SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN VIETNAM'S RUSSIA POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 001163 SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR EAP/MLS, EUR/RUS, S/P (GREEN) E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD RS VM SUBJECT: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN VIETNAM'S RUSSIA POLICY REF: A. MOSCOW 2969 ¶B. HANOI 1094 ¶C. HANOI 1003 HANOI 00001163 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Counselor Brian Aggeler. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Relations with Russia occupy an important, but by no means central place in Vietnam's foreign policy. An influential generation of policymakers continues to hold surprisingly warm feelings toward Russia, and ties have improved steadily since the Yeltsin years. But long gone are the days when Vietnam was forced to rely on the Soviet Union as its sole international benefactor. Even as it seeks to deepen its relations with Russia, particularly in the areas of trade and investment, Vietnam does so in the context of an overall foreign policy that seeks to diversify bilateral relationships and to enmesh these in a framework of multilateral engagement. There are few illusions that Vietnam can "balance" China with Russia. Similarly, while many in Vietnam's foreign policy establishment might sympathize with Russian positions, say, on Kosovo and Georgia, Hanoi's decision-making remains grounded in an unsentimental calculus of national interest. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) A note on sources: This cable draws on conversations September 24-October 6 with officials from the MFA and Russian Embassy, as well as with a range of Embassy sources including Institute for European Studies Director Nguyen Quang Thuan, VietnamNet Chairman Nguyen Anh Tuan, Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies Deputy Director General Luan Thuy Duong, and retired "People's Army" Editor Colonel Tran Nhung. (Please protect all.) IMPROVING TIES... -------------- ¶3. (C) Echoing the positive assessment from Russia's MFA (ref. A),Vietnam's MFA and Russian Embassy officials in Hanoi pointed to DPM/FM Pham Gia Khiem's September 13-16 visit to Moscow -- the first such visit in seven years -- as a step forward in solidifying the two country's "Strategic Partnership." The Chief of the MFA's Russia-CIS Section Pham Thi Ngoc Bich described a supportive relationship uncomplicated by major disagreements, and cited recent accords to allow visa-free travel by Russian citizens and discussions on expanding trade and energy cooperation as evidence of an increasingly robust �A;relationship. In addition to their formal biannual strategic dialogue, the two sides consult regularly at the UN Security Council and through the ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC. According to Nguyen Quang Thuan, who directs the Institute for European Studies at the state-affiliated Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences (VASS),the Vietnamese Politburo recently issued a directive instructing the MFA to place more of an emphasis on relations with Russia. ...AND A CERTAIN STRANGE NOSTALGIA -------------- ¶4. (C) Many Vietnamese maintain warm personal feelings toward Russia, dating from Vietnam's years as a stalwart member of the Soviet bloc. This is particularly true for an influential generation of officials, mostly northerners, who received training in Moscow or elsewhere in the Soviet Union and now occupy senior positions throughout the Party and state apparatus. Topping the list are CPV General Secretary Nong Duc Manh, who studied Forestry at Leningrad from 1966 to 1971; Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh, who attended the Voroshilov Military Academy in 1989; and National Assembly Chairman Nguyen Phu Trong and Hanoi Party Chief Pham Quang Nghi, who did post-graduate work at the Soviet Academy of Social Sciences in the 1980s. But the influence goes much deeper, extending beyond the Party and state ministries, to local administration, the arts, and academia. While few would want to relive the international isolation and economic hardship that marked that period in Vietnam's history, to this day many middle-aged Hanoians profess appreciation for Soviet support and a surprising degree of nostalgia for their student days. HANOI 00001163 002.2 OF 003 ¶5. (C) Caveats are in order, of course. Sentimentalism toward Russia is largely a northern phenomenon, characteristic of an aging generation. Even the most ardent proponents of Vietnam-Russian ties, such as Bich, Dr. Tuan, and Russian Embassy Counselor Vadim Bublikov and Second Secretary Andrey Kobylayatskiy -- on their third and second tour in Hanoi, respectively - recognize that English is now the second language of choice for most young Vietnamese, followed by Chinese. As the on-line media entrepreneur Nguyen Anh Tuan, fresh from a trip to Russia, noted, market economics and an increasingly globalized culture have significantly diminished Russia's appeal. Still, as Tuan and our other contacts emphasized, this demographic, while limited and growing older, remains heavily represented in the state and CPV bureaucracies. A DIFFERENT ERA BRINGS DIFFERENT PRIORITIES -------------- ¶6. (C) Still, both the MFA's Bich and VASS's Thuan conceded that Vietnam's relations with Russia do not occupy a central place in either country's foreign policy, a point the Russian diplomats also emphasized. The two countries' USD one billion in bilateral trade is dwarfed by Vietnam's trade with the United States, the EU, and China. A different era brings different priorities, the Deputy Director General of the MFA'S Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Luan Thuy Duong, stated frankly. Vietnam's strategic priorities are China and to a lesser extent the United States, Dr. Duong explained, and while Vietnam seeks friendly relations with other important countries such as Russia, it does so in the context of an overall foreign policy approach that stresses a diversity of bilateral ties and Vietnam's integration into international organizations. PLAYING THE "RUSSIA CARD"? -------------- ¶7. (C) China's Embassy sits opposite Lenin Park, and as Colonel Tran Nhung, the well-connected former editor of the army daily Quan Doi Nhan Dan joked, the triangular shape of the park is symbolic of the geo-strategy of the 1970s and 1980s: A large Lenin statue at one end, the PRC Embassy at another, and the Citadel occupied by Vietnam's Ministry of Defense at the third. But this strategic triangle, such as it was, is now a thing of the past, Colonel Nhung stressed. While no one in Vietnam's defense and foreign policy establishment completely trusts China, there are no illusions about Vietnam's ability to play Russia -- or the United States for that matter -- against China. Echoing Dr. Duong and others familiar with Vietnam's China policy (ref. B),Colonel Nhung said the wisest approach for Vietnam remains to maintain as cordial and stable a relationship with China as possible, while also cautiously cultivating a diverse range of bilateral friendships. GEORGIA -------------- ¶8. (C) The tension between sentiment and realpolitik can be seen in Vietnam's position on Georgia. In more than one meeting, Russian diplomats expressed confidence that Vietnam's leadership sympathizes with Russia's position on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a point reinforced in conversations with our MFA and think tank contacts. VFM Pham Binh Minh said as much when he stated that Vietnam would refuse to condemn Russia for its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, arguing that the crisis was initiated by Georgia and justifying Russia's actions as a direct consequence of a U.S.-led drive to recognize Kosovo's independence (ref. C). Still, in practical terms, this sympathy has meant very little. There is no prospect that Vietnam will recognize either of the breakaway regions, a fact that Russia's diplomats frankly acknowledge. As reported in ref A, at the conclusion of his Moscow visit, DPM/FM Khiem did little more than restate the tepid formula adopted at the August 28 Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Dushanbe that simply affirmed support for Russia's role in "strengthening peace and cooperation." HANOI 00001163 003.2 OF 003 COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Overall, our contacts seem pleased with the state of Vietnam-Russian relations and are not plagued by overly ambitious expectations. Nostalgia aside, Vietnam has never been comfortable relying on one patron, and most see Hanoi's ties to Moscow today as balanced and appropriate. The one source of anxiety, expressed by individuals both in and outside of government, has less to do with Vietnam's relations with Russia than with what they perceive as increased tensions between Moscow and Washington. Several expressed concern that the United States and Russia are on the brink of a new arms race. Oddly, this fear comes back to China: discord between the United States and Russia, they reason, could strengthen China's position regionally. The logic is far from airtight, but it suggests a fundamental unease underlying Vietnam's "friends to all" foreign policy. PALMER