: The Amendment could be presented to Parliament for debate and vote 30 days after gazetting. END NOTE.) Biti said that even if Amendment 19 is gazetted, the MDC would not vote for it unless and until outstanding issues (Ref) were resolved. ¶7. (C) Apart from the meeting with the facilitators, Biti and Mangoma said there had been no talks with either the facilitators or ZANU-PF since the negotiations on Amendment 19 in South Africa. Biti said he was leaving Zimbabwe on December 19 for holidays; it was therefore unlikely there could be renewed talks until next year. -------------- Tsvangirai's Absence -------------- ¶8. (C) Biti and Mangoma both told us, consistent with the views of other MDC officials, that Tsvangirai's absence from Zimbabwe since the SADC Extraordinary Summit in South Africa on November 9 had created an MDC leadership void in Zimbabwe. They both thought that there had been threats against Tsvangirai's life which should not readily be discounted, but said there are always risks in Zimbabwe. At a critical time, when ZANU-PF was abducting MDC officials and attempting to destroy MDC party structures, it was important for Tsvangirai to be in Zimbabwe. ¶9. (C) Taking a contrarian position, Masiyiwa said he did not believe there were serious threats against Tsvangirai. But he thought Tsvangirai could be more effective outside of Zimbabwe. SADC had sided with ZANU-PF on November 9 when, ignoring other issues, it urged the parties to resolve the Home Affairs issue and form a government, and it was important to reverse SADC's position. It was therefore necessary for Tsvangirai to meet with foreign leaders. Also, it was easier for Tsvangirai to meet the international press from outside Zimbabwe. ¶10. (C) On Tsvangirai's ability to travel, Biti said South Africa, piqued by Tsvangirai's refusal to complete an agreement with ZANU-PF, was refusing to allow him to enter the country. Masiyiwa, on the other hand, said Tsvangirai could enter South Africa on his current travel document. But he had been harassed last time he came to South Africa because he did not have a passport, and he now refuses to travel again on the document for fear of being embarrassed by South African immigration officials. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) The MDC now has three power centers: Harare, where most of the leadership is; Gaborone, Tsvangirai's temporary home; and South Africa, where Masiyiwa and MDC treasurer Roy Bennett live. This has reduced the MDC's ability to forcefully address Zimbabwe's ongoing political, economic, and health crises; and to forge a common party position on issues. Many in the MDC believe, and we agree, that Tsvangirai should be seen in Zimbabwe leading his party, meeting with civil society leaders, and monitoring the health crisis--all things that a leader does. END COMMENT. HARARE 00001117 003 OF 003 CURTIS

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