AGENT ORANGE: DESPITE OBSTACLES, BILATERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L HANOI 001332 STATE FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/EP, EAP/RSP, EAP/PD, OES/PCI, OES/STC (EILEEN KANE) STATE PASS TO USAID FOR ANE, G/ENV STATE PASS TO EPA/OIA (DENNIS CUNNINGHAM AND MARK KASMAN) STATE PASS TO EPA/ORD (KEVIN TEICHMAN) HHS/OSSI/DSI PASS TO OGHA/HHS (STEIGER/VALDEZ/ABDOO) CDC FOR OGHA (BLOUT),NCEH (SINKS),NIOSH (SWEENEY),AND NCBDDD (BOYLE) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (SHUBERT AND VAN HOUTEN) HHS/OSSI/DSI PASS TO FIC/NIH (GLASS) AND NIEHS/NIH BANGKOK PASS TO RDMA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2013 TAGS: PREL SENV TBIO KPAO VM SUBJECT: AGENT ORANGE: DESPITE OBSTACLES, BILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL TASK FORCE PROPOSES WAY FORWARD ON DANANG REMEDIATION REF: HANOI 1088 Classified By: DCM VIRGINIA PALMER FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: At the first meeting of the Environmental Task Force (ETF),set up under the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Advisory Committee on Agent Orange and its contaminant dioxin (JAC) (Reftel),the United States and Vietnam made substantial progress towards developing a remediation work plan for Danang airport. However, the two sides have yet to come to consensus on remediation technology and cleanup levels. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Czech Republic have had similar difficulties engaging the Government of Vietnam (GVN) on remediation technology and costing estimates. The U.S. and Vietnamese delegations will continue to work together to reach agreement to possibly allow remediation to begin in early 2009. The United States informed its Vietnamese counterparts that any possible U.S. participation in remediation efforts would be conditioned upon the ability of the planned remediation to conform to U.S. practices and to USAID legal and environmental requirements. End Summary. JAC Environmental Task Force Initial Meeting -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The bilateral ETF, set up this September by the U.S.-Vietnam JAC, met from November 17-25 to agree upon remediation technology and to craft a plan to address the technical aspects of remediation at the Danang airport. U.S. participants consisted of scientists from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (including Embassy Science Fellow Tien Nguyen),USAID officials, and ESTH officer. The Vietnamese delegation included representatives from Office 33 (which coordinates Government of Vietnam (GVN) policy on Agent Orange/dioxin),and the Ministry of Defense. Dr. Le Ke Son, the Vietnamese co-chair of the JAC, took a leadership role in urging compromise solutions, even though Dr. Lai Minh ;Hien, the new Director of Office 33, technically led the Vietnamese delegation. Following this first meeting, we expect the ETF to continue to meet to review the possible Danang cleanup and other remediation issues. U.S. participation was supported by USAID using money from the 2007 Congressional appropriation. The GVN has requested the Ford Foundation to provide ongoing funding for ETF operations. General Agreement on Remediation Work Plan, but Not on Remediation Technology -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The ETF agreed on the basic structure of a remediation work plan for Danang, initially focusing on contaminated areas at the north side of the airport to facilitate the planned expansion of runways and taxiways as part of airport modernization. U.S. experts now will work to develop cost estimates for various remediation-related tasks, which will be reviewed with Vietnamese ETF members. From a technical standpoint, both sides hoped to be ready to begin work in early 2009, after the start of the dry season in Central Vietnam. However, while Vietnamese and U.S. participants concurred on breaking the clean up into smaller, more manageable, and easier to finance components, the two sides have yet to reach consensus on the applicable cleanup standards and the volume of soil to be excavated. Responding to Vietnamese concerns about timing, U.S. participants noted that the GVN can start remediation whenever it is ready, though U.S. support may not be forthcoming until a later date and might not encompass certain activities planned by the GVN. Clean Up Levels and Soil Volumes -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The Vietnamese participants argued that GVN policy for the primary "hotspots" set a clean up level of one part per billion (ppb) at the excavation site (though they were not wedded to such a stringent level for the soil after it had been transferred to treatment/landfill facilities elsewhere on site). Pursuant to U.S. practice at contaminated waste "Superfund" sites, the U.S. delegation urged performance of a risk assessment based upon the specific characteristics of the Danang airbase and the desired remediation activities to determine the cleanup level, which could range from one to twenty parts per billion. The Vietnamese side agreed to review documentation regarding risk assessments at U.S. clean up sites with similar characteristics to Danang. (Note: USAID and Embassy Science Fellow are determining if a risk assessment can be finalized quickly using already available site details). The Vietnamese delegation initially asserted that the entire area at the north end of the airport in which samples had shown elevated dioxin levels would need to be excavated to a level of 1.8 meters. Consistent with the discussion at the September JAC, EPA's Allen recommended a much smaller volume based upon his calculations of the attenuation rate of dioxin contamination to 1 ppb for the Storage and Loading/Mixing areas (for a total excavation cost of about USD 3 million). Bio-Remediation Pilot Testing Concurrent with Excavation -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) After lengthy discussion, the Vietnamese agreed with U.S. suggestions to initiate pilot testing of bio-remediation of contaminated soil at the same time excavation commences. The Vietnamese, some of whom were hesitant to support the pilot testing for fear that it might delay the excavation or that it might not work (in contrast to their optimistic pronouncements about bio-remediation technology for the past several years),urged that funding for the project not come from the remaining 2007 Congressional appropriation in order to maximize money spent on actual soil excavation. (Note: We understand that the GVN has pushed the Czech Government to fund a cleanup at Phu Cat airbase solely reliant on passive landfill technology). We have spoken with the Ford Foundation to determine whether it would be willing to finance this effort, which we estimate would take three to six months and cost USD 50,000 to USD 200,000. Complicated logistics for the study require complete buy-in and support by the ETF and JAC members. Need for Remediation to Meet U.S. Standards -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Aside from the purely technical discussions, U.S. participants stressed the need for a remediation program supported by the United States to meet certain standards and practices. First, U.S. participation must be part of a multilateral effort to address dioxin contamination. Currently, U.S. efforts at Danang are part of a broader dioxin remediation initiative with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) focusing on the Bien Hoa airbase and the Czech Republic providing technical and financial assistance for clean up efforts at the Phu Cat airport. A U.S.-supported remediation program focusing on Danang needs to incorporate other participants, including the GVN and the Ford Foundation. Second, any U.S. funded remediation effort must be consistent with U.S. practice - it should not adopt standards more strict or less protective than those used in the United States. Finally, the United States supported a work plan that led to full and final remediation of dioxin contaminated soils. Long-term containment solutions, without treatment, left open the likelihood of future Vietnamese demands for U.S. assistance should current planned land usage patterns change. We are looking for closure at the Danang airport. UNDP Complaints About GVN Remediation Cooperation Reinforce U.S. Concerns -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Subsequent to the ETF, Koos Neefjes, the UNDP senior advisor responsible for Agent Orange/dioxin issues, expressed his concern about recent GVN Agent Orange/dioxin-related actions. In particular, Neefjes noted the GVN's refusal to respond to a report on remediation technologies in Vietnam authored for UNDP by one of the world's foremost dioxin authorities. The GVN did not seem interested in a scientific discussion, but instead expected UNDP to sign checks and leave all implementation decisions to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). UNDP cannot operate this way and, in fact, will only be able to support remediation piloting -- not the large-scale cleanups the GVN expects. His concerns reinforce some of our apprehension about the seeming about-face by the GVN on remediation technologies and its hesitance to agree to any form of remediation beyond a passive landfill. While the GVN appeared to finally agree to bio-remediation testing during the ETF, we worry that the MOD, in particular, will drag its heels. Similarly, seemingly high initial costing estimates provided by MOD for soil excavation are consistent with Neefjes' recitation of requests for unnecessary funds for workshops and his report that the GVN provided similarly high numbers to the Czechs and refused to discuss Czech remediation suggestions (Note: We have reached out to the Czechs, but have not yet discussed these concerns). Comment -------------- ¶8. (SBU) As we move into the specifics of possible cooperation on dioxin remediation efforts, we continue to try to manage Vietnamese expectations on financial support, timing, and the scope of U.S. participation. We will consider working in partnership with the GVN and other donors. We will not accept GVN technical and costing assumptions that do not seem credible to our technical experts. Any possible assistance must meet USAID requirements, while remaining consistent with ongoing U.S. remediation practices. We are finalizing the work plan (with costing estimates) that will allow for a full discussion within the USG. of what we might be able to attain with the remainder of the 2007 USD 3 million appropriation, estimated at 1.5 million. Finally, we are also trying to navigate the changed landscape within the GVN Agent Orange/dioxin decision-making structure as our longtime interlocutor, Dr. Son, seemingly battles to maintain primacy with his replacements in Office 33. Given Dr. Son's consistent support for closer cooperation and our impression that new Office 33 Director Hien more closely toes MOD positions, we want to see Dr. Son succeed. End Comment. MICHALAK