VIETNAMESE RESPONSE TO MELAMINE CONTAMINATION SHOWS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 001320 SENSITIVE SIPDIS HHS/OSSI/DSI PASS TO OGHA AND FDA CDC FOR COGH AND CCEHIP/NCEH E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EAGR SENV TBIO EFIN ETRD VM SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE RESPONSE TO MELAMINE CONTAMINATION SHOWS CONTINUED WEAKNESSES IN FOOD SAFETY REGULATION REF: A. HANOI 398; B. HANOI 409; C. HANOI 694; D. HANOI 588; E. 07 HANOI 2012; F. HO CHI MINH CITY 915 HANOI 00001320 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (U) Summary. Recent discoveries of melamine contamination in milk products, eggs and animal feed imported from China highlight gaps in Vietnam's food safety import programs. Though the Government of Vietnam (GVN) eventually located, sampled, and tested thousands of products, its initial reaction was to deny that it had allowed the importation of suspect Chinese dairy products, changing its position only when confronted by local media and consumers with evidence of those products on market shelves. The resulting discovery of thousands of tons of dairy products of unknown origin raised additional concerns about the capacity of the Vietnamese food safety and inspection system. The situation is made worse by the continuing flow of licit and illicit shipments of suspect products from China, a particular concern now that melamine contamination has been found in Chinese poultry products. The Ministry of Health (MOH) has taken a zero concentration tolerance approach to melamine, which appears more stringent than standards adopted elsewhere around the world, including the United States. The U.S. Embassy has offered to assist the GVN to respond to legitimate health concerns without unduly restricting imports. End Summary. FIRST, MELAMINE CONTAMINATED MILK PRODUCTS FROM CHINA -------------- ¶2. (U) In early October, after initially stating that blacklisted Chinese milk products had not been allowed to enter Vietnam, the central Bureau for Food Safety and Hygiene of MOH ordered expanded product safety testing after local reporters documented the importation and sale of hundreds of tons of Chinese-origin milk. Milk imports included those from three firms known to have sold tainted milk in China: Sanlu, Yili and Longcom. (Note: Chinese firms exported substantial amounts of milk products to Vietnam). Testing confirmed that several batches of milk products imported from China contained melamine. Inspections also turned up many tons of milk powder of dubious origin, highlighting the difficulty in tracking and managing the path of various food products on their way to consumers. As of mid-November, MOH had announced the detection of 33 melamine-contaminated products in Vietnam, including five tons of powdered milk just imported into the country by a trading company in Ho Chi Minh City. THEN, CONTAMINATED ANIMAL FEED -------------- ¶3. (U) Following the discovery of contaminated milk products, local media reported that the Ho Chi Minh City Department of Science and Technology detected melamine in 80 out of 400 animal feed samples imported from China. Soon thereafter, tests on 240 tons of fish meal imported from China found traces melamine some containing up to two parts per million (ppm) of melamine. (Note: The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) standard is 2.5 ppm of melamine per kilogram of food products. End note.) GVN tested farmed fish raised on contaminated feed and found no melamine in the fish. The Vietnamese press also reported of melamine found in eggs smuggled from China. To date, there are no reports of domestically produced milk products, animal feed or related goods have been found to contain melamine. Unlike China, Vietnam does not have a substantial domestic milk production sector and does not require testing for protein content in the processing of dairy products; therefore there is not the same incentive to add melamine to those products. GVN CONSULTED WITH WHO AND FAO -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Once confronted with clear evidence of melamine contamination, GVN health officials turned to the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) for assistance in preparing a response and prevent consumer panic. WHO and FAO recommended that consumers only chose products verified as not containing melamine and with proper packaging, labels and origin clearly displayed. WHO sent two Vietnamese technicians to Singapore for training to detect melamine contamination. GVN RESPONSE TO MELAMINE CONTAMINATION OF MILK PRODUCTS -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Following consultations with WHO and FAO, MOH established inter-ministerial teams to conduct inspections, suspended the HANOI 00001320 002.2 OF 003 distribution of all milk products without a clear origin and brand name, and standardized melamine testing methods. Many local stores simply pulled off the shelves all milk products with a Chinese connection. GVN officials subsequently penalized many small traders for trading milk without labels or of dubious origin. In late October, Vietnamese officials announced plans to return over 393 tons of melamine-contaminated milk powder imported from China and destroy 384 tons of contaminated liquid milk and milk ingredients, also from China. A ZERO TOLERANCE APPROACH -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Despite WHO advice to adopt international standards, which generally allow minimal presence of melamine in food products, Vietnam adopted a standard allowing no detectable concentration of melamine in dairy products in Vietnam. This contrasts with the general international threshold (consistent with U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) policy) of 2.5 ppm of melamine per kilogram of food products and 1 ppm for infant formula. MELAMINE BEYOND DAIRY PRODUCTS -------------- ¶7. (U) Following the news of possible contamination of imported Chinese poultry products, Vietnam began inspecting eggs and animal feeds throughout the country and required all shipments of animal feed imported into the country to present certificates of origin to customs offices. Local supermarkets requested egg suppliers to provide free-melamine certificates with the products sold in their markets. The GVN then announced plans to cordon-off affected farms and destroy the feed. Initial testing has not found any melamine contamination in samples taken from Ho Chi Minh City supermarkets. CONSUMPTION CONTINUES, REGARDLESS OF SAFETY CONCERNS -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Despite wide media coverage of melamine contamination and a broad, though somewhat delayed GVN response, Vietnamese consumers still face exposure to melamine-contaminated goods, including poultry products illegally smuggled from China. (Note: this is not the first public health issue involving smuggled Chinese poultry, as chickens smuggled into Vietnam from China repeatedly have tested positive for the H5N1 highly pathogenic strain of avian influenza, Refs A and B). Additionally, low-income Vietnamese consumers find it hard to resist low-priced imports. In contrast, the urban emerging middle class, particularly in Ho Chi Minh City, is voting with their paycheck. Large Vietnamese retail chains like Saigon Coop, which controls about 40 percent of Vietnam's modern retail sector, say that their store orders indicate that greater numbers of Vietnamese consumers are switching to high-quality U.S. products despite their price. U.S. ACTIONS -------------- ¶9. (SBU) U.S. milk product exports to Vietnam approach USD 100 million per year. Embassy Agricultural Attache drafted a letter to the MOH's Vietnam Food Administration offering to assist GVN efforts to prevent adulteration, while requesting that Vietnam rely upon realistic science-based analysis that will not unduly impede the delivery of imported milk products to Vietnamese consumers. The VFA responded that it appreciated the offer of assistance and would notify the U.S. Embassy if it received any approvals for new regulations related to melamine. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Vietnam faces an uphill battle to regulate domestic food safety: long, porous borders, low technical capacity and a history of traditional (versus modern) retail (Refs C, D and E) mean that GVN authorities do not have the capacity to track imports adequately or to implement a comprehensive inspection scheme. Interestingly, Vietnam's domestic food safety regulators are beginning to learn from Vietnam's exporters that comprehensive supply chain management and rigorous testing are both key to maintaining markets. Vietnamese companies are keen to learn more on how to protect their brands -- as demonstrated by the hundreds of businesses that turned HANOI 00001320 003.2 OF 003 out for the U.S. Consumer Products Safety Commission seminars on U.S. product safety standards this September (ref F). At the same time, a zero-tolerance approach is designed to fail. Vietnam is unlikely to prevent imports of legitimate products that meet international standards, and it will likely create incentives to smuggle products into the country. There is no quick solution to Vietnam's food safety deficiencies. While GVN announced a major program last year to improve capacity for food safety to improve overall monitoring, testing and enforcement, little donor support has come to the table. ¶11. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate General Ho Chi Minh City. MICHALAK